rfc9810.original   rfc9810.txt 
LAMPS Working Group H. Brockhaus Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) H. Brockhaus
Internet-Draft D. von Oheimb Request for Comments: 9810 D. von Oheimb
Obsoletes: 4210 9480 (if approved) Siemens Obsoletes: 4210, 9480 Siemens
Updates: 5912 (if approved) M. Ounsworth Updates: 5912 M. Ounsworth
Intended status: Standards Track J. Gray Category: Standards Track J. Gray
Expires: 3 August 2025 Entrust ISSN: 2070-1721 Entrust
30 January 2025 June 2025
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure -- Certificate Management Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure -- Certificate Management
Protocol (CMP) Protocol (CMP)
draft-ietf-lamps-rfc4210bis-18
Abstract Abstract
This document describes the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure This document describes the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) Certificate Management Protocol (CMP). Protocol messages are (PKI) Certificate Management Protocol (CMP). Protocol messages are
defined for X.509v3 certificate creation and management. CMP defined for X.509v3 certificate creation and management. CMP
provides interactions between client systems and PKI components such provides interactions between client systems and PKI components such
as a Registration Authority (RA) and a Certification Authority (CA). as a Registration Authority (RA) and a Certification Authority (CA).
This document adds support for management of certificates containing This document adds support for management of certificates containing
a Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) public key and use EnvelopedData a Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) public key and uses EnvelopedData
instead of EncryptedValue. This document also includes the updates instead of EncryptedValue. This document also includes the updates
specified in Section 2 and Appendix A.2 of RFC 9480. specified in Section 2 and Appendix A.2 of RFC 9480.
The updates maintain backward compatibility with CMP version 2 The updates maintain backward compatibility with CMP version 2
wherever possible. Updates to CMP version 2 are improving crypto wherever possible. Updates to CMP version 2 are improving crypto
agility, extending the polling mechanism, adding new general message agility, extending the polling mechanism, adding new general message
types, and adding extended key usages to identify special CMP server types, and adding extended key usages (EKUs) to identify special CMP
authorizations. CMP version 3 is introduced for changes to the ASN.1 server authorizations. CMP version 3 is introduced for changes to
syntax, which are support of EnvelopedData, certConf with hashAlg, the ASN.1 syntax, which support EnvelopedData, certConf with hashAlg,
POPOPrivKey with agreeMAC, and RootCaKeyUpdateContent in ckuann POPOPrivKey with agreeMAC, and RootCaKeyUpdateContent in ckuann
messages. messages.
This document obsoletes RFC 4210 and together with I-D.ietf-lamps- This document obsoletes RFC 4210, and together with RFC 9811, it also
rfc6712bis and it also obsoletes RFC 9480. Appendix F of this obsoletes RFC 9480. Appendix F of this document updates Section 9 of
document updates the Section 9 of RFC 5912. RFC 5912.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This is an Internet Standards Track document.
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference received public review and has been approved for publication by the
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
This Internet-Draft will expire on 3 August 2025. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9810.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1. Introduction
1.1. Changes Made by RFC 4210 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.1. Changes Made by RFC 4210
1.2. Updates Made by RFC 9480 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.2. Updates Made by RFC 9480
1.3. Changes Made by This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.3. Changes Made by This Document
2. Terminology and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2. Terminology and Abbreviations
3. PKI Management Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3. PKI Management Overview
3.1. PKI Management Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.1. PKI Management Model
3.1.1. Definitions of PKI Entities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.1.1. Definitions of PKI Entities
3.1.1.1. Subjects and End Entities . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.1.1.1. Subjects and End Entities
3.1.1.2. Certification Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.1.1.2. Certification Authority
3.1.1.3. Registration Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.1.1.3. Registration Authority
3.1.1.4. Key Generation Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.1.1.4. Key Generation Authority
3.1.2. PKI Management Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3.1.2. PKI Management Requirements
3.1.3. PKI Management Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3.1.3. PKI Management Operations
4. Assumptions and Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4. Assumptions and Restrictions
4.1. End Entity Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.1. End Entity Initialization
4.2. Initial Registration/Certification . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.2. Initial Registration/Certification
4.2.1. Criteria Used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.2.1. Criteria Used
4.2.1.1. Initiation of Registration/Certification . . . . 20 4.2.1.1. Initiation of Registration/Certification
4.2.1.2. End Entity Message Origin Authentication . . . . 21 4.2.1.2. End Entity Message Origin Authentication
4.2.1.3. Location of Key Generation . . . . . . . . . . . 21 4.2.1.3. Location of Key Generation
4.2.1.4. Confirmation of Successful Certification . . . . 22 4.2.1.4. Confirmation of Successful Certification
4.2.2. Initial Registration/Certification Schemes . . . . . 22 4.2.2. Initial Registration/Certification Schemes
4.2.2.1. Centralized Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4.2.2.1. Centralized Scheme
4.2.2.2. Basic Authenticated Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4.2.2.2. Basic Authenticated Scheme
4.3. Proof-of-Possession (POP) of Private Key
4.3. Proof-of-Possession (POP) of Private Key . . . . . . . . 23 4.3.1. Signature Keys
4.3.1. Signature Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 4.3.2. Encryption Keys
4.3.2. Encryption Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 4.3.3. Key Agreement Keys
4.3.3. Key Agreement Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 4.3.4. Key Encapsulation Mechanism Keys
4.3.4. Key Encapsulation Mechanism Keys . . . . . . . . . . 25 4.4. Root CA Key Update
4.4. Root CA Key Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 4.4.1. CA Operator Actions
4.4.1. CA Operator Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 4.4.2. Verifying Certificates
4.4.2. Verifying Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 4.4.2.1. Verification in Cases 1 and 4
4.4.2.1. Verification in Cases 1 and 4 . . . . . . . . . . 29 4.4.2.2. Verification in Case 2
4.4.2.2. Verification in Case 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 4.4.2.3. Verification in Case 3
4.4.2.3. Verification in Case 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 4.4.3. Revocation - Change of the CA Key
4.4.3. Revocation - Change of CA Key . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4.5. Extended Key Usage for PKI Entities
4.5. Extended Key Usage for PKI Entities . . . . . . . . . . . 31 5. Data Structures
5. Data Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 5.1. Overall PKI Message
5.1. Overall PKI Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 5.1.1. PKI Message Header
5.1.1. PKI Message Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 5.1.1.1. ImplicitConfirm
5.1.1.1. ImplicitConfirm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 5.1.1.2. ConfirmWaitTime
5.1.1.2. ConfirmWaitTime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 5.1.1.3. OrigPKIMessage
5.1.1.3. OrigPKIMessage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 5.1.1.4. CertProfile
5.1.1.4. CertProfile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 5.1.1.5. KemCiphertextInfo
5.1.1.5. KemCiphertextInfo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 5.1.2. PKI Message Body
5.1.2. PKI Message Body . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 5.1.3. PKI Message Protection
5.1.3. PKI Message Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 5.1.3.1. Shared Secret Information
5.1.3.1. Shared Secret Information . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 5.1.3.2. DH Key Pairs
5.1.3.2. DH Key Pairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 5.1.3.3. Signature
5.1.3.3. Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 5.1.3.4. Key Encapsulation
5.1.3.4. Key Encapsulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 5.1.3.5. Multiple Protection
5.1.3.5. Multiple Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 5.2. Common Data Structures
5.2. Common Data Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 5.2.1. Requested Certificate Contents
5.2.1. Requested Certificate Contents . . . . . . . . . . . 47 5.2.2. Encrypted Values
5.2.2. Encrypted Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 5.2.3. Status Codes and Failure Information for PKI Messages
5.2.3. Status Codes and Failure Information for PKI 5.2.4. Certificate Identification
Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 5.2.5. Out-of-Band Root CA Public Key
5.2.4. Certificate Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 5.2.6. Archive Options
5.2.5. Out-of-band root CA Public Key . . . . . . . . . . . 52 5.2.7. Publication Information
5.2.6. Archive Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 5.2.8. Proof-of-Possession Structures
5.2.7. Publication Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 5.2.8.1. raVerified
5.2.8. Proof-of-Possession Structures . . . . . . . . . . . 53 5.2.8.2. POPOSigningKey Structure
5.2.8.1. raVerified . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 5.2.8.3. POPOPrivKey Structure
5.2.8.2. POPOSigningKey Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 5.2.8.4. Summary of POP Options
5.2.8.3. POPOPrivKey Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 5.2.9. GeneralizedTime
5.2.8.4. Summary of PoP Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 5.3. Operation-Specific Data Structures
5.2.9. GeneralizedTime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 5.3.1. Initialization Request
5.3. Operation-Specific Data Structures . . . . . . . . . . . 60 5.3.2. Initialization Response
5.3.1. Initialization Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 5.3.3. Certification Request
5.3.2. Initialization Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 5.3.4. Certification Response
5.3.3. Certification Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 5.3.5. Key Update Request Content
5.3.4. Certification Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 5.3.6. Key Update Response Content
5.3.5. Key Update Request Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 5.3.7. Key Recovery Request Content
5.3.6. Key Update Response Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 5.3.8. Key Recovery Response Content
5.3.7. Key Recovery Request Content . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 5.3.9. Revocation Request Content
5.3.8. Key Recovery Response Content . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 5.3.10. Revocation Response Content
5.3.9. Revocation Request Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 5.3.11. Cross-Certification Request Content
5.3.10. Revocation Response Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 5.3.12. Cross-Certification Response Content
5.3.11. Cross Certification Request Content . . . . . . . . . 64 5.3.13. CA Key Update Announcement Content
5.3.12. Cross Certification Response Content . . . . . . . . 65 5.3.14. Certificate Announcement
5.3.13. CA Key Update Announcement Content . . . . . . . . . 65 5.3.15. Revocation Announcement
5.3.14. Certificate Announcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 5.3.16. CRL Announcement
5.3.15. Revocation Announcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 5.3.17. PKI Confirmation Content
5.3.16. CRL Announcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 5.3.18. Certificate Confirmation Content
5.3.17. PKI Confirmation Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 5.3.19. PKI General Message Content
5.3.18. Certificate Confirmation Content . . . . . . . . . . 66 5.3.19.1. CA Protocol Encryption Certificate
5.3.19. PKI General Message Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 5.3.19.2. Signing Key Pair Types
5.3.19.1. CA Protocol Encryption Certificate . . . . . . . 68 5.3.19.3. Encryption / Key Agreement Key Pair Types
5.3.19.2. Signing Key Pair Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 5.3.19.4. Preferred Symmetric Algorithm
5.3.19.3. Encryption/Key Agreement Key Pair Types . . . . 68 5.3.19.5. Updated CA Key Pair
5.3.19.4. Preferred Symmetric Algorithm . . . . . . . . . 69 5.3.19.6. CRL
5.3.19.5. Updated CA Key Pair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 5.3.19.7. Unsupported Object Identifiers
5.3.19.6. CRL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 5.3.19.8. Key Pair Parameters
5.3.19.7. Unsupported Object Identifiers . . . . . . . . . 69 5.3.19.9. Revocation Passphrase
5.3.19.8. Key Pair Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 5.3.19.10. ImplicitConfirm
5.3.19.9. Revocation Passphrase . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 5.3.19.11. ConfirmWaitTime
5.3.19.10. ImplicitConfirm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 5.3.19.12. Original PKIMessage
