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<front> <front>
<title abbrev="Statement of Private Key Possession">An Attribute for Stateme nt of Possession of a Private Key</title> <title abbrev="Statement of Private Key Possession">An Attribute for Stateme nt of Possession of a Private Key</title>
<seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-lamps-private-key-stmt-a ttr-09"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9883"/>
<author initials="R." surname="Housley" fullname="Russ Housley"> <author initials="R." surname="Housley" fullname="Russ Housley">
<organization abbrev="Vigil Security">Vigil Security, LLC</organization> <organization abbrev="Vigil Security">Vigil Security, LLC</organization>
<address> <address>
<postal> <postal>
<city>Herndon, VA</city> <city>Herndon</city><region>VA</region>
<country>US</country> <country>United States of America</country>
</postal> </postal>
<email>housley@vigilsec.com</email> <email>housley@vigilsec.com</email>
</address> </address>
</author> </author>
<date year="2025" month="June" day="26"/> <date year="2025" month="October"/>
<area>Security</area> <area>SEC</area>
<keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword> <workgroup>lamps</workgroup>
<abstract>
<?line 61?>
<abstract>
<t>This document specifies an attribute for a statement of possession of a priva te key <t>This document specifies an attribute for a statement of possession of a priva te key
by a certificate subject. As part of X.509 certificate enrollment, a Certificat ion by a certificate subject. As part of X.509 certificate enrollment, a Certificat ion
Authority (CA) typically demands proof that the subject possesses the private ke y Authority (CA) typically demands proof that the subject possesses the private ke y
that corresponds to the to-be-certified public key. In some cases, a CA might a ccept that corresponds to the to-be-certified public key. In some cases, a CA might a ccept
a signed statement from the certificate subject. For example, when a certificat e a signed statement from the certificate subject. For example, when a certificat e
subject needs separate certificates for signature and key establishment, a state ment subject needs separate certificates for signature and key establishment, a state ment
that can be validated with the previously issued signature certificate for the s ame that can be validated with the previously issued signature certificate for the s ame
subject might be adequate for subsequent issuance of the key establishment certi ficate.</t> subject might be adequate for subsequent issuance of the key establishment certi ficate.</t>
</abstract> </abstract>
</front> </front>
skipping to change at line 57 skipping to change at line 56
private key by a certificate subject. X.509 certificate <xref target="RFC5280"/ > private key by a certificate subject. X.509 certificate <xref target="RFC5280"/ >
enrollment often depends on PKCS#10 <xref target="RFC2986"/> or the Certificate enrollment often depends on PKCS#10 <xref target="RFC2986"/> or the Certificate
Request Message Format (CRMF) <xref target="RFC4211"/>. As part of enrollment, a Request Message Format (CRMF) <xref target="RFC4211"/>. As part of enrollment, a
Certification Authority (CA) typically demands proof that the subject Certification Authority (CA) typically demands proof that the subject
possesses the private key that corresponds to the to-be-certified public possesses the private key that corresponds to the to-be-certified public
key. Alternatively, a CA may accept a signed statement from the key. Alternatively, a CA may accept a signed statement from the
certificate subject claiming knowledge of that private key. When a certificate subject claiming knowledge of that private key. When a
certificate subject needs separate certificates for signature and key certificate subject needs separate certificates for signature and key
establishment, a signed statement that can be validated with the establishment, a signed statement that can be validated with the
previously issued signature certificate for the same subject might be previously issued signature certificate for the same subject might be
adequate for subsequent issuance of the key establishment certificate.</t> adequate for subsequent issuance of the key establishment certificate.</t>
<t>For example, a subject may need a signature certificate that contains a
ML-DSA <t>For example, a subject may need a signature certificate that contains a
n ML-DSA
(Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm) public key and a key (Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm) public key and a key
establishment certificate that contains a ML-KEM (Module-Lattice-Based establishment certificate that contains an ML-KEM (Module-Lattice-Based
Key-Encapsulation Mechanism) public key. For another example, a subject may Key-Encapsulation Mechanism) public key. For another example, a subject may
need a signature certificate that contains a ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital need a signature certificate that contains an ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm) public key and a key establishment certificate that Signature Algorithm) public key and a key establishment certificate that
contains a ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman) public key.</t> contains an ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman) public key.</t>
<t>A statement of possession may be used in lieu of the usual proof of <t>A statement of possession may be used in lieu of the usual proof-of-pos
possession mechanisms. The statement is simply a signed assertion that session mechanisms. The statement is simply a signed assertion that
the requestor of a key establishment certificate has possession of the the requestor of a key establishment certificate has possession of the
key establishment private key, and that statement is signed using a key establishment private key and that statement is signed using a
signature private key that was previously shown to be in the possession signature private key that was previously shown to be in the possession
of the same certificate subject. If allowed by the Certificate Policy of the same certificate subject. If allowed by the Certificate Policy
<xref target="RFC3647"/>, the CA is permitted to accept this statement in lieu o f proof <xref target="RFC3647"/>, the CA is permitted to accept this statement in lieu o f proof
that the requestor has possession of the private key, such as <xref target="RFC6 955"/>.</t> that the requestor has possession of the private key, such as <xref target="RFC6 955"/>.</t>
<t>Note that <xref target="RFC6955"/> offers some algorithms that provide proof of possession for <t>Note that <xref target="RFC6955"/> offers some algorithms that provide proof of possession for
Diffie-Hellman private keys; however, these algorithms are not suitable for use Diffie-Hellman private keys; however, these algorithms are not suitable for use
with PKCS#10 <xref target="RFC2986"/>. In addition, the algorithms in <xref tar get="RFC6955"/> do not with PKCS#10 <xref target="RFC2986"/>. In addition, the algorithms in <xref tar get="RFC6955"/> do not
support key encapsulation mechanism algorithms, such as ML-KEM. The attribute support key encapsulation mechanism algorithms, such as ML-KEM. The attribute
specified in this document, on the other hand, is suitable for use with both specified in this document, on the other hand, is suitable for use with both
PKCS#10 and the CRMF <xref target="RFC4211"/>.</t> PKCS#10 and the CRMF <xref target="RFC4211"/>.</t>