5.3.19.11. ConfirmWaitTime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 5.3.19.13. Supported Language Tags
5.3.19.12. Original PKIMessage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 5.3.19.14. CA Certificates
5.3.19.13. Supported Language Tags . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 5.3.19.15. Root CA Update
5.3.19.14. CA Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 5.3.19.16. Certificate Request Template
5.3.19.15. Root CA Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 5.3.19.17. CRL Update Retrieval
5.3.19.16. Certificate Request Template . . . . . . . . . . 71 5.3.19.18. KEM Ciphertext
5.3.19.17. CRL Update Retrieval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 5.3.20. PKI General Response Content
5.3.19.18. KEM Ciphertext . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 5.3.21. Error Message Content
5.3.20. PKI General Response Content . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 5.3.22. Polling Request and Response
5.3.21. Error Message Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 6. Mandatory PKI Management Functions
5.3.22. Polling Request and Response . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 6.1. Root CA Initialization
6. Mandatory PKI Management Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 6.2. Root CA Key Update
6.1. Root CA Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 6.3. Subordinate CA Initialization
6.2. Root CA Key Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 6.4. CRL Production
6.3. Subordinate CA Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 6.5. PKI Information Request
6.4. CRL production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 6.6. Cross Certification
6.5. PKI Information Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 6.6.1. One-Way Request-Response Scheme
6.6. Cross Certification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 6.7. End Entity Initialization
6.6.1. One-Way Request-Response Scheme: . . . . . . . . . . 81 6.7.1. Acquisition of PKI Information
6.7. End Entity Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 6.7.2. Out-of-Band Verification of the Root CA Key
6.7.1. Acquisition of PKI Information . . . . . . . . . . . 83 6.8. Certificate Request
6.7.2. Out-of-Band Verification of Root CA Key . . . . . . . 84 6.9. Key Update
6.8. Certificate Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 7. Version Negotiation
6.9. Key Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 7.1. Supporting RFC 2510 Implementations
7. Version Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 7.1.1. Clients Talking to RFC 2510 Servers
7.1. Supporting RFC 2510 Implementations . . . . . . . . . . . 85 7.1.2. Servers Receiving Version cmp1999 PKIMessages
7.1.1. Clients Talking to RFC 2510 Servers . . . . . . . . . 85 8. Security Considerations
7.1.2. Servers Receiving Version cmp1999 PKIMessages . . . . 85 8.1. On the Necessity of Proof-of-Possession
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 8.2. Proof-of-Possession with a Decryption Key
8.1. On the Necessity of Proof-Of-Possession . . . . . . . . . 86 8.3. Proof-of-Possession by Exposing the Private Key
8.2. Proof-Of-Possession with a Decryption Key . . . . . . . . 86 8.4. Attack Against Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
8.3. Proof-Of-Possession by Exposing the Private Key . . . . . 86 8.5. Perfect Forward Secrecy
8.4. Attack Against Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange . . . . . . . 87
8.5. Perfect Forward Secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
8.6. Private Keys for Certificate Signing and CMP Message 8.6. Private Keys for Certificate Signing and CMP Message
Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Protection
8.7. Entropy of Random Numbers, Key Pairs, and Shared Secret 8.7. Entropy of Random Numbers, Key Pairs, and Shared Secret
Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Information
8.8. Recurring Usage of KEM Keys for Message Protection . . . 89 8.8. Recurring Usage of KEM Keys for Message Protection
8.9. Trust Anchor Provisioning Using CMP Messages . . . . . . 89 8.9. Trust Anchor Provisioning Using CMP Messages
8.10. Authorizing Requests for Certificates with Specific 8.10. Authorizing Requests for Certificates with Specific EKUs
EKUs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 8.11. Usage of Certificate Transparency Logs
8.11. Usage of Certificate Transparency Logs . . . . . . . . . 90 9. IANA Considerations
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 10. References
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 10.1. Normative References
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 10.2. Informative References
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 Appendix A. Reasons for the Presence of RAs
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Appendix B. The Use of Revocation Passphrase
Appendix A. Reasons for the Presence of RAs . . . . . . . . . . 97 Appendix C. PKI Management Message Profiles (REQUIRED)
Appendix B. The Use of Revocation Passphrase . . . . . . . . . . 98 C.1. General Rules for Interpretation of These Profiles
Appendix C. PKI Management Message Profiles (REQUIRED) . . . . . 100 C.2. Algorithm Use Profile
C.1. General Rules for Interpretation of These Profiles . . . 101 C.3. Proof-of-Possession Profile
C.2. Algorithm Use Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
C.3. Proof-of-Possession Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
C.4. Initial Registration/Certification (Basic Authenticated C.4. Initial Registration/Certification (Basic Authenticated
Scheme) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 Scheme)
C.5. Certificate Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 C.5. Certificate Request
C.6. Key Update Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 C.6. Key Update Request
Appendix D. PKI Management Message Profiles (OPTIONAL) . . . . . 110 Appendix D. PKI Management Message Profiles (OPTIONAL)
D.1. General Rules for Interpretation of These Profiles. . . . 111 D.1. General Rules for Interpretation of These Profiles
D.2. Algorithm Use Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 D.2. Algorithm Use Profile
D.3. Self-Signed Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 D.3. Self-Signed Certificates
D.4. Root CA Key Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 D.4. Root CA Key Update
D.5. PKI Information Request/Response . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 D.5. PKI Information Request/Response
D.6. Cross Certification Request/Response (1-way) . . . . . . 115 D.6. Cross-Certification Request/Response (1-way)
D.7. In-Band Initialization Using External Identity D.7. In-Band Initialization Using External Identity Certificate
Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 Appendix E. Variants of Using KEM Keys for PKI Message Protection
Appendix E. Variants of Using KEM Keys for PKI Message Appendix F. Compilable ASN.1 Definitions
Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 Acknowledgements
Appendix F. Compilable ASN.1 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 Authors' Addresses
Appendix G. History of Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
[RFC Editor: please delete:
During IESG telechat the CMP Updates document was approved on
condition that LAMPS provides a RFC4210bis document. Version -00 of
this document shall be identical to RFC 4210 and version -01
incorporates the changes specified in CMP Updates Section 2 and
Appendix A.2.
A history of changes is available in Appendix G of this document.
The authors of this document wish to thank Carlisle Adams, Stephen
Farrell, Tomi Kause, and Tero Mononen, the original authors of
RFC4210, for their work and invite them, next to further volunteers,
to join the -bis activity as co-authors.
]
[RFC Editor:
Please perform the following substitution.
* RFCXXXX --> the assigned numerical RFC value for this draft ]
This document describes the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure This document describes the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) Certificate Management Protocol (CMP). Protocol messages are (PKI) Certificate Management Protocol (CMP). Protocol messages are
defined for certificate creation and management. The term defined for certificate creation and management. The term
"certificate" in this document refers to an X.509v3 Certificate as "certificate" in this document refers to an X.509v3 Certificate as
defined in [RFC5280]. defined in [RFC5280].
1.1. Changes Made by RFC 4210 1.1. Changes Made by RFC 4210
[RFC4210] differs from [RFC2510] in the following areas: [RFC4210] differs from [RFC2510] in the following areas:
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appendices: the required profile and the optional profile. Some appendices: the required profile and the optional profile. Some
of the formerly mandatory functionality is moved to the optional of the formerly mandatory functionality is moved to the optional
profile. profile.
* The message confirmation mechanism has changed substantially. * The message confirmation mechanism has changed substantially.
* A new polling mechanism is introduced, deprecating the old polling * A new polling mechanism is introduced, deprecating the old polling
method at the CMP transport level. method at the CMP transport level.
* The CMP transport protocol issues are handled in a separate * The CMP transport protocol issues are handled in a separate
document [RFC6712], thus the Transports section is removed. document [RFC6712], thus the "Transports" section is removed.
* A new implicit confirmation method is introduced to reduce the * A new implicit confirmation method is introduced to reduce the
number of protocol messages exchanged in a transaction. number of protocol messages exchanged in a transaction.
* The new specification contains some less prominent protocol * The new specification contains some less prominent protocol
enhancements and improved explanatory text on several issues. enhancements and improved explanatory text on several issues.
1.2. Updates Made by RFC 9480 1.2. Updates Made by RFC 9480
CMP Updates [RFC9480] and CMP Algorithms [RFC9481] updated [RFC4210], CMP Updates [RFC9480] and CMP Algorithms [RFC9481] updated [RFC4210],
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CMP Profile [RFC9483], in the following areas: CMP Profile [RFC9483], in the following areas:
* Added new extended key usages for various CMP server types, e.g., * Added new extended key usages for various CMP server types, e.g.,
registration authority and certification authority, to express the registration authority and certification authority, to express the
authorization of the certificate holder that acts as the indicated authorization of the certificate holder that acts as the indicated
type of PKI management entity. type of PKI management entity.
* Extended the description of multiple protection to cover * Extended the description of multiple protection to cover
additional use cases, e.g., batch processing of messages. additional use cases, e.g., batch processing of messages.
* Use the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] type * Used the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] type
EnvelopedData as the preferred choice instead of EncryptedValue to EnvelopedData as the preferred choice instead of EncryptedValue to
better support crypto agility in CMP. better support crypto agility in CMP.
For reasons of completeness and consistency, the type For reasons of completeness and consistency, the type
EncryptedValue has been exchanged in all occurrences. This EncryptedValue has been exchanged in all occurrences. This
includes the protection of centrally generated private keys, includes the protection of centrally generated private keys,
encryption of certificates, proof-of-possession methods, and encryption of certificates, proof-of-possession methods, and
protection of revocation passphrases. To properly differentiate protection of revocation passphrases. To properly differentiate
the support of EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue, CMP the support of EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue, CMP
version 3 is introduced in case a transaction is supposed to use version 3 is introduced in case a transaction is supposed to use
EnvelopedData. EnvelopedData.
Note: According to [RFC4211], Section 2.1, point 9, the use of the Note: According to point 9 in Section 2.1 of [RFC4211], the use of
EncryptedValue structure has been deprecated in favor of the the EncryptedValue structure has been deprecated in favor of the
EnvelopedData structure. [RFC4211] offers the EncryptedKey EnvelopedData structure. [RFC4211] offers the EncryptedKey
structure a choice of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData for structure a choice of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData for
migration to EnvelopedData. migration to EnvelopedData.
* Offer an optional hashAlg field in CertStatus supporting cases * Offered an optional hashAlg field in CertStatus supporting cases
that a certificate needs to be confirmed that has a signature that a certificate needs to be confirmed that has a signature
algorithm that does not indicate a specific hash algorithm to use algorithm that does not indicate a specific hash algorithm to use
for computing the certHash. This is also in preparation for for computing the certHash. This is also in preparation for
upcoming post-quantum algorithms. upcoming post-quantum algorithms.
* Added new general message types to request CA certificates, a root * Added new general message types to request CA certificates, a root
CA update, a certificate request template, or Certificate CA update, a certificate request template, or Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) updates. Revocation List (CRL) updates.
* Extended the use of polling to p10cr, certConf, rr, genm, and * Extended the use of polling to p10cr, certConf, rr, genm, and
error messages. error messages.
* Deleted the mandatory algorithm profile in Appendix C.2 and refer * Deleted the mandatory algorithm profile in Appendix C.2 and
instead to Section 7 of [RFC9481]. instead referred to Section 7 of [RFC9481].
* Added security considerations Sections 8.6, 8.7, 8.9, and 8.10. * Added Sections 8.6, 8.7, 8.9, and 8.10 to the security
considerations.
1.3. Changes Made by This Document 1.3. Changes Made by This Document
This document obsoletes [RFC4210] and [RFC9480]. It includes the This document obsoletes [RFC4210] and [RFC9480]. It includes the
changes specified by Section 2 and Appendix C.2 of [RFC9480] as changes specified by Section 2 and Appendix A.2 of [RFC9480] as
described in Section 1.2. Additionally this document updates the described in Section 1.2. Additionally, this document updates the
content of [RFC4210] in the following areas: content of [RFC4210] in the following areas:
* Added Section 3.1.1.4 introducing the Key Generation Authority. * Added Section 3.1.1.4 introducing the Key Generation Authority.
* Extended Section 3.1.2 regarding use of Certificate Transparency * Extended Section 3.1.2 regarding use of Certificate Transparency
logs. logs.
* Updated Section 4.4 introducing RootCaKeyUpdateContent as * Updated Section 4.4 introducing RootCaKeyUpdateContent as an
alternative to using a repository to acquire new root CA alternative to using a repository to acquire new root CA
certificates. certificates.
* Added Section 5.1.1.3 containing description of origPKIMessage * Added Section 5.1.1.3 containing a description of origPKIMessage
content moved here from Section 5.1.3.4. content, moved here from Section 5.1.3.4.
* Added support for KEM keys for proof-of-possession to Section 4.3 * Added support for KEM keys for proof-of-possession to Sections 4.3
and Section 5.2.8, for message protection to Section 5.1.1, and 5.2.8, for message protection to Sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.3.4
Section 5.1.3.4, and Appendix E, and for usage with CMS and Appendix E, and for usage with CMS EnvelopedData to
EnvelopedData to Section 5.2.2. Section 5.2.2.
* Deprecated CAKeyUpdAnnContent in favor of RootCaKeyUpdateContent. * Deprecated CAKeyUpdAnnContent in favor of RootCaKeyUpdateContent.
* Incorporated the request message behavioral clarifications from * Incorporated the request message behavioral clarifications from
Appendix C of [RFC4210] to Section 5. The definition of Appendix C of [RFC4210] to Section 5. The definition of
altCertTemplate was incorporated into Section 5.2.1 and the altCertTemplate was incorporated into Section 5.2.1, and the
clarification on POPOSigningKey and on POPOPrivKey was clarification on POPOSigningKey and on POPOPrivKey was
incorporated into Section 5.2.8. incorporated into Section 5.2.8.
* Added support for CMS EnvelopedData to different proof-of- * Added support for CMS EnvelopedData to different proof-of-
possession methods for transferring encrypted private keys, possession methods for transferring encrypted private keys,
certificates, and challenges to Section 5.2.8. certificates, and challenges to Section 5.2.8.
* Added security considerations Sections 8.1, 8.5, 8.8, and 8.11. * Added Sections 8.1, 8.5, 8.8, and 8.11 to the security
considerations.
2. Terminology and Abbreviations 2. Terminology and Abbreviations
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
This document relies on the terminology defined in [RFC5280]. The This document relies on the terminology defined in [RFC5280]. The
most important abbreviations are listed below: most important abbreviations are listed below:
CA: Certification Authority CA: Certification Authority
CMP: Certificate Management Protocol CMP: Certificate Management Protocol
CMS: Cryptographic Message Syntax CMS: Cryptographic Message Syntax
CRL: Certificate Revocation List CRL: Certificate Revocation List
CRMF: Certificate Request Message Format CRMF: Certificate Request Message Format
EE: End Entity EE: End Entity
KEM: Key Encapsulation Mechanism KEM: Key Encapsulation Mechanism
KGA: Key Generation Authority KGA: Key Generation Authority
LRA: Local Registration Authority LRA: Local Registration Authority
MAC: Message Authentication Code MAC: Message Authentication Code
PKI: Public Key Infrastructure PKI: Public Key Infrastructure
POP: Proof Of Possession POP: Proof-of-Possession
RA: Registration Authority RA: Registration Authority
TEE: Trusted Execution Environment TEE: Trusted Execution Environment
3. PKI Management Overview 3. PKI Management Overview
The PKI must be structured to be consistent with the types of The PKI must be structured to be consistent with the types of
individuals who must administer it. Providing such administrators individuals who must administer it. Providing such administrators
with unbounded choices not only complicates the software required, with unbounded choices not only complicates the software required but
but also increases the chances that a subtle mistake by an also increases the chances that a subtle mistake by an administrator
administrator or software developer will result in broader or software developer will result in broader compromise. Similarly,
compromise. Similarly, restricting administrators with cumbersome restricting administrators with cumbersome mechanisms will cause them
mechanisms will cause them not to use the PKI. not to use the PKI.
Management protocols are REQUIRED to support on-line interactions Management protocols are REQUIRED to support on-line interactions
between Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) components. For example, a between Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) components. For example, a
management protocol might be used between a Certification Authority management protocol might be used between a Certification Authority
(CA) and a client system with which a key pair is associated, or (CA) and a client system with which a key pair is associated or
between two CAs that issue cross-certificates for each other. between two CAs that issue cross-certificates for each other.
3.1. PKI Management Model 3.1. PKI Management Model
Before specifying particular message formats and procedures, we first Before specifying particular message formats and procedures, we first
define the entities involved in PKI management and their interactions define the entities involved in PKI management and their interactions
(in terms of the PKI management functions required). We then group (in terms of the PKI management functions required). We then group
these functions in order to accommodate different identifiable types these functions in order to accommodate different identifiable types
of end entities. of end entities.
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3.1.1.1. Subjects and End Entities 3.1.1.1. Subjects and End Entities
The term "subject" is used here to refer to the entity to whom the The term "subject" is used here to refer to the entity to whom the
certificate is issued, typically named in the subject or certificate is issued, typically named in the subject or
subjectAltName field of a certificate. When we wish to distinguish subjectAltName field of a certificate. When we wish to distinguish
the tools and/or software used by the subject (e.g., a local the tools and/or software used by the subject (e.g., a local
certificate management module), we will use the term "subject certificate management module), we will use the term "subject
equipment". In general, the term "end entity" (EE), rather than equipment". In general, the term "end entity" (EE), rather than
"subject", is preferred in order to avoid confusion with the field "subject", is preferred in order to avoid confusion with the field
name. It is important to note that the end entities here will name. It is important to note that the end entities here will
include not only human users of applications, but also applications include not only human users of applications but also applications
themselves (e.g., for IKE/IPsec) or devices (e.g., routers or themselves (e.g., for Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKE) / IPsec)
industrial control systems). This factor influences the protocols or devices (e.g., routers or industrial control systems). This
that the PKI management operations use; for example, application factor influences the protocols that the PKI management operations
software is far more likely to know exactly which certificate use; for example, application software is far more likely to know
extensions are required than are human users. PKI management exactly which certificate extensions are required than are human
entities are also end entities in the sense that they are sometimes users. PKI management entities are also end entities in the sense
named in the subject or subjectAltName field of a certificate or that they are sometimes named in the subject or subjectAltName field
cross-certificate. Where appropriate, the term "end entity" will be of a certificate or cross-certificate. Where appropriate, the term
used to refer to end entities who are not PKI management entities. "end entity" will be used to refer to end entities who are not PKI
management entities.
All end entities require secure local access to some information -- All end entities require secure local access to some information --
at a minimum, their own name and private key, the name of a CA that at a minimum, their own name and private key, the name of a CA that
is directly trusted by this entity, and that CA's public key (or a is directly trusted by this entity, and that CA's public key (or a
fingerprint of the public key where a self-certified version is fingerprint of the public key where a self-certified version is
available elsewhere). Implementations MAY use secure local storage available elsewhere). Implementations MAY use secure local storage
for more than this minimum (e.g., the end entity's own certificates for more than this minimum (e.g., the end entity's own certificates
or application-specific information). The form of storage will also or application-specific information). The form of storage will also
vary -- from files to tamper-resistant cryptographic tokens. The vary -- from files to tamper-resistant cryptographic tokens. The
information stored in such local, trusted storage is referred to here information stored in such local, trusted storage is referred to here
as the end entity's Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) also known as as the end entity's Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), also known
Personal Security Environment (PSE). as Personal Security Environment (PSE).
Though TEE formats are beyond the scope of this document (they are Though TEE formats are beyond the scope of this document (they are
very dependent on equipment, et cetera), a generic interchange format very dependent on equipment, et cetera), a generic interchange format
for TEEs is defined here: a certification response message, see for TEEs is defined here: a certification response message (see
Section 5.3.4, MAY be used. Section 5.3.4) MAY be used.
3.1.1.2. Certification Authority 3.1.1.2. Certification Authority
The certification authority (CA) may or may not actually be a real The certification authority (CA) may or may not actually be a real
"third party" from the end entity's point of view. Quite often, the "third party" from the end entity's point of view. Quite often, the
CA will actually belong to the same organization as the end entities CA will actually belong to the same organization as the end entities
it supports. it supports.
Again, we use the term "CA" to refer to the entity named in the Again, we use the term "CA" to refer to the entity named in the
issuer field of a certificate. When it is necessary to distinguish issuer field of a certificate. When it is necessary to distinguish
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an "on-line" component, with the CA private key only available to the an "on-line" component, with the CA private key only available to the
"off-line" component. This is, however, a matter for implementers "off-line" component. This is, however, a matter for implementers
(though it is also relevant as a policy issue). (though it is also relevant as a policy issue).
We use the term "root CA" to indicate a CA that is directly trusted We use the term "root CA" to indicate a CA that is directly trusted
by an end entity; that is, securely acquiring the value of a root CA by an end entity; that is, securely acquiring the value of a root CA
public key requires some out-of-band step(s). This term is not meant public key requires some out-of-band step(s). This term is not meant
to imply that a root CA is necessarily at the top of any hierarchy, to imply that a root CA is necessarily at the top of any hierarchy,
simply that the CA in question is trusted directly. The "root CA" simply that the CA in question is trusted directly. The "root CA"
may provide its trust anchor information with or without using a may provide its trust anchor information with or without using a
certificate. In some circumstances such a certificate may be self- certificate. In some circumstances, such a certificate may be self-
signed, but in other circumstances it may be cross signed, signed by signed, but in other circumstances, it may be cross-signed, signed by
a peer, signed by a superior CA, or unsigned. a peer, signed by a superior CA, or unsigned.
Note that other documents like [X509.2019] and [RFC5280] use the term Note that other documents like [X509.2019] and [RFC5280] use the term
"trusted CA" or "trust anchor" instead of "root CA". This document "trusted CA" or "trust anchor" instead of "root CA". This document
continues using "root CA" based on the above definition because it is continues using "root CA" based on the above definition because it is
also present in the ASN.1 syntax that cannot be changed easily. also present in the ASN.1 syntax that cannot be changed easily.