<section anchor="asn1"> <section anchor="asn1">
<name>ASN.1</name> <name>ASN.1</name>
<t>The attribute defined in this document is generated using ASN.1 <xref target="X680"/>, using <t>The attribute defined in this document is generated using ASN.1 <xref target="X680"/>, using
the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) <xref target="X690"/>.</t> the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) <xref target="X690"/>.</t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="terminology"> <section anchor="terminology">
<name>Terminology</name> <name>Terminology</name>
<t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp <t>
14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQU
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECO IRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
MMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be i RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
nterpreted as "<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and be interpreted as
only when, they described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/>
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t> when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
<?line -18?> </t>
</section> </section>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="overview"> <section anchor="overview">
<name>Overview</name> <name>Overview</name>
<t>When using the attribute defined in this document to make a statement a bout the <t>When using the attribute defined in this document to make a statement a bout the
possession of the key establishment private key, the process to obtain two possession of the key establishment private key, the process to obtain two
certificates with PKCS#10 is:</t> certificates with PKCS#10 is as follows:</t>
<ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li> <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
<t>The subject generates the signature key pair.</t> <t>The subject generates the signature key pair.</t>
</li> </li>
<li> <li>
<t>The subject composes a PKCS#10 Certificate Signing Request (CSR) in the usual <t>The subject composes a PKCS#10 Certificate Signing Request (CSR) in the usual
manner. It includes a signature that is produced with the private key from manner. It includes a signature that is produced with the private key from
step 1.</t> step 1.</t>
</li> </li>
<li> <li>
<t>The subject sends the CSR to the CA, and it gets back a signature c ertificate. <t>The subject sends the CSR to the CA, and it gets back a signature c ertificate.
skipping to change at line 138 skipping to change at line 137
<t>In general, the issuer of the key establishment certificate will be the same <t>In general, the issuer of the key establishment certificate will be the same
as the issuer of the signature certificate. If the issuers of the two certifica tes as the issuer of the signature certificate. If the issuers of the two certifica tes
will be different, then the certificate policy of the issuer of the key establis hment will be different, then the certificate policy of the issuer of the key establis hment
certificate <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> explain the procedure that is used to verify the subject and certificate <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> explain the procedure that is used to verify the subject and
subject alternative names.</t> subject alternative names.</t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="attr"> <section anchor="attr">
<name>Attribute for Statement of Possession of a Private Key</name> <name>Attribute for Statement of Possession of a Private Key</name>
<t>The attribute for statement of possession of a private key is included in a <t>The attribute for statement of possession of a private key is included in a
certificate request to make the following statement:</t> certificate request to make the following statement:</t>
<ul empty="true">
<li> <t indent="3">The subject of the signature certificate that is used to
<t>The subject of the signature certificate that is used to
validate the signature on this certificate request states, validate the signature on this certificate request states,
without providing proof, that it has possession of the without providing proof, that it has possession of the
private key that corresponds to the public key in the private key that corresponds to the public key in the
certificate request.</t> certificate request.</t>
</li>
</ul>
<t>The CA <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> perform certification path validation for th e signature <t>The CA <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> perform certification path validation for th e signature
certificate as specified in <xref section="6" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC5280 "/>. If the certification certificate as specified in <xref section="6" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC5280 "/>. If the certification
path is not valid, then the CA <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject the request for the ke y path is not valid, then the CA <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject the request for the ke y
establishment certificate.</t> establishment certificate.</t>
<t>The CA <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> validate the signature on the certificate re quest using the <t>The CA <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> validate the signature on the certificate re quest using the
public key from the signature certificate. If the signature is not valid, public key from the signature certificate. If the signature is not valid,
then the CA <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject the certificate request.</t> then the CA <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject the certificate request.</t>
<t>The subject in the signature certificate <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be the s ame as the subject name <t>The subject in the signature certificate <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be the s ame as the subject name
in the certificate request. If they are different, the certificate policy <bcp1 4>MUST</bcp14> in the certificate request. If they are different, the certificate policy <bcp1 4>MUST</bcp14>
describe how the CA can determine that the two subject names identify the same describe how the CA can determine that the two subject names identify the same
entity. If the CA is unable to determine that the two subject names identify entity. If the CA is unable to determine that the two subject names identify
the same entity, then the CA <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject the certificate request. </t> the same entity, then the CA <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject the certificate request. </t>
<t>If subject alternative names are present in the certificate request, th ey <t>If subject alternative names are present in the certificate request, th ey
<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> match subject alternative names in the signature certifica te. If they <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> match subject alternative names in the signature certifica te. If they
are different, the certificate policy <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> describe how the CA ca n determine that are different, the certificate policy <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> describe how the CA ca n determine that