A "subordinate CA" is one that is not a root CA for the end entity in A "subordinate CA" is one that is not a root CA for the end entity in
question. Often, a subordinate CA will not be a root CA for any question. Often, a subordinate CA will not be a root CA for any
entity, but this is not mandatory. entity, but this is not mandatory.
3.1.1.3. Registration Authority 3.1.1.3. Registration Authority
In addition to end-entities and CAs, many environments call for the In addition to end entities and CAs, many environments call for the
existence of a Registration Authority (RA) separate from the existence of a Registration Authority (RA) separate from the
Certification Authority. The functions that the registration Certification Authority. The functions that the registration
authority may carry out will vary from case to case but MAY include authority may carry out will vary from case to case but MAY include
identity checking, token distribution, checking certificate requests identity checking, token distribution, checking certificate requests
and authentication of their origin, revocation reporting, name and authentication of their origin, revocation reporting, name
assignment, archival of key pairs, et cetera. assignment, archival of key pairs, et cetera.
This document views the RA as an OPTIONAL component: when it is not This document views the RA as an OPTIONAL component: When it is not
present, the CA is assumed to be able to carry out the RA's functions present, the CA is assumed to be able to carry out the RA's functions
so that the PKI management protocols are the same from the end- so that the PKI management protocols are the same from the end
entity's point of view. entity's point of view.
Again, we distinguish, where necessary, between the RA and the tools Again, we distinguish, where necessary, between the RA and the tools
used (the "RA equipment"). used (the "RA equipment").
Note that an RA is itself an end entity. We further assume that all Note that an RA is itself an end entity. We further assume that all
RAs are in fact certified end entities and that RAs have private keys RAs are in fact certified end entities and that RAs have private keys
that are usable for signing. How a particular CA equipment that are usable for signing. How a particular CA equipment
identifies some end entities as RAs is an implementation issue (i.e., identifies some end entities as RAs is an implementation issue (i.e.,
this document specifies no special RA certification operation). We this document specifies no special RA certification operation). We
do not mandate that the RA is certified by the CA with which it is do not mandate that the RA is certified by the CA with which it is
interacting at the moment (so one RA may work with more than one CA interacting at the moment (so one RA may work with more than one CA
whilst only being certified once). whilst only being certified once).
In some circumstances, end entities will communicate directly with a In some circumstances, end entities will communicate directly with a
CA even where an RA is present. For example, for initial CA even where an RA is present. For example, for initial
registration and/or certification, the end entity may use its RA, but registration and/or certification, the end entity may use its RA but
communicate directly with the CA in order to refresh its certificate. communicate directly with the CA in order to refresh its certificate.
3.1.1.4. Key Generation Authority 3.1.1.4. Key Generation Authority
A Key Generation Authority (KGA) is a PKI management entity A Key Generation Authority (KGA) is a PKI management entity
generating key pairs on behalf of an end entity. As the KGA generating key pairs on behalf of an end entity. As the KGA
generates the key pair it knows the public and the private part. generates the key pair, it knows the public and the private part.
This document views the KGA as an OPTIONAL component. When it is not This document views the KGA as an OPTIONAL component. When it is not
present and central key generation is needed, the CA is assumed to be present and central key generation is needed, the CA is assumed to be
able to carry out the KGA's functions so that the PKI management able to carry out the KGA's functions so that the PKI management
protocol messages are the same from the end-entity's point of view. protocol messages are the same from the end entity's point of view.
If certain tasks of a CA are delegated to other components, this If certain tasks of a CA are delegated to other components, this
delegation needs authorization, which can be indicated by extended delegation needs authorization, which can be indicated by extended
key usages (see Section 4.5). key usages (see Section 4.5).
Note: When doing central generation of key pairs, implementers should Note: When doing central generation of key pairs, implementers should
consider the implications of server-side retention on the overall consider the implications of server-side retention on the overall
security of the system; in some case retention is good, for example security of the system; in some cases, retention is good, for
for escrow reasons, but in other cases the server should clear its example, for escrow reasons, but in other cases, the server should
copy after delivery to the end entity. clear its copy after delivery to the end entity.
Note: If the CA delegates key generation to a KGA, the KGA can be Note: If the CA delegates key generation to a KGA, the KGA can be
collocated with the RA. collocated with the RA.
3.1.2. PKI Management Requirements 3.1.2. PKI Management Requirements
The protocols given here meet the following requirements on PKI The protocols given here meet the following requirements on PKI
management management
1. PKI management must conform to the ISO/IEC 9594-8/ITU-T X.509 1. PKI management must conform to the ISO/IEC 9594-8/ITU-T X.509
standards. standards.
2. It must be possible to regularly update any key pair without 2. It must be possible to regularly update any key pair without
affecting any other key pair. affecting any other key pair.
3. The use of confidentiality in PKI management protocols must be 3. The use of confidentiality in PKI management protocols must be
kept to a minimum in order to ease acceptance in environments kept to a minimum in order to ease acceptance in environments
where strong confidentiality might cause regulatory problems. where strong confidentiality might cause regulatory problems.
4. PKI management protocols must allow the use of different 4. PKI management protocols must allow the use of different
industry-standard cryptographic algorithms, see CMP Algorithms industry-standard cryptographic algorithms (see CMP Algorithms
[RFC9481]. This means that any given CA, RA, or end entity may, [RFC9481]). This means that any given CA, RA, or end entity
in principle, use whichever algorithms suit it for its own key may, in principle, use whichever algorithms suit it for its own
pair(s). key pair(s).
5. PKI management protocols must not preclude the generation of key 5. PKI management protocols must not preclude the generation of key
pairs by the end entity concerned, by a KGA or by a CA. Key pairs by the end entity concerned, by a KGA, or by a CA. Key
generation may also occur elsewhere, but for the purposes of PKI generation may also occur elsewhere, but for the purposes of PKI
management we can regard key generation as occurring wherever management, we can regard key generation as occurring wherever
the key is first present at an end entity, KGA, or CA. the key is first present at an end entity, KGA, or CA.
6. PKI management protocols must support the publication of 6. PKI management protocols must support the publication of
certificates by the end entity concerned, by an RA, or by a CA. certificates by the end entity concerned, by an RA, or by a CA.
Different implementations and different environments may choose Different implementations and different environments may choose
any of the above approaches. any of the above approaches.
7. PKI management protocols must support the production of 7. PKI management protocols must support the production of
Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) by allowing certified end Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) by allowing certified end
entities to make requests for the revocation of certificates. entities to make requests for the revocation of certificates.
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"transport" mechanisms, specifically including mail, Hypertext "transport" mechanisms, specifically including mail, Hypertext
Transfer Protocol (HTTP), Message Queuing Telemetry Transport Transfer Protocol (HTTP), Message Queuing Telemetry Transport
(MQTT), Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), and off-line (MQTT), Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), and off-line
file-based. file-based.
9. Final authority for certification creation rests with the CA. 9. Final authority for certification creation rests with the CA.
No RA or end entity equipment can assume that any certificate No RA or end entity equipment can assume that any certificate
issued by a CA will contain what was requested; a CA may alter issued by a CA will contain what was requested; a CA may alter
certificate field values or may add, delete, or alter extensions certificate field values or may add, delete, or alter extensions
according to its operating policy. In other words, all PKI according to its operating policy. In other words, all PKI
entities (end-entities, RAs, KGAs, and CAs) must be capable of entities (end entities, RAs, KGAs, and CAs) must be capable of
handling responses to requests for certificates in which the handling responses to requests for certificates in which the
actual certificate issued is different from that requested (for actual certificate issued is different from that requested (for
example, a CA may shorten the validity period requested). Note example, a CA may shorten the validity period requested). Note
that policy may dictate that the CA must not publish or that policy may dictate that the CA must not publish or
otherwise distribute the certificate until the requesting entity otherwise distribute the certificate until the requesting entity
has reviewed and accepted the newly-created certificate or the has reviewed and accepted the newly created certificate or the
POP is completed. In case of publication of the certificate POP is completed. In case of publication of the certificate
(when using indirect POP, see Section 8.11) or a precertificate (when using indirect POP, see Section 8.11) or a precertificate
in a Certificate Transparency log [RFC9162], the certificate in a Certificate Transparency log [RFC9162], the certificate
must be revoked if it was not accepted by the EE or the POP must be revoked if it was not accepted by the EE or the POP
could not be completed. could not be completed.
10. A graceful, scheduled change-over from one non-compromised CA 10. A graceful, scheduled changeover from one non-compromised CA key
key pair to the next (CA key update) must be supported (note pair to the next (CA key update) must be supported (note that if
that if the CA key is compromised, re-initialization must be the CA key is compromised, re-initialization must be performed
performed for all entities in the domain of that CA). An end for all entities in the domain of that CA). An end entity whose
entity whose TEE contains the new CA public key (following a CA TEE contains the new CA public key (following a CA key update)
key update) may also need to be able to verify certificates may also need to be able to verify certificates verifiable using
verifiable using the old public key. End entities who directly the old public key. End entities who directly trust the old CA
trust the old CA key pair may also need to be able to verify key pair may also need to be able to verify certificates signed
certificates signed using the new CA private key (required for using the new CA private key (required for situations where the
situations where the old CA public key is "hardwired" into the old CA public key is "hardwired" into the end entity's
end entity's cryptographic equipment). cryptographic equipment).
11. The functions of an RA may, in some implementations or 11. The functions of an RA may, in some implementations or
environments, be carried out by the CA itself. The protocols environments, be carried out by the CA itself. The protocols
must be designed so that end entities will use the same protocol must be designed so that end entities will use the same protocol
regardless of whether the communication is with an RA or CA. regardless of whether the communication is with an RA or CA.
Naturally, the end entity must use the correct RA or CA public Naturally, the end entity must use the correct RA or CA public
key to verify the protection of the communication. key to verify the protection of the communication.
12. Where an end entity requests a certificate containing a given 12. Where an end entity requests a certificate containing a given
public key value, the end entity must be ready to demonstrate public key value, the end entity must be ready to demonstrate
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+------+ +------+
| CA-2 | | CA-2 |
+------+ +------+
Figure 1: PKI Entities Figure 1: PKI Entities
At a high level, the set of operations for which management messages At a high level, the set of operations for which management messages
are defined can be grouped as follows. are defined can be grouped as follows.
1. CA establishment: When establishing a new CA, certain steps are 1. CA establishment: When establishing a new CA, certain steps are
required (e.g., production of initial CRLs, export of CA public required (e.g., production of initial CRLs and export of CA
key). public key).
2. End entity initialization: This includes importing a root CA 2. End entity initialization: This includes importing a root CA
public key and requesting information about the options supported public key and requesting information about the options supported
by a PKI management entity. by a PKI management entity.
3. Certification: Various operations result in the creation of new 3. Certification: Various operations result in the creation of new
certificates: certificates:
1. initial registration/certification: This is the process a. initial registration/certification: This is the process
whereby an end entity first makes itself known to a CA or RA, whereby an end entity first makes itself known to a CA or RA,
prior to the CA issuing a certificate or certificates for prior to the CA issuing a certificate or certificates for
that end entity. The end result of this process (when it is that end entity. The end result of this process (when it is
successful) is that a CA issues a certificate for an end successful) is that a CA issues a certificate for an end
entity's public key, and returns that certificate to the end entity's public key and returns that certificate to the end
entity and/or posts that certificate in a repository. This entity and/or posts that certificate in a repository. This
process may, and typically will, involve multiple "steps", process may, and typically will, involve multiple "steps",
possibly including an initialization of the end entity's possibly including an initialization of the end entity's
equipment. For example, the end entity's equipment must be equipment. For example, the end entity's equipment must be
securely initialized with the public key of a CA, e.g., using securely initialized with the public key of a CA, e.g., using
zero-touch methods like Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key zero-touch methods like Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
Infrastructure (BRSKI) [RFC8995] or Secure Zero Touch Infrastructure (BRSKI) [RFC8995] or Secure Zero Touch
Provisioning (SZTP) [RFC8572], to be used in validating Provisioning (SZTP) [RFC8572], to be used in validating
certificate paths. Furthermore, an end entity typically certificate paths. Furthermore, an end entity typically
needs to be initialized with its own key pair(s). needs to be initialized with its own key pair(s).
2. key pair update: Every key pair needs to be updated regularly b. key pair update: Every key pair needs to be updated regularly
(i.e., replaced with a new key pair), and a new certificate (i.e., replaced with a new key pair), and a new certificate
needs to be issued. needs to be issued.
3. certificate update: As certificates expire, they may be c. certificate update: As certificates expire, they may be
"refreshed" if nothing relevant in the environment has "refreshed" if nothing relevant in the environment has
changed. changed.
4. CA key pair update: As with end entities, CA key pairs need d. CA key pair update: As with end entities, CA key pairs need
to be updated regularly; however, different mechanisms are to be updated regularly; however, different mechanisms are
required. required.
5. cross-certification request: One CA requests issuance of a e. cross-certification request: One CA requests issuance of a
cross-certificate from another CA. For the purposes of this cross-certificate from another CA. For the purposes of this
standard, the following terms are defined. A "cross- standard, the following terms are defined. A "cross-
certificate" is a certificate in which the subject CA and the certificate" is a certificate in which the subject CA and the
issuer CA are distinct and SubjectPublicKeyInfo contains a issuer CA are distinct and SubjectPublicKeyInfo contains a
verification key (i.e., the certificate has been issued for verification key (i.e., the certificate has been issued for
the subject CA's signing key pair). When it is necessary to the subject CA's signing key pair). When it is necessary to
distinguish more finely, the following terms may be used: a distinguish more finely, the following terms may be used: A
cross-certificate is called an "inter-domain cross- cross-certificate is called an "inter-domain cross-
certificate" if the subject and issuer CAs belong to certificate" if the subject and issuer CAs belong to
different administrative domains; it is called an "intra- different administrative domains; it is called an "intra-
domain cross-certificate" otherwise. domain cross-certificate" otherwise.
Note 1: The above definition of "cross-certificate" aligns Note 1: The above definition of "cross-certificate" aligns
with the defined term "CA-certificate" in X.509. Note that with the defined term "CA-certificate" in X.509.
this term is not to be confused with the X.500 "cACertificate" Note that this term is not to be confused with the
attribute type, which is unrelated. X.500 "cACertificate" attribute type, which is
unrelated.
Note 2: In many environments, the term "cross-certificate", Note 2: In many environments, the term "cross-certificate",
unless further qualified, will be understood to be synonymous unless further qualified, will be understood to be
with "inter-domain cross-certificate" as defined above. synonymous with "inter-domain cross-certificate" as
defined above.
Note 3: Issuance of cross-certificates may be, but is not Note 3: Issuance of cross-certificates may be, but is not
necessarily, mutual; that is, two CAs may issue cross- necessarily, mutual; that is, two CAs may issue
certificates for each other. cross-certificates for each other.
1. [RFC-Editor: Please fix the enumeration and continue with f. cross-certificate update: Similar to a normal certificate
'6'.] cross-certificate update: Similar to a normal update but involving a cross-certificate.
certificate update, but involving a cross-certificate.
4. Certificate/CRL discovery operations: Some PKI management 4. Certificate/CRL discovery operations: Some PKI management
operations result in the publication of certificates or CRLs: operations result in the publication of certificates or CRLs:
1. certificate publication: Having gone to the trouble of a. certificate publication: Having gone to the trouble of
producing a certificate, some means for publishing may be producing a certificate, some means for publishing may be
needed. The "means" defined in PKIX MAY involve the messages needed. The "means" defined in PKIX MAY involve the messages
specified in Sections 5.3.13 to 5.3.16, or MAY involve other specified in Sections 5.3.13 to 5.3.16 or MAY involve other
methods (LDAP, for example) as described in [RFC4511] or methods (for example, Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
[RFC2585] (the "Operational Protocols" documents of the PKIX (LDAP)) as described in [RFC4511] or [RFC2585] (the
series of specifications). "Operational Protocols" documents of the PKIX series of
specifications).
2. CRL publication: As for certificate publication. b. CRL publication: As for certificate publication.
5. Recovery operations: Some PKI management operations are used when 5. Recovery operations: Some PKI management operations are used when
an end entity has "lost" its TEE: an end entity has "lost" its TEE:
1. key pair recovery: As an option, user client key materials a. key pair recovery: As an option, user client key materials
(e.g., a user's private key used for decryption purposes) MAY (e.g., a user's private key used for decryption purposes) MAY
be backed up by a CA, an RA, or a key backup system be backed up by a CA, an RA, or a key backup system
associated with a CA or RA. If an entity needs to recover associated with a CA or RA. If an entity needs to recover
these backed up key materials (e.g., as a result of a these backed up key materials (e.g., as a result of a
forgotten password or a lost key chain file), a protocol forgotten password or a lost key chain file), a protocol
exchange may be needed to support such recovery. exchange may be needed to support such recovery.
6. Revocation operations: Some PKI management operations result in 6. Revocation operations: Some PKI management operations result in
the creation of new CRL entries and/or new CRLs: the creation of new CRL entries and/or new CRLs:
1. revocation request: An authorized person advises a CA of an a. revocation request: An authorized person advises a CA of an
abnormal situation requiring certificate revocation. abnormal situation requiring certificate revocation.
7. TEE operations: Whilst the definition of TEE operations (e.g., 7. TEE operations: Whilst the definition of TEE operations (e.g.,
moving a TEE, changing a PIN, etc.) are beyond the scope of this moving a TEE, changing a PIN, etc.) are beyond the scope of this
specification, we do define a PKIMessage (CertRepMessage) that specification, we do define a PKIMessage (CertRepMessage) that
can form the basis of such operations. can form the basis of such operations.
Note that on-line protocols are not the only way of implementing the Note that on-line protocols are not the only way of implementing the
above operations. For all operations, there are off-line methods of above operations. For all operations, there are off-line methods of
achieving the same result, and this specification does not mandate achieving the same result, and this specification does not mandate
use of on-line protocols. For example, when hardware tokens are use of on-line protocols. For example, when hardware tokens are
used, many of the operations MAY be achieved as part of the physical used, many of the operations MAY be achieved as part of the physical
token delivery. token delivery.
Later sections define a set of standard messages supporting the above Later sections define a set of standard messages supporting the above
operations. Transfer protocols for conveying these exchanges in operations. Transfer protocols for conveying these exchanges in
various environments (e.g., off-line: file-based, on-line: mail, HTTP various environments (e.g., off-line: file-based; on-line: mail, HTTP
[I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc6712bis], MQTT, and CoAP [RFC9482]) are beyond the [RFC9811], MQTT, and CoAP [RFC9482]) are beyond the scope of this
scope of this document and must be specified separately. Appropriate document and must be specified separately. Appropriate transfer
transfer protocols MUST be capable of delivering the CMP messages protocols MUST be capable of delivering the CMP messages reliably.
reliably.
CMP provides inbuilt integrity protection and authentication. The CMP provides inbuilt integrity protection and authentication. The
information communicated unencrypted in CMP messages does not contain information communicated unencrypted in CMP messages does not contain
sensitive information endangering the security of the PKI when sensitive information endangering the security of the PKI when
intercepted. However, it might be possible for an eavesdropper to intercepted. However, it might be possible for an eavesdropper to
utilize the available information to gather confidential technical or utilize the available information to gather confidential technical or
business critical information. Therefore, users should consider business-critical information. Therefore, users should consider
protection of confidentiality on lower levels of the protocol stack, protection of confidentiality on lower levels of the protocol stack,
e.g., by using TLS [RFC8446], DTLS [RFC9147], or IPsec e.g., by using TLS [RFC8446], DTLS [RFC9147], or IPsec
[RFC7296][RFC4303]. [RFC7296][RFC4303].
4. Assumptions and Restrictions 4. Assumptions and Restrictions
4.1. End Entity Initialization 4.1. End Entity Initialization
The first step for an end entity in dealing with PKI management The first step for an end entity in dealing with PKI management
entities is to request information about the PKI functions supported entities is to request information about the PKI functions supported
and to securely acquire a copy of the relevant root CA public key(s). and to securely acquire a copy of the relevant root CA public key(s).
4.2. Initial Registration/Certification 4.2. Initial Registration/Certification
There are many schemes that can be used to achieve initial There are many schemes that can be used to achieve initial
registration and certification of end entities. No one method is registration and certification of end entities. No one method is
suitable for all situations due to the range of policies that a CA suitable for all situations due to the range of policies that a CA
may implement and the variation in the types of end entity which can may implement and the variation in the types of end entity that can
occur. occur.
However, we can classify the initial registration/certification However, we can classify the initial registration/certification
schemes that are supported by this specification. Note that the word schemes that are supported by this specification. Note that the word
"initial", above, is crucial: we are dealing with the situation where "initial", above, is crucial: We are dealing with the situation where
the end entity in question has had no previous contact with the PKI, the end entity in question has had no previous contact with the PKI,
except having received the root CA certificate of that PKI by some except having received the root CA certificate of that PKI by some
zero-touch method like BRSKI [RFC8995] and [I-D.ietf-anima-brski-ae] zero-touch method like BRSKI [RFC8995] [RFC9733] or SZTP [RFC8572].
or SZTP [RFC8572]. In case the end entity already possesses In case the end entity already possesses certified keys, then some
certified keys, then some simplifications/alternatives are possible. simplifications/alternatives are possible.
Having classified the schemes that are supported by this Having classified the schemes that are supported by this
specification we can then specify some as mandatory and some as specification, we can then specify some as mandatory and some as
optional. The goal is that the mandatory schemes cover a sufficient optional. The goal is that the mandatory schemes cover a sufficient
number of the cases that will arise in real use, whilst the optional number of the cases that will arise in real use, whilst the optional
schemes are available for special cases that arise less frequently. schemes are available for special cases that arise less frequently.
In this way, we achieve a balance between flexibility and ease of In this way, we achieve a balance between flexibility and ease of
implementation. implementation.