the two subject alternative names identify the same entity. If the CA the two subject alternative names identify the same entity. If the CA
is unable to determine that each of subject alternative names identifies is unable to determine that each of subject alternative names identifies
the same entity as is named in the signature certificate, then the CA <bcp14>MUS T</bcp14> the same entity as is named in the signature certificate, then the CA <bcp14>MUS T</bcp14>
reject the certificate request.</t> reject the certificate request.</t>
<t>When the CA rejects a certificate request for any of the reasons listed <t>When the CA rejects a certificate request for any of the reasons listed
above, the CA should provide information to the requester about the reason above, the CA should provide information to the requestor about the reason
for the rejection to aid with diagnostic efforts. Likewise, the CA should for the rejection to aid with diagnostic efforts. Likewise, the CA should
log the rejection events.</t> log the rejection events.</t>
<t>The attribute for statement of possession of a private key has the foll owing <t>The attribute for statement of possession of a private key has the foll owing
structure:</t> structure:</t>
<sourcecode type="asn.1"><![CDATA[ <sourcecode type="asn.1"><![CDATA[
id-at-statementOfPossession OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-at-statementOfPossession OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ 1 3 6 1 4 1 22112 2 1 } { 1 3 6 1 4 1 22112 2 1 }
privateKeyPossessionStatement ATTRIBUTE ::= { privateKeyPossessionStatement ATTRIBUTE ::= {
TYPE PrivateKeyPossessionStatement TYPE PrivateKeyPossessionStatement
IDENTIFIED BY id-at-statementOfPossession } IDENTIFIED BY id-at-statementOfPossession }
PrivateKeyPossessionStatement ::= SEQUENCE { PrivateKeyPossessionStatement ::= SEQUENCE {
signer IssuerAndSerialNumber, signer IssuerAndSerialNumber,
cert Certificate OPTIONAL } cert Certificate OPTIONAL }]]></sourcecode>
]]></sourcecode>
<t>The components of the PrivateKeyStatement SEQUENCE have the following s emantics:</t> <t>The components of the PrivateKeyStatement SEQUENCE have the following s emantics:</t>
<ul empty="true">
<li> <dl spacing="normal" newline="false">
<dl>
<dt>signer:</dt> <dt>signer:</dt>
<dd> <dd>
<t>the issuer name and certificate serial number of the signature certificate.</t> <t>The issuer name and certificate serial number of the signature certificate.</t>
</dd> </dd>
</dl>
</li>
</ul>
<ul empty="true">
<li>
<dl>
<dt>cert:</dt> <dt>cert:</dt>
<dd> <dd>
<t>the signature certificate. If the issuer of the key establishm ent certificate <t>The signature certificate. If the issuer of the key establishm ent certificate
will be the same as the issuer of the signature certificate, then this will be the same as the issuer of the signature certificate, then this
component <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be omitted. When the signature certificate is omit ted, the component <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be omitted. When the signature certificate is omit ted, the
signer is assuming that the CA has a mechanism to obtain all valid signer is assuming that the CA has a mechanism to obtain all valid
certificates that it issued.</t> certificates that it issued.</t>
</dd> </dd>
</dl> </dl>
</li>
</ul>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="conventions-for-pkcs10"> <section anchor="conventions-for-pkcs10">
<name>Conventions for PKCS#10</name> <name>Conventions for PKCS#10</name>
<t>This section specifies the conventions for using the attribute for stat ement <t>This section specifies the conventions for using the attribute for stat ement
of possession of a private key with PKCS#10 <xref target="RFC2986"/> when reques ting a of possession of a private key with PKCS#10 <xref target="RFC2986"/> when reques ting a
key establishment certificate.</t> key establishment certificate.</t>
<t>The PKCS#10 CertificationRequest always has three components, as follow s:</t> <t>The PKCS#10 CertificationRequest always has three components, as follow s:</t>
<ul empty="true">
<li> <dl spacing="normal" newline="false">
<dl>
<dt>certificationRequestInfo:</dt> <dt>certificationRequestInfo:</dt>
<dd> <dd>
<t>the subject name <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be the same as the subje ct name in the signature certificate, <t>The subject name <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be the same as the subje ct name in the signature certificate,
the subjectPKInfo <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain the public key for the key establi shment algorithm, the subjectPKInfo <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain the public key for the key establi shment algorithm,
and the attributes <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include privateKeyPossessionStatement att ribute as specified and the attributes <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include privateKeyPossessionStatement att ribute as specified
in <xref target="attr"/> of this document.</t> in <xref target="attr"/> of this document.</t>
</dd> </dd>
</dl>
</li>
</ul>
<ul empty="true">
<li>
<dl>
<dt>signatureAlgorithm:</dt> <dt>signatureAlgorithm:</dt>
<dd> <dd>
<t>the signature algorithm <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be one that can be validated with the public key <t>The signature algorithm <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be one that can be validated with the public key
in the signature certificate.</t> in the signature certificate.</t>
</dd> </dd>
</dl>
</li>
</ul>
<ul empty="true">
<li>
<dl>
<dt>signature:</dt> <dt>signature:</dt>
<dd> <dd>
<t>the signature over certificationRequestInfo <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> validate with the public key <t>The signature over certificationRequestInfo <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> validate with the public key
in the signature certificate, and certification path validation for the signatur e in the signature certificate, and certification path validation for the signatur e
certificate <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be successful as specified in <xref section="6" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC5280"/>.</t> certificate <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be successful as specified in <xref section="6" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC5280"/>.</t>
</dd> </dd>
</dl> </dl>
</li>
</ul>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="conventions-for-crmf"> <section anchor="conventions-for-crmf">
<name>Conventions for CRMF</name> <name>Conventions for CRMF</name>
<t>This section specifies the conventions for using the attribute for stat ement <t>This section specifies the conventions for using the attribute for stat ement
of possession of a private key with the CRMF <xref target="RFC4211"/> when reque sting a key of possession of a private key with the CRMF <xref target="RFC4211"/> when reque sting a key
establishment certificate.</t> establishment certificate.</t>
<t>The following ASN.1 types are defined for use with CRMF. They have exa ctly <t>The following ASN.1 types are defined for use with CRMF. They have exa ctly
the same semantics and syntax as the attribute discussed above, but they the same semantics and syntax as the attribute discussed above, but they
offer a similar naming convention to the Registration Controls in <xref target=" RFC4211"/>.</t> offer a similar naming convention to the Registration Controls in <xref target=" RFC4211"/>.</t>