Further classification of mandatory and optional schemes addressing Further classification of mandatory and optional schemes addressing
different environments is available, e.g., in Appendix C and different environments is available, e.g., in Appendices C and D of
Appendix D of this specification on managing human user certificates this specification on managing human user certificates as well as in
as well as in the Lightweight CMP Profile [RFC9483] on fully the Lightweight CMP Profile [RFC9483] on fully automating certificate
automating certificate management in a machine-to-machine and IoT management in a machine-to-machine and Internet of Things (IoT)
environment. Also industry standards like [ETSI-3GPP.33.310] for environment. Also, industry standards like [ETSI-3GPP.33.310] for
mobile networks and [UNISIG.Subset-137] for Rail Automation adopted mobile networks and [UNISIG.Subset-137] for Rail Automation adopted
CMP and have specified a set of mandatory schemes for their use case. CMP and have specified a set of mandatory schemes for their use case.
We will now describe the classification of initial registration/ We will now describe the classification of initial registration/
certification schemes. certification schemes.
4.2.1. Criteria Used 4.2.1. Criteria Used
4.2.1.1. Initiation of Registration/Certification 4.2.1.1. Initiation of Registration/Certification
In terms of the PKI messages that are produced, we can regard the In terms of the PKI messages that are produced, we can regard the
initiation of the initial registration/certification exchanges as initiation of the initial registration/certification exchanges as
occurring wherever the first PKI message relating to the end entity occurring wherever the first PKI message relating to the end entity
is produced. Note that the real-world initiation of the is produced. Note that the real-world initiation of the
registration/certification procedure may occur elsewhere (e.g., a registration/certification procedure may occur elsewhere (e.g., a
personnel department may telephone an RA operator or using zero touch personnel department may telephone an RA operator or use zero touch
methods like BRSKI [RFC8995] or SZTP [RFC8572]). methods like BRSKI [RFC8995] or SZTP [RFC8572]).
The possible locations are at the end entity, an RA, or a CA. The possible locations are at the end entity, an RA, or a CA.
4.2.1.2. End Entity Message Origin Authentication 4.2.1.2. End Entity Message Origin Authentication
The on-line messages produced by the end entity that requires a The on-line messages produced by the end entity that requires a
certificate may be authenticated or not. The requirement here is to certificate may be authenticated or not. The requirement here is to
authenticate the origin of any messages from the end entity to the authenticate the origin of any messages from the end entity to the
PKI (CA/RA). PKI (CA/RA).
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In this specification, such authentication is achieved by two In this specification, such authentication is achieved by two
different means: different means:
* symmetric: The PKI (CA/RA) issuing the end entity with a secret * symmetric: The PKI (CA/RA) issuing the end entity with a secret
value (initial authentication key) and reference value (used to value (initial authentication key) and reference value (used to
identify the secret value) via some out-of-band means. The identify the secret value) via some out-of-band means. The
initial authentication key can then be used to protect relevant initial authentication key can then be used to protect relevant
PKI messages. PKI messages.
* asymmetric: Using a private key and certificate issued by another * asymmetric: Using a private key and certificate issued by another
PKI trusted for initial authentication, e.g., an IDevID PKI trusted for initial authentication, e.g., an Initial Device
IEEE 802.1AR [IEEE.802.1AR-2018]. The trust establishment in this Identifier (IDevID) IEEE 802.1AR [IEEE.802.1AR-2018]. The trust
external PKI is out of scope of this document. establishment in this external PKI is out of scope of this
document.
Thus, we can classify the initial registration/certification scheme Thus, we can classify the initial registration/certification scheme
according to whether or not the on-line 'end entity -> PKI management according to whether or not the on-line 'end entity -> PKI management
entity' messages are authenticated or not. entity' messages are authenticated or not.
Note 1: We do not discuss the authentication of the 'PKI management Note 1: We do not discuss the authentication of the 'PKI management
entity -> end entity' messages here, as this is always REQUIRED. In entity -> end entity' messages here, as this is always
any case, it can be achieved simply once the root-CA public key has REQUIRED. In any case, it can be achieved simply once the
been installed at the end entity's equipment or it can be based on root-CA public key has been installed at the end entity's
the initial authentication key. equipment or it can be based on the initial authentication
key.
Note 2: An initial registration/certification procedure can be secure Note 2: An initial registration/certification procedure can be
where the messages from the end entity are authenticated via some secure where the messages from the end entity are
out-of-band means (e.g., a subsequent visit). authenticated via some out-of-band means (e.g., a subsequent
visit).
4.2.1.3. Location of Key Generation 4.2.1.3. Location of Key Generation
In this specification, "key generation" is regarded as occurring In this specification, "key generation" is regarded as occurring
wherever either the public or private component of a key pair first wherever either the public or private component of a key pair first
occurs in a PKIMessage. Note that this does not preclude a occurs in a PKIMessage. Note that this does not preclude a
centralized key generation service by a KGA; the actual key pair MAY centralized key generation service by a KGA; the actual key pair MAY
have been generated elsewhere and transported to the end entity, RA, have been generated elsewhere and transported to the end entity, RA,
or CA using a (proprietary or standardized) key generation request/ or CA using a (proprietary or standardized) key generation request/
response protocol (outside the scope of this specification). response protocol (outside the scope of this specification).
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authentication key or other means). authentication key or other means).
This gives two further possibilities: confirmed or not. This gives two further possibilities: confirmed or not.
4.2.2. Initial Registration/Certification Schemes 4.2.2. Initial Registration/Certification Schemes
The criteria above allow for a large number of initial registration/ The criteria above allow for a large number of initial registration/
certification schemes. Examples of possible initial registration/ certification schemes. Examples of possible initial registration/
certification schemes can be found in the following subsections. An certification schemes can be found in the following subsections. An
entity may support other schemes specified in profiles of PKIX-CMP, entity may support other schemes specified in profiles of PKIX-CMP,
such as Appendix C and Appendix D or [RFC9483]. such as Appendices C and D or [RFC9483].
4.2.2.1. Centralized Scheme 4.2.2.1. Centralized Scheme
In terms of the classification above, this scheme is, in some ways, In terms of the classification above, this scheme is, in some ways,
the simplest possible, where: the simplest possible, where:
* initiation occurs at the certifying CA; * initiation occurs at the certifying CA;
* no on-line message authentication is required; * no on-line message authentication is required;
* "key generation" occurs at the certifying CA (see * "key generation" occurs at the certifying CA (see
Section 4.2.1.3); Section 4.2.1.3); and
* no confirmation message is required. * no confirmation message is required.
In terms of message flow, this scheme means that the only message In terms of message flow, this scheme means that the only message
required is sent from the CA to the end entity. The message must required is sent from the CA to the end entity. The message must
contain the entire TEE for the end entity. Some out-of-band means contain the entire TEE for the end entity. Some out-of-band means
must be provided to allow the end entity to authenticate the message must be provided to allow the end entity to authenticate the message
received and to decrypt any encrypted values. received and to decrypt any encrypted values.
4.2.2.2. Basic Authenticated Scheme 4.2.2.2. Basic Authenticated Scheme
In terms of the classification above, this scheme is where: In terms of the classification above, this scheme is where:
* initiation occurs at the end entity; * initiation occurs at the end entity;
* message authentication is required; * message authentication is required;
* "key generation" occurs at the end entity (see Section 4.2.1.3); * "key generation" occurs at the end entity (see Section 4.2.1.3);
and
* a confirmation message is recommended. * a confirmation message is recommended.
Note: An Initial Authentication Key (IAK) can be either a symmetric Note: An Initial Authentication Key (IAK) can be either a symmetric
key or an asymmetric private key with a certificate issued by another key or an asymmetric private key with a certificate issued by another
PKI trusted for this purpose. The establishment of such trust is out PKI trusted for this purpose. The establishment of such trust is out
of scope of this document. of scope of this document.
In terms of message flow, the basic authenticated scheme is as In terms of message flow, the basic authenticated scheme is as
follows: follows:
skipping to change at page 24, line 14 skipping to change at line 1044
out-of-band procedural means versus PKIX-CMP in-band messages) in its out-of-band procedural means versus PKIX-CMP in-band messages) in its
certification exchanges (i.e., this may be a policy issue). However, certification exchanges (i.e., this may be a policy issue). However,
it is REQUIRED that CAs/RAs MUST enforce POP by some means because it is REQUIRED that CAs/RAs MUST enforce POP by some means because
there are currently many non-PKIX operational protocols in use there are currently many non-PKIX operational protocols in use
(various electronic mail protocols are one example) that do not (various electronic mail protocols are one example) that do not
explicitly check the binding between the end entity and the private explicitly check the binding between the end entity and the private
key. Until operational protocols that do verify the binding (for key. Until operational protocols that do verify the binding (for
signature, encryption, key agreement, and KEM key pairs) exist, and signature, encryption, key agreement, and KEM key pairs) exist, and
are ubiquitous, this binding can only be assumed to have been are ubiquitous, this binding can only be assumed to have been
verified by the CA/RA. Therefore, if the binding is not verified by verified by the CA/RA. Therefore, if the binding is not verified by
the CA/RA, certificates in the Internet Public-Key Infrastructure end the CA/RA, certificates in the Internet Public Key Infrastructure end
up being somewhat less meaningful. up being somewhat less meaningful.
POP is accomplished in different ways depending upon the type of key POP is accomplished in different ways depending upon the type of key
for which a certificate is requested. If a key can be used for for which a certificate is requested. If a key can be used for
multiple purposes (e.g., an RSA key) then any appropriate method MAY multiple purposes (e.g., an RSA key), then any appropriate method MAY
be used (e.g., a key that may be used for signing, as well as other be used (e.g., a key that may be used for signing, as well as other
purposes, MUST NOT be sent to the CA/RA in order to prove possession purposes, MUST NOT be sent to the CA/RA in order to prove possession
unless archival of the private key is explicitly desired). unless archival of the private key is explicitly desired).
This specification explicitly allows for cases where an end entity This specification explicitly allows for cases where an end entity
supplies the relevant proof to an RA and the RA subsequently attests supplies the relevant proof to an RA and the RA subsequently attests
to the CA that the required proof has been received (and validated!). to the CA that the required proof has been received (and validated!).
For example, an end entity wishing to have a signing key certified For example, an end entity wishing to have a signing key certified
could send the appropriate signature to the RA, which then simply could send the appropriate signature to the RA, which then simply
notifies the relevant CA that the end entity has supplied the notifies the relevant CA that the end entity has supplied the
required proof. Of course, such a situation may be disallowed by required proof. Of course, such a situation may be disallowed by
some policies (e.g., CAs may be the only entities permitted to verify some policies (e.g., CAs may be the only entities permitted to verify
POP during certification). POP during certification).
4.3.1. Signature Keys 4.3.1. Signature Keys
For signature keys, the end entity can sign a value to prove For signature keys, the end entity can sign a value to prove
possession of the private key, see Section 5.2.8.2. possession of the private key; see Section 5.2.8.2.