<sourcecode type="asn.1"><![CDATA[ <sourcecode type="asn.1"><![CDATA[
regCtrl-privateKeyPossessionStatement ATTRIBUTE ::= regCtrl-privateKeyPossessionStatement ATTRIBUTE ::=
privateKeyPossessionStatement privateKeyPossessionStatement
id-regCtrl-statementOfPossession OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-regCtrl-statementOfPossession OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
id-at-statementOfPossession id-at-statementOfPossession]]></sourcecode>
]]></sourcecode>
<t>The CRMF CertificationRequest always has three components, as follows:< /t> <t>The CRMF CertificationRequest always has three components, as follows:< /t>
<ul empty="true">
<li> <dl spacing="normal" newline="false">
<dl>
<dt>certReq:</dt> <dt>certReq:</dt>
<dd> <dd>
<t>the certTemplate <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include the subject and th e publicKey components. The <t>The certTemplate <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include the subject and th e publicKey components. The
same subject name <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> match the subject name in the signature certificate, and same subject name <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> match the subject name in the signature certificate, and
publicKey <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain the public key for the key establishment a lgorithm.</t> publicKey <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain the public key for the key establishment a lgorithm.</t>
</dd> </dd>
</dl>
</li>
</ul>
<ul empty="true">
<li>
<dl>
<dt>popo:</dt> <dt>popo:</dt>
<dd> <dd>
<t>the ProofOfPossession <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use the signature CHO ICE, <t>The ProofOfPossession <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use the signature CHO ICE,
the poposkInput <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be present, POPOSigningKeyInput.authInfo <bc p14>MUST</bcp14> use the poposkInput <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be present, POPOSigningKeyInput.authInfo <bc p14>MUST</bcp14> use
the sender CHOICE, the sender <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be set to the subject name t hat appears in the sender CHOICE, the sender <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be set to the subject name t hat appears in
the signature certificate, the publicKey <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain a copy of t he public the signature certificate, the publicKey <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain a copy of t he public
key from the certTemplate, the algorithmIdentifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> identify a signature key from the certTemplate, the algorithmIdentifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> identify a signature
algorithm that can be validated with the public key in the signature certificate , algorithm that can be validated with the public key in the signature certificate ,
signature over the poposkInput <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> validate with the public key in the signature the signature over the poposkInput <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> validate with the public key in the signature
certificate, and certification path validation for the signature certificate certificate, and certification path validation for the signature certificate
<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be successful as specified in <xref section="6" sectionForma t="of" target="RFC5280"/>.</t> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be successful as specified in <xref section="6" sectionForma t="of" target="RFC5280"/>.</t>
</dd> </dd>
</dl>
</li>
</ul>
<ul empty="true">
<li>
<dl>
<dt>regInfo:</dt> <dt>regInfo:</dt>
<dd> <dd>
<t>the attributes <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include privateKeyPossession Statement attribute as specified <t>The attributes <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include the privateKeyPosses sionStatement attribute as specified
in <xref target="attr"/> of this document.</t> in <xref target="attr"/> of this document.</t>
</dd> </dd>
</dl> </dl>
</li>
</ul>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="security-considerations"> <section anchor="security-considerations">
<name>Security Considerations</name> <name>Security Considerations</name>
<t>The privateKeyPossessionStatement attribute <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used to obtain a <t>The privateKeyPossessionStatement attribute <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used to obtain a
signature certificate. Performing proof of possession of the signature signature certificate. Performing proof of possession of the signature
private key is easily accomplished by signing the certificate request.</t> private key is easily accomplished by signing the certificate request.</t>
<t>The subject is signing privateKeyPossessionStatement attribute to tell the CA that it has <t>The subject is signing the privateKeyPossessionStatement attribute to t ell the CA that it has
possession of the key establishment private key. This is being done instead of possession of the key establishment private key. This is being done instead of
providing technical proof of possession. If the subject has lost control providing technical proof of possession. If the subject has lost control
of the signature private key, then the signed privateKeyPossessionStatement attr ibute of the signature private key, then the signed privateKeyPossessionStatement attr ibute
could be generated by some other party. Timely revocation of the compromised could be generated by some other party. Timely revocation of the compromised
signature certificate is the only protection against such loss of control.</t> signature certificate is the only protection against such loss of control.</t>
<t>If the CA revokes a compromised signature certificate, then the CA <bcp 14>SHOULD</bcp14> <t>If the CA revokes a compromised signature certificate, then the CA <bcp 14>SHOULD</bcp14>
also revoke all key establishment certificates that were obtained with also revoke all key establishment certificates that were obtained with
privateKeyPossessionStatement attributes signed by that compromised signature privateKeyPossessionStatement attributes signed by that compromised signature
certificate.</t> certificate.</t>
<t>The signature key pair and the key establishment key pair are expected to have <t>The signature key pair and the key establishment key pair are expected to have
roughly the same security strength. To ensure that the signature on the stateme nt roughly the same security strength. To ensure that the signature on the stateme nt
is not the weakest part of the certificate enrollment, the signature key pair <b cp14>SHOULD</bcp14> is not the weakest part of the certificate enrollment, the signature key pair <b cp14>SHOULD</bcp14>
be at least as strong as the key establishment key pair.</t> be at least as strong as the key establishment key pair.</t>
<t>If a CA allows subject in the key establishment certificate to be diffe rent than <t>If a CA allows a subject in the key establishment certificate to be dif ferent than
the subject name in the signature certificate, then certificate policy <bcp14>MU ST</bcp14> the subject name in the signature certificate, then certificate policy <bcp14>MU ST</bcp14>
describe how to determine that the two subject names identify the same entity. describe how to determine that the two subject names identify the same entity.