4.3.2. Encryption Keys 4.3.2. Encryption Keys
For encryption keys, the end entity can provide the private key to For encryption keys, the end entity can provide the private key to
the CA/RA (e.g., for archiving), see Section 5.2.8.3.1, or can be the CA/RA (e.g., for archiving), see Section 5.2.8.3.1, or can be
required to decrypt a value in order to prove possession of the required to decrypt a value in order to prove possession of the
private key. Decrypting a value can be achieved either directly (see private key. Decrypting a value can be achieved either directly (see
Section 5.2.8.3.3) or indirectly (see Section 5.2.8.3.2). Section 5.2.8.3.3) or indirectly (see Section 5.2.8.3.2).
The direct method is for the RA/CA to issue a random challenge to The direct method is for the RA/CA to issue a random challenge to
skipping to change at page 25, line 23 skipping to change at line 1098
demonstrated using the {request, response, confirmation} triple of demonstrated using the {request, response, confirmation} triple of
messages). messages).
4.3.3. Key Agreement Keys 4.3.3. Key Agreement Keys
For key agreement keys, the end entity and the PKI management entity For key agreement keys, the end entity and the PKI management entity
(i.e., CA or RA) must establish a shared secret key in order to prove (i.e., CA or RA) must establish a shared secret key in order to prove
that the end entity has possession of the private key. that the end entity has possession of the private key.
Note that this need not impose any restrictions on the keys that can Note that this need not impose any restrictions on the keys that can
be certified by a given CA. In particular, for Diffie-Hellman keys be certified by a given CA. In particular, for Diffie-Hellman keys,
the end entity may freely choose its algorithm parameters provided the end entity may freely choose its algorithm parameters provided
that the CA can generate a short-term (or one-time) key pair with the that the CA can generate a short-term (or one-time) key pair with the
appropriate parameters when necessary. appropriate parameters when necessary.
4.3.4. Key Encapsulation Mechanism Keys 4.3.4. Key Encapsulation Mechanism Keys
For key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) keys, the end entity can For key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) keys, the end entity can
provide the private key to the CA/RA (e.g., for archiving), see provide the private key to the CA/RA (e.g., for archiving), see
Section 5.2.8.3.1, or can be required to decrypt a value in order to Section 5.2.8.3.1, or can be required to decrypt a value in order to
prove possession of the private key. Decrypting a value can be prove possession of the private key. Decrypting a value can be
achieved either directly (see Section 5.2.8.3.3) or indirectly (see achieved either directly (see Section 5.2.8.3.3) or indirectly (see
Section 5.2.8.3.2). Section 5.2.8.3.2).
Note: A definition of key encapsulation mechanisms can be found in Note: A definition of key encapsulation mechanisms can be found in
[RFC9629], Section 1. Section 1 of [RFC9629].
The direct method is for the RA/CA to issue a random challenge to The direct method is for the RA/CA to issue a random challenge to
which an immediate response by the EE is required. which an immediate response by the EE is required.
The indirect method is to issue a certificate that is encrypted for The indirect method is to issue a certificate that is encrypted for
the end entity using a shared secret key derived from a key the end entity using a shared secret key derived from a key
encapsulated using the public key (and have the end entity encapsulated using the public key (and have the end entity
demonstrate its ability to use its private key for decapsulation of demonstrate its ability to use its private key for decapsulation of
the KEM ciphertext, derive the shared secret key, decrypt this the KEM ciphertext, derive the shared secret key, decrypt this
certificate, and provide a hash of the certificate in the certificate, and provide a hash of the certificate in the
confirmation message). This allows a CA to issue a certificate in a confirmation message). This allows a CA to issue a certificate in a
form that can only be used by the intended end entity. form that can only be used by the intended end entity.
This specification encourages use of the indirect method because it This specification encourages use of the indirect method because it
requires no extra messages to be sent (i.e., the proof can be requires no extra messages to be sent (i.e., the proof can be
demonstrated using the {request, response, confirmation} triple of demonstrated using the {request, response, confirmation} triple of
messages). messages).
A certification request message for a KEM certificate SHALL use A certification request message for a KEM certificate SHALL use
POPOPrivKey by using the keyEncipherment choice of ProofOfPossession, POPOPrivKey by using the keyEncipherment choice of ProofOfPossession
see Section 5.2.8, in the popo field of CertReqMsg as long as no KEM- (see Section 5.2.8) in the popo field of CertReqMsg as long as no
specific choice is available. KEM-specific choice is available.
4.4. Root CA Key Update 4.4. Root CA Key Update
This discussion only applies to CAs that are directly trusted by some This discussion only applies to CAs that are directly trusted by some
end entities. Recognizing whether a self-signed or non-self-signed end entities. Recognizing whether a self-signed or non-self-signed
CA is supposed to be directly trusted for some end entities is a CA is supposed to be directly trusted for some end entities is a
matter of CA policy and end entity configuration. This is thus matter of CA policy and end entity configuration. Thus, this is
beyond the scope of this document. beyond the scope of this document.
The basis of the procedure described here is that the CA protects its The basis of the procedure described here is that the CA protects its
new public key using its previous private key and vice versa. Thus, new public key using its previous private key and vice versa. Thus,
when a CA updates its key pair it may generate two link certificates when a CA updates its key pair, it may generate two link
"old with new" and "new with old". certificates: "old with new" and "new with old".
Note: The usage of link certificates has been shown to be very use Note: The usage of link certificates has been shown to be very
case specific and no assumptions are done on this aspect. specific for each use case, and no assumptions are done on this
RootCaKeyUpdateContent is updated to specify these link certificates aspect. RootCaKeyUpdateContent is updated to specify these link
as optional. certificates as optional.
Note: When an LDAP directory is used to publish root CA updates, the Note: When an LDAP directory is used to publish root CA updates, the
old and new root CA certificates together with the two link old and new root CA certificates together with the two link
certificates are stored as cACertificate attribute values. certificates are stored as cACertificate attribute values.
When a CA changes its key pair, those entities who have acquired the When a CA changes its key pair, those entities who have acquired the
old CA public key via "out-of-band" means are most affected. These old CA public key via "out-of-band" means are most affected. These
end entities need to acquire the new CA public key in a trusted way. end entities need to acquire the new CA public key in a trusted way.
This may be achieved "out-of-band", by using a repository, or by This may be achieved "out-of-band" by using a repository or by using
using online messages also containing the link certificates "new with online messages also containing the link certificates "new with old".
old". Once the end entity acquired and properly verified the new CA Once the end entity acquired and properly verified the new CA public
public key, it must load the new trust anchor information into its key, it must load the new trust anchor information into its trusted
trusted store. store.
The data structure used to protect the new and old CA public keys is The data structure used to protect the new and old CA public keys is
typically a standard X.509 v3 certificate (which may also contain typically a standard X.509 v3 certificate (which may also contain
extensions). There are no new data structures required. extensions). There are no new data structures required.
Note: Sometimes self-signed root CA certificates do not make use of Note: Sometimes self-signed root CA certificates do not make use of
X.509 v3 extensions and may be X.509 v1 certificates. Therefore, a X.509 v3 extensions and may be X.509 v1 certificates. Therefore, a
root CA key update must be able to work for version 1 certificates. root CA key update must be able to work for version 1 certificates.
The use of the X.509 v3 KeyIdentifier extension is recommended for The use of the X.509 v3 KeyIdentifier extension is recommended for
easier path building. easier path building.
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period. period.
Note: This scheme offers a mechanism to ensures that end entities Note: This scheme offers a mechanism to ensures that end entities
will acquire the new CA public key, at the latest by the expiry of will acquire the new CA public key, at the latest by the expiry of
the last certificate they owned that was signed with the old CA the last certificate they owned that was signed with the old CA
private key. Certificate and/or key update operations occurring at private key. Certificate and/or key update operations occurring at
other times do not necessarily require this (depending on the end other times do not necessarily require this (depending on the end
entity's equipment). entity's equipment).
Note: In practice, a new root CA may have a slightly different Note: In practice, a new root CA may have a slightly different
subject DN, e.g., indicating a generation identifier like the year of subject Distinguished Name (DN), e.g., indicating a generation
issuance or a version number, for instance in an OU element. How to identifier like the year of issuance or a version number, for
bridge trust to the new root CA certificate in a CA DN change or a instance, in an Organizational Unit (OU) element. How to bridge
cross-certificate scenario is out of scope for this document. trust to the new root CA certificate in a CA DN change or a cross-
certificate scenario is out of scope for this document.
4.4.1. CA Operator Actions 4.4.1. CA Operator Actions
To change the key of the CA, the CA operator does the following: To change the key of the CA, the CA operator does the following:
1. Generate a new key pair. 1. Generate a new key pair.
2. Create a certificate containing the new CA public key signed with 2. Create a certificate containing the new CA public key signed with
the new private key or by the private key of some other CA (the the new private key or by the private key of some other CA (the
"new with new" certificate). "new with new" certificate).
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The "new with old" certificate must have a validity period with the The "new with old" certificate must have a validity period with the
same notBefore time as the "new with new" certificate and a notAfter same notBefore time as the "new with new" certificate and a notAfter
time by which all end entities of this CA will securely possess the time by which all end entities of this CA will securely possess the
new CA public key (at the latest, at the notAfter time of the "old new CA public key (at the latest, at the notAfter time of the "old
with old" certificate). with old" certificate).
The "old with new" certificate must have a validity period with the The "old with new" certificate must have a validity period with the
same notBefore and notAfter time as the "old with old" certificate. same notBefore and notAfter time as the "old with old" certificate.
Note: Further operational considerations on transition from one root Note: Further operational considerations on transition from one root
CA self-signed certificate to the next is available in RFC 8649 CA self-signed certificate to the next is available in Section 5 of
Section 5 [RFC8649]. [RFC8649].
4.4.2. Verifying Certificates 4.4.2. Verifying Certificates
Normally when verifying a signature, the verifier verifies (among Normally when verifying a signature, the verifier verifies (among
other things) the certificate containing the public key of the other things) the certificate containing the public key of the
signer. However, once a CA is allowed to update its key there are a signer. However, once a CA is allowed to update its key, there are a
range of new possibilities. These are shown in the table below. range of new possibilities. These are shown in the table below.
+======================+======================+=====================+ +======================+======================+=====================+
| | Verifier's TEE | Verifier's TEE | | | Verifier's TEE | Verifier's TEE |
| | contains NEW public | contains OLD | | | contains NEW public | contains OLD |
| | key | public key | | | key | public key |
+======================+======================+=====================+ +======================+======================+=====================+
| Signer's certificate | Case 1: The verifier | Case 2: The | | Signer's certificate | Case 1: The verifier | Case 2: The |
| is protected using | can directly verify | verifier is | | is protected using | can directly verify | verifier is |
| NEW key pair | the certificate. | missing the NEW | | NEW key pair | the certificate. | missing the NEW |
| | | public key. | | | | public key. |
+----------------------+----------------------+---------------------+ +======================+----------------------+---------------------+
| Signer's certificate | Case 3: The verifier | Case 4: The | | Signer's certificate | Case 3: The verifier | Case 4: The |
| is protected using | is missing the OLD | verifier can | | is protected using | is missing the OLD | verifier can |
| OLD key pair | public key. | directly verify | | OLD key pair | public key. | directly verify |
| | | the certificate. | | | | the certificate. |
+----------------------+----------------------+---------------------+ +======================+----------------------+---------------------+
Table 1 Table 1
4.4.2.1. Verification in Cases 1 and 4 4.4.2.1. Verification in Cases 1 and 4
In these cases, the verifier has a local copy of the CA public key In these cases, the verifier has a local copy of the CA public key
that can be used to verify the certificate directly. This is the that can be used to verify the certificate directly. This is the
same as the situation where no key change has occurred. same as the situation where no key change has occurred.