Likewise, if a CA allows subject alternative names in the key establishment Likewise, if a CA allows subject alternative names in the key establishment
certificate that are not present in the signature certificate, then certificate certificate that are not present in the signature certificate, then certificate
policy <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> describe how to determine that the subject alternativ e names identify policy <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> describe how to determine that the subject alternativ e names identify
the same entity as is named in the signature certificate.</t> the same entity as is named in the signature certificate.</t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="iana"> <section anchor="iana">
<name>IANA Considerations</name> <name>IANA Considerations</name>
<t>For the ASN.1 Module in the <xref target="appendix-asn1"/> of this docu <t>For the ASN.1 Module in <xref target="appendix-asn1"/> of this document
ment, IANA is , IANA has assigned an object identifier (OID) for the module identifier (118)
requested to assign an object identifier (OID) for the module identifier (TBD0) with a Description of "id-mod-private-key-possession-stmt-2025" in the "SMI Secu
with a Description of "id-mod-private-key-possession-stmt-2025". The rity for PKIX Module
OID for the module should be allocated in the "SMI Security for PKIX Module
Identifier" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0).</t> Identifier" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0).</t>
</section> </section>
</middle> </middle>
<back> <back>
<references anchor="sec-combined-references"> <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
<name>References</name> <name>References</name>
<references anchor="sec-normative-references"> <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
<name>Normative References</name> <name>Normative References</name>
<reference anchor="RFC2986"> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2
<front> 986.xml"/>
<title>PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification Version <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4
1.7</title> 211.xml"/>
<author fullname="M. Nystrom" initials="M." surname="Nystrom"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5
<author fullname="B. Kaliski" initials="B." surname="Kaliski"/> 280.xml"/>
<date month="November" year="2000"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5
<abstract> 912.xml"/>
<t>This memo represents a republication of PKCS #10 v1.7 from RSA <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6
Laboratories' Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) series, and change contro 268.xml"/>
l is retained within the PKCS process. The body of this document, except for the
security considerations section, is taken directly from the PKCS #9 v2.0 or the
PKCS #10 v1.7 document. This memo provides information for the Internet communi
ty.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2986"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2986"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC4211">
<front>
<title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Request
Message Format (CRMF)</title>
<author fullname="J. Schaad" initials="J." surname="Schaad"/>
<date month="September" year="2005"/>
<abstract>
<t>This document describes the Certificate Request Message Format
(CRMF) syntax and semantics. This syntax is used to convey a request for a certi
ficate to a Certification Authority (CA), possibly via a Registration Authority
(RA), for the purposes of X.509 certificate production. The request will typical
ly include a public key and the associated registration information. This docume
nt does not define a certificate request protocol. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4211"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4211"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC5280">
<front>
<title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Cert
ificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile</title>
<author fullname="D. Cooper" initials="D." surname="Cooper"/>
<author fullname="S. Santesson" initials="S." surname="Santesson"/>
<author fullname="S. Farrell" initials="S." surname="Farrell"/>
<author fullname="S. Boeyen" initials="S." surname="Boeyen"/>
<author fullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley"/>
<author fullname="W. Polk" initials="W." surname="Polk"/>
<date month="May" year="2008"/>
<abstract>
<t>This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certif
icate revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet. An overview of this approac
h and model is provided as an introduction. The X.509 v3 certificate format is d
escribed in detail, with additional information regarding the format and semanti
cs of Internet name forms. Standard certificate extensions are described and two
Internet-specific extensions are defined. A set of required certificate extensi
ons is specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described in detail along with stan
dard and Internet-specific extensions. An algorithm for X.509 certification path
validation is described. An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in the appen
dices. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5280"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5280"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC5912">
<front>
<title>New ASN.1 Modules for the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.5
09 (PKIX)</title>
<author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/>
<author fullname="J. Schaad" initials="J." surname="Schaad"/>
<date month="June" year="2010"/>
<abstract>
<t>The Public Key Infrastructure using X.509 (PKIX) certificate fo
rmat, and many associated formats, are expressed using ASN.1. The current ASN.1
modules conform to the 1988 version of ASN.1. This document updates those ASN.1
modules to conform to the 2002 version of ASN.1. There are no bits-on-the-wire c
hanges to any of the formats; this is simply a change to the syntax. This docume
nt is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informa
tional purposes.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5912"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5912"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC6268">
<front>
<title>Additional New ASN.1 Modules for the Cryptographic Message Sy
ntax (CMS) and the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)</title>
<author fullname="J. Schaad" initials="J." surname="Schaad"/>
<author fullname="S. Turner" initials="S." surname="Turner"/>
<date month="July" year="2011"/>
<abstract>
<t>The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) format, and many associa
ted formats, are expressed using ASN.1. The current ASN.1 modules conform to the
1988 version of ASN.1. This document updates some auxiliary ASN.1 modules to co
nform to the 2008 version of ASN.1; the 1988 ASN.1 modules remain the normative
version. There are no bits- on-the-wire changes to any of the formats; this is s
imply a change to the syntax. This document is not an Internet Standards Track s
pecification; it is published for informational purposes.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6268"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6268"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="X680" target="https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680"> <reference anchor="X680" target="https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680">
<front> <front>
<title>Information technology -- Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1 ): Specification of basic notation</title> <title>Information technology -- Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1 ): Specification of basic notation</title>
<author> <author>
<organization>ITU-T</organization> <organization>ITU-T</organization>
</author> </author>
<date year="2021" month="February"/> <date year="2021" month="February"/>
</front> </front>
<seriesInfo name="ITU-T Recommendation" value="X.680"/> <seriesInfo name="ITU-T Recommendation" value="X.680"/>
<seriesInfo name="ISO/IEC" value="8824-1:2021"/> <seriesInfo name="ISO/IEC" value="8824-1:2021"/>
</reference> </reference>
<reference anchor="X690" target="https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690"> <reference anchor="X690" target="https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690">
<front> <front>
<title>Information technology -- ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)</title> <title>Information technology -- ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)</title>
<author> <author>
<organization>ITU-T</organization> <organization>ITU-T</organization>
</author> </author>
<date year="2021" month="February"/> <date year="2021" month="February"/>
</front> </front>
<seriesInfo name="ITU-T Recommendation" value="X.690"/> <seriesInfo name="ITU-T Recommendation" value="X.690"/>
<seriesInfo name="ISO/IEC" value="8825-1-2021"/> <seriesInfo name="ISO/IEC" value="8825-1:2021"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC2119">
<front>
<title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</tit
le>
<author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
<date month="March" year="1997"/>
<abstract>
<t>In many standards track documents several words are used to sig
nify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. T
his document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents
. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Co
mmunity, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8174">
<front>
<title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</ti
tle>
<author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
<date month="May" year="2017"/>
<abstract>
<t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protoco
l specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that
only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
</reference> </reference>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2
119.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8
174.xml"/>
</references> </references>
<references anchor="sec-informative-references"> <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
<name>Informative References</name> <name>Informative References</name>
<reference anchor="RFC3647"> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3
<front> 647.xml"/>
<title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy a <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6
nd Certification Practices Framework</title> 955.xml"/>
<author fullname="S. Chokhani" initials="S." surname="Chokhani"/>
<author fullname="W. Ford" initials="W." surname="Ford"/>
<author fullname="R. Sabett" initials="R." surname="Sabett"/>
<author fullname="C. Merrill" initials="C." surname="Merrill"/>
<author fullname="S. Wu" initials="S." surname="Wu"/>
<date month="November" year="2003"/>
<abstract>
<t>This document presents a framework to assist the writers of cer
tificate policies or certification practice statements for participants within p
ublic key infrastructures, such as certification authorities, policy authorities
, and communities of interest that wish to rely on certificates. In particular,
the framework provides a comprehensive list of topics that potentially (at the w
riter's discretion) need to be covered in a certificate policy or a certificatio
n practice statement. This document supersedes RFC 2527.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3647"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3647"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC6955">