4.4.2.2. Verification in Case 2 4.4.2.2. Verification in Case 2
In case 2, the verifier must get access to the new public key of the In case 2, the verifier must get access to the new public key of the
CA. Case 2 will arise when the CA operator has issued the verifier's CA. Case 2 will arise when the CA operator has issued the verifier's
certificate, then changed the CA's key, and then issued the signer's certificate, then changed the CA's key, and then issued the signer's
certificate; so it is quite a typical case. certificate; so it is quite a typical case.
The verifier does the following: The verifier does the following:
1. Get the "new with new" and "new with old" certificates. The 1. Get the "new with new" and "new with old" certificates. The
location to retrieve theses certificates from, may be available location of where to retrieve these certificates may be available
in the authority information access extension of the "old with in the authority information access extension of the "old with
old" certificate, see caIssuers access method in Section 4.2.2.1 old" certificate (see the access method for caIssuers in
of [RFC5280], or it may be locally configured. Section 4.2.2.1 of [RFC5280]), or it may be locally configured.
1. If a repository is available, look up the certificates in the a. If a repository is available, look up the certificates in the
caCertificate attribute. caCertificate attribute.
2. If a HTTP or FTP server is available, pick the certificates b. If an HTTP or FTP server is available, pick the certificates
from the "certs-only" CMS message. from the "certs-only" CMS message.
3. If a CMP server is available, request the certificates using c. If a CMP server is available, request the certificates using
the root CA update general message, see Section 5.3.19.15. the root CA update the general message (see
Section 5.3.19.15).
4. Otherwise, get the certificates "out-of-band" using any d. Otherwise, get the certificates "out-of-band" using any
trustworthy mechanism. trustworthy mechanism.
2. If received the certificates, check that the validity periods and 2. If the certificates are received, check that the validity periods
the subject and issuer fields match. Verify the signatures using and the subject and issuer fields match. Verify the signatures
the old root CA key (which the verifier has locally). using the old root CA key (which the verifier has locally).
3. If all checks were successful, securely store the new trust 3. If all checks are successful, securely store the new trust anchor
anchor information and validate the signer's certificate. information and validate the signer's certificate.
4.4.2.3. Verification in Case 3 4.4.2.3. Verification in Case 3
In case 3, the verifier must get access to the old public key of the In case 3, the verifier must get access to the old public key of the
CA. Case 3 will arise when the CA operator has issued the signer's CA. Case 3 will arise when the CA operator has issued the signer's
certificate, then changed the key, and then issued the verifier's certificate, then changed the key, and then issued the verifier's
certificate. certificate.
The verifier does the following: The verifier does the following:
1. Get the "old with new" certificate. The location to retrieve 1. Get the "old with new" certificate. The location of where to
theses certificates from, may be available in the authority retrieve these certificates may be available in the authority
information access extension of the "new with new" certificate, information access extension of the "new with new" certificate
see caIssuers access method in Section 4.2.2.1 of [RFC5280], or (see caIssuers access method in Section 4.2.2.1 of [RFC5280]), or
it may be locally configured. it may be locally configured.
1. If a repository is available, look up the certificate in the a. If a repository is available, look up the certificate in the
caCertificate attribute. caCertificate attribute.
2. If a HTTP or FTP server is available, pick the certificate b. If an HTTP or FTP server is available, pick the certificate
from the "certs-only" CMS message. from the "certs-only" CMS message.
3. If a CMP server and an untrusted copy of the old root CA c. If a CMP server and an untrusted copy of the old root CA
certificate is available (e.g., the signer provided it in- certificate are available (e.g., the signer provided it in-
band in the CMP extraCerts filed), request the certificate band in the CMP extraCerts filed), request the certificate
using the root CA update general message, see using the root CA update the general message (see
Section 5.3.19.15. Section 5.3.19.15).
4. Otherwise, get the certificate "out-of-band" using any d. Otherwise, get the certificate "out-of-band" using any
trustworthy mechanism. trustworthy mechanism.
2. If received the certificate, check that the validity periods and 2. If the certificate is received, check that the validity periods
the subject and issuer fields match. Verify the signatures using and the subject and issuer fields match. Verify the signatures
the new root CA key (which the verifier has locally). using the new root CA key (which the verifier has locally).
3. If all checks were successful, securely store the old trust 3. If all checks were successful, securely store the old trust
anchor information and validate the signer's certificate. anchor information and validate the signer's certificate.
4.4.3. Revocation - Change of CA Key 4.4.3. Revocation - Change of the CA Key
As we saw above, the verification of a certificate becomes more As we saw above, the verification of a certificate becomes more
complex once the CA is allowed to change its key. This is also true complex once the CA is allowed to change its key. This is also true
for revocation checks as the CA may have signed the CRL using a newer for revocation checks, as the CA may have signed the CRL using a
private key than the one within the user's TEE. newer private key than the one within the user's TEE.
The analysis of the alternatives is the same as for certificate The analysis of the alternatives is the same as for certificate
verification. verification.
4.5. Extended Key Usage for PKI Entities 4.5. Extended Key Usage for PKI Entities
The extended key usage (EKU) extension indicates the purposes for The extended key usage (EKU) extension indicates the purposes for
which the certified key pair may be used. Therefore, it restricts which the certified key pair may be used. Therefore, it restricts
the use of a certificate to specific applications. the use of a certificate to specific applications.
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security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) 32 } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) 32 }
Note: Section 2.10 of [RFC6402] specifies OIDs for a Certificate Note: Section 2.10 of [RFC6402] specifies OIDs for a Certificate
Management over CMS (CMC) CA and a CMC RA. As the functionality of a Management over CMS (CMC) CA and a CMC RA. As the functionality of a
CA and RA is not specific to any certificate management protocol CA and RA is not specific to any certificate management protocol
(such as CMC or CMP), these EKUs are reused by CMP. (such as CMC or CMP), these EKUs are reused by CMP.
The meaning of the id-kp-cmKGA EKU is as follows: The meaning of the id-kp-cmKGA EKU is as follows:
CMP KGA: CMP key generation authorities are CAs or are identified by CMP KGA: CMP key generation authorities are CAs or are identified by
the id-kp-cmKGA extended key usage. The CMP KGA knows the the id-kp-cmKGA extended key usage. The CMP KGA knows the private
private key it generated on behalf of the end entity. This key it generated on behalf of the end entity. This is a very
is a very sensitive service and needs specific sensitive service and needs specific authorization, which by
authorization, which by default is with the CA certificate default is with the CA certificate itself. The CA may delegate
itself. The CA may delegate its authorization by placing its authorization by placing the id-kp-cmKGA extended key usage in
the id-kp-cmKGA extended key usage in the certificate used the certificate used to authenticate the origin of the generated
to authenticate the origin of the generated private key. private key. The authorization may also be determined through
The authorization may also be determined through local local configuration of the end entity.
configuration of the end entity.
5. Data Structures 5. Data Structures
This section contains descriptions of the data structures required This section contains descriptions of the data structures required
for PKI management messages. Section 6 describes constraints on for PKI management messages. Section 6 describes constraints on
their values and the sequence of events for each of the various PKI their values and the sequence of events for each of the various PKI
management operations. management operations.
5.1. Overall PKI Message 5.1. Overall PKI Message
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messages. messages.
The PKIBody contains message-specific information. The PKIBody contains message-specific information.
The PKIProtection, when used, contains bits that protect the PKI The PKIProtection, when used, contains bits that protect the PKI
message. message.
The extraCerts field can contain certificates that may be useful to The extraCerts field can contain certificates that may be useful to
the recipient. For example, this can be used by a CA or RA to the recipient. For example, this can be used by a CA or RA to
present an end entity with certificates that it needs to verify its present an end entity with certificates that it needs to verify its
own new certificate (if, for example, the CA that issued the end own new certificate (for example, if the CA that issued the end
entity's certificate is not a root CA for the end entity). Note that entity's certificate is not a root CA for the end entity). Note that
this field does not necessarily contain a certification path; the this field does not necessarily contain a certification path; the
recipient may have to sort, select from, or otherwise process the recipient may have to sort, select from, or otherwise process the
extra certificates in order to use them. extra certificates in order to use them.
5.1.1. PKI Message Header 5.1.1. PKI Message Header
All PKI messages require some header information for addressing and All PKI messages require some header information for addressing and
transaction identification. Some of this information will also be transaction identification. Some of this information will also be
present in a transport-specific envelope. However, if the PKI present in a transport-specific envelope. However, if the PKI
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PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
The usage of the protocol version number (pvno) is described in The usage of the protocol version number (pvno) is described in
Section 7. Section 7.
The sender field contains the name of the sender of the PKIMessage. The sender field contains the name of the sender of the PKIMessage.
This name (in conjunction with senderKID, if supplied) should be This name (in conjunction with senderKID, if supplied) should be
sufficient to indicate the key to use to verify the protection on the sufficient to indicate the key to use to verify the protection on the
message. If nothing about the sender is known to the sending entity message. If nothing about the sender is known to the sending entity
(e.g., in the initial request message, where the end entity may not (e.g., in the initial request message, where the end entity may not
know its own Distinguished Name (DN), e-mail name, IP address, etc.), know its own Distinguished Name (DN), email name, IP address, etc.),
then the "sender" field MUST contain a "NULL-DN" value in the then the "sender" field MUST contain a "NULL-DN" value in the
directoryName choice. A "NULL-DN" is a SEQUENCE OF relative directoryName choice. A "NULL-DN" is a SEQUENCE OF relative
distinguished names of zero length and is encoded as 0x3000. In such distinguished names of zero length and is encoded as 0x3000. In such
a case, the senderKID field MUST hold an identifier (i.e., a a case, the senderKID field MUST hold an identifier (i.e., a
reference number) that indicates to the receiver the appropriate reference number) that indicates to the receiver the appropriate
shared secret information to use to verify the message. shared secret information to use to verify the message.
The recipient field contains the name of the recipient of the The recipient field contains the name of the recipient of the
PKIMessage. This name (in conjunction with recipKID, if supplied) PKIMessage. This name (in conjunction with recipKID, if supplied)
should be usable to verify the protection on the message. should be usable to verify the protection on the message.
The protectionAlg field specifies the algorithm used to protect the The protectionAlg field specifies the algorithm used to protect the
message. If no protection bits are supplied (note that PKIProtection message. If no protection bits are supplied (note that PKIProtection
is OPTIONAL) then this field MUST be omitted; if protection bits are is OPTIONAL), then this field MUST be omitted; if protection bits