<front>
<title>Diffie-Hellman Proof-of-Possession Algorithms</title>
<author fullname="J. Schaad" initials="J." surname="Schaad"/>
<author fullname="H. Prafullchandra" initials="H." surname="Prafullc
handra"/>
<date month="May" year="2013"/>
<abstract>
<t>This document describes two methods for producing an integrity
check value from a Diffie-Hellman key pair and one method for producing an integ
rity check value from an Elliptic Curve key pair. This behavior is needed for su
ch operations as creating the signature of a Public-Key Cryptography Standards (
PKCS) #10 Certification Request. These algorithms are designed to provide a Proo
f-of-Possession of the private key and not to be a general purpose signing algor
ithm.</t>
<t>This document obsoletes RFC 2875.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6955"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6955"/>
</reference>
</references> </references>
</references> </references>
<?line 355?>
<section anchor="appendix-asn1"> <section anchor="appendix-asn1">
<name>ASN.1 Module</name> <name>ASN.1 Module</name>
<t>This ASN.1 Module uses the conventions established by <xref target="RFC 5912"/> and <xref target="RFC6268"/>.</t> <t>This ASN.1 Module uses the conventions established by <xref target="RFC 5912"/> and <xref target="RFC6268"/>.</t>
<sourcecode type="asn.1" markers="true"><![CDATA[ <sourcecode type="asn.1" markers="true"><![CDATA[
PrivateKeyPossessionStatement-2025 PrivateKeyPossessionStatement-2025
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-private-key-possession-stmt-2025(TBD0) } id-mod-private-key-possession-stmt-2025(118) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN
EXPORTS ALL; EXPORTS ALL;
IMPORTS IMPORTS
ATTRIBUTE ATTRIBUTE
FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 -- in [RFC5912] FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 -- in [RFC5912]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
skipping to change at line 567 skipping to change at line 406
RegControlSet ATTRIBUTE ::= RegControlSet ATTRIBUTE ::=
{ regCtrl-privateKeyPossessionStatement, ... } { regCtrl-privateKeyPossessionStatement, ... }
regCtrl-privateKeyPossessionStatement ATTRIBUTE ::= regCtrl-privateKeyPossessionStatement ATTRIBUTE ::=
privateKeyPossessionStatement privateKeyPossessionStatement
id-regCtrl-statementOfPossession OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-regCtrl-statementOfPossession OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
id-at-statementOfPossession id-at-statementOfPossession
END END]]></sourcecode>
]]></sourcecode>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="example-use-of-the-privatekeypossessionstatement-attribute" > <section anchor="example-use-of-the-privatekeypossessionstatement-attribute" >
<name>Example use of the privateKeyPossessionStatement Attribute</name> <name>Example Use of the privateKeyPossessionStatement Attribute</name>
<t>In this example, the self-signed certificate for the CA is:</t> <t>In this example, the self-signed certificate for the CA is as follows:<
/t>
<artwork><![CDATA[ <artwork><![CDATA[
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIB7DCCAXKgAwIBAgIUL149AUxHunELBZMELEQm+isgKCQwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwMw MIIB7DCCAXKgAwIBAgIUL149AUxHunELBZMELEQm+isgKCQwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwMw
NzELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxEzARBgNVBAoTCkV4YW1wbGUgQ0ExEzARBgNVBAMTCmNh NzELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxEzARBgNVBAoTCkV4YW1wbGUgQ0ExEzARBgNVBAMTCmNh
LmV4YW1wbGUwHhcNMjUwMTAzMjAyNzA5WhcNMzUwMTAzMjAyNzA5WjA3MQswCQYD LmV4YW1wbGUwHhcNMjUwMTAzMjAyNzA5WhcNMzUwMTAzMjAyNzA5WjA3MQswCQYD
VQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UEChMKRXhhbXBsZSBDQTETMBEGA1UEAxMKY2EuZXhhbXBs VQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UEChMKRXhhbXBsZSBDQTETMBEGA1UEAxMKY2EuZXhhbXBs
ZTB2MBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAiA2IABDxZdB/Glcxdk1p6Jf1j5en6QfliY9OS ZTB2MBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAiA2IABDxZdB/Glcxdk1p6Jf1j5en6QfliY9OS
fjZbtje/w6M58PN8Sb3VFln1rPdvD17UXeazSG9Hr/Dq3enbsHHO0pPntcFOgb8n fjZbtje/w6M58PN8Sb3VFln1rPdvD17UXeazSG9Hr/Dq3enbsHHO0pPntcFOgb8n
r8R8LUGhxRzjlxkaEJN+pa6Nf7qk49JDeaM/MD0wDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAL r8R8LUGhxRzjlxkaEJN+pa6Nf7qk49JDeaM/MD0wDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAL
BgNVHQ8EBAMCAgQwHQYDVR0OBBYEFD6YvLLv3DQbvnGS0qP6bbzyZkCqMAoGCCqG BgNVHQ8EBAMCAgQwHQYDVR0OBBYEFD6YvLLv3DQbvnGS0qP6bbzyZkCqMAoGCCqG
SM49BAMDA2gAMGUCMGfb61IigoJ3QDnlsRdoktREHe0Dpm6DKw3qOyLL6A0cFK9Z SM49BAMDA2gAMGUCMGfb61IigoJ3QDnlsRdoktREHe0Dpm6DKw3qOyLL6A0cFK9Z
g8m11xIwvptlran52gIxAK1VrOjzRsFiHRptO+gFXstTXnQkKBb2/3WQz2SqcIS/ g8m11xIwvptlran52gIxAK1VrOjzRsFiHRptO+gFXstTXnQkKBb2/3WQz2SqcIS/
BWEp+siJ19OXOlz6APDB7w== BWEp+siJ19OXOlz6APDB7w==
-----END CERTIFICATE----- -----END CERTIFICATE-----
]]></artwork> ]]></artwork>
<t>Alice generates her ECDSA signature key pair. Then, Alice composes <t>Alice generates her ECDSA signature key pair. Then, Alice composes
a PKCS#10 Certificate Signing Request (CSR) in the usual manner as a PKCS#10 Certificate Signing Request (CSR) in the usual manner as
specified in <xref target="RFC2986"/>. The CSR includes a signature that is pro duced specified in <xref target="RFC2986"/>. The CSR includes a signature that is pro duced
with her ECDSA private key. The CSR is:</t> with her ECDSA private key. The CSR is as follows:</t>
<artwork><![CDATA[ <artwork><![CDATA[
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
MIIBhTCCAQsCAQAwPDELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxCzAJBgNVBAgTAlZBMRAwDgYDVQQH MIIBhTCCAQsCAQAwPDELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxCzAJBgNVBAgTAlZBMRAwDgYDVQQH
EwdIZXJuZG9uMQ4wDAYDVQQDEwVBbGljZTB2MBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAiA2IA EwdIZXJuZG9uMQ4wDAYDVQQDEwVBbGljZTB2MBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAiA2IA
BIAc+6lXN1MIM/82QeWNb55H0zr+lVgWVeF0bf4jzxCb5MCjVaM0eFEvcjXMV5p4 BIAc+6lXN1MIM/82QeWNb55H0zr+lVgWVeF0bf4jzxCb5MCjVaM0eFEvcjXMV5p4
kzqiJTHC0V2JAoqYMX/DMFIcwZ7xP9uQd9ep6KZ+RXut211L8+W1QI1QJSDNxANR kzqiJTHC0V2JAoqYMX/DMFIcwZ7xP9uQd9ep6KZ+RXut211L8+W1QI1QJSDNxANR
saBQME4GCSqGSIb3DQEJDjFBMD8wDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADALBgNVHQ8EBAMCB4Aw saBQME4GCSqGSIb3DQEJDjFBMD8wDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADALBgNVHQ8EBAMCB4Aw
IgYDVR0RBBswGYEXYWxpY2VAZW1haWwuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwMD IgYDVR0RBBswGYEXYWxpY2VAZW1haWwuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwMD
aAAwZQIwPa2rOCe60edAF43C/t57IW8liyy+69FE04hMAFgw3Ga+nR+8zDuUsVLw aAAwZQIwPa2rOCe60edAF43C/t57IW8liyy+69FE04hMAFgw3Ga+nR+8zDuUsVLw
xXGAHtcDAjEA6LbvNkZjo6j2z5xRIjrHzEbGgiV4MF4xtnpfSSRI4dB0zT52bWkj xXGAHtcDAjEA6LbvNkZjo6j2z5xRIjrHzEbGgiV4MF4xtnpfSSRI4dB0zT52bWkj
skipping to change at line 626 skipping to change at line 464
VR0jBBgwFoAUPpi8su/cNBu+cZLSo/ptvPJmQKowFwYDVR0gBBAwDjAMBgpghkgB VR0jBBgwFoAUPpi8su/cNBu+cZLSo/ptvPJmQKowFwYDVR0gBBAwDjAMBgpghkgB
ZQMCATAwMAoGCCqGSM49BAMDA2cAMGQCMGu/Uypd7BaVnUjB36UtX9m5ZmPi78y5 ZQMCATAwMAoGCCqGSM49BAMDA2cAMGQCMGu/Uypd7BaVnUjB36UtX9m5ZmPi78y5
1RA8WhbOv0KQVrcYtj4qOdiMVKBcoVceyAIwRJ6U91048NAb3nicHcrGFf1UYrhb 1RA8WhbOv0KQVrcYtj4qOdiMVKBcoVceyAIwRJ6U91048NAb3nicHcrGFf1UYrhb
DlytK4tCa5HBxD/qAgy4/eUzA5NZwVaLK78u DlytK4tCa5HBxD/qAgy4/eUzA5NZwVaLK78u
-----END CERTIFICATE----- -----END CERTIFICATE-----
]]></artwork> ]]></artwork>
<t>Alice generates her ECDH key establishment key pair. Then, Alice <t>Alice generates her ECDH key establishment key pair. Then, Alice
composes a PKCS#10 CSR. The CSR attributes include the composes a PKCS#10 CSR. The CSR attributes include the
privateKeyPossessionStatement attribute, which points to her ECDSA signature privateKeyPossessionStatement attribute, which points to her ECDSA signature
certificate. The CSR includes her ECDH public key and a signature that certificate. The CSR includes her ECDH public key and a signature that
is produced with her ECDSA private key. The CSR is:</t> is produced with her ECDSA private key. The CSR is as follows:</t>
<artwork><![CDATA[ <artwork><![CDATA[
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
MIIEMTCCA7gCAQAwPDELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxCzAJBgNVBAgTAlZBMRAwDgYDVQQH MIIEMTCCA7gCAQAwPDELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxCzAJBgNVBAgTAlZBMRAwDgYDVQQH
EwdIZXJuZG9uMQ4wDAYDVQQDEwVBbGljZTB0MA4GBSuBBAEMBgUrgQQAIgNiAAQB EwdIZXJuZG9uMQ4wDAYDVQQDEwVBbGljZTB0MA4GBSuBBAEMBgUrgQQAIgNiAAQB
RyQTH+cq1s5F94uFqFe7l1LqGdEC8Tm+e5VYBCfKAC8MJySQMj1GixEEXL+1Wjtg RyQTH+cq1s5F94uFqFe7l1LqGdEC8Tm+e5VYBCfKAC8MJySQMj1GixEEXL+1Wjtg
23XvnJouCDoxSpDCSMqf3kvp5+naM37uxa3ZYgD6DPY3me5EZvyZPvSRJTFl/Bag 23XvnJouCDoxSpDCSMqf3kvp5+naM37uxa3ZYgD6DPY3me5EZvyZPvSRJTFl/Bag
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skipping to change at line 654 skipping to change at line 492
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MAoGCCqGSM49BAMDA2cAMGQCL2TNHPULWcCS2DqZCCiQeSwx2JPLMI14Vi977bzy MAoGCCqGSM49BAMDA2cAMGQCL2TNHPULWcCS2DqZCCiQeSwx2JPLMI14Vi977bzy
rImq5p0H3Bel6fAS8BnQ00WNAjEAhHDAlcbRuHhqdW6mOgDd5kWEGGqgixIuvEEc rImq5p0H3Bel6fAS8BnQ00WNAjEAhHDAlcbRuHhqdW6mOgDd5kWEGGqgixIuvEEc
fVbnNCEyEE4n0mQ99PHURnXoHwqF fVbnNCEyEE4n0mQ99PHURnXoHwqF
-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- -----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
]]></artwork> ]]></artwork>
<t>The CSR decodes to:</t> <t>The CSR decodes to the following:</t>
<artwork><![CDATA[ <artwork><![CDATA[
0 1073: SEQUENCE { 0 1073: SEQUENCE {
4 952: SEQUENCE { 4 952: SEQUENCE {
8 1: INTEGER 0 8 1: INTEGER 0
11 60: SEQUENCE { 11 60: SEQUENCE {
13 11: SET { 13 11: SET {
15 9: SEQUENCE { 15 9: SEQUENCE {
17 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6) 17 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
22 2: PrintableString 'US' 22 2: PrintableString 'US'
: } : }
skipping to change at line 972 skipping to change at line 810
BgNVHQ8EBAMCAwgwHQYDVR0OBBYEFAnLfJvnEUcvLXaPUDZMZlQ/zZ3WMB8GA1Ud BgNVHQ8EBAMCAwgwHQYDVR0OBBYEFAnLfJvnEUcvLXaPUDZMZlQ/zZ3WMB8GA1Ud
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AgEwMDAKBggqhkjOPQQDAwNnADBkAjARQ5LuV6yz8A5DZCll1S/gfxZ+QSJl/pKc AgEwMDAKBggqhkjOPQQDAwNnADBkAjARQ5LuV6yz8A5DZCll1S/gfxZ+QSJl/pKc
cTL6Sdr1IS18U/zY8VUJeB2H0nBamLwCMBRQ6sEWpNoeeR8Bonpoot/zYD2luQ1V cTL6Sdr1IS18U/zY8VUJeB2H0nBamLwCMBRQ6sEWpNoeeR8Bonpoot/zYD2luQ1V
2jevmYsnBihKF0debgfhGvh8WIgBR69DZg== 2jevmYsnBihKF0debgfhGvh8WIgBR69DZg==
-----END CERTIFICATE----- -----END CERTIFICATE-----
]]></artwork> ]]></artwork>
</section> </section>
<section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgements"> <section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgements">
<name>Acknowledgements</name> <name>Acknowledgements</name>
<t>Thanks to <t>Thanks to <contact fullname="Sean Turner"/>, <contact fullname="Joe
Sean Turner, Mandel"/>, <contact fullname="Mike StJohns"/>, <contact fullname="Mike
Joe Mandel, Ounsworth"/>, <contact fullname="John Gray"/>, <contact fullname="Carl
Mike StJohns, Wallace"/>, <contact fullname="Corey Bonnell"/>, <contact fullname="Hani
Mike Ounsworth, Ezzadeen"/>, <contact fullname="Deb Cooley"/>, <contact
John Gray, fullname="Mohamed Boucadair"/>, and <contact fullname="Bron Gondwana"/>
Carl Wallace, for their constructive comments.</t>
Corey Bonnell,
Hani Ezzadeen,
Deb Cooley,
Mohamed Boucadair, and
Bron Gondwana
for their constructive comments.</t>
</section> </section>
</back> </back>
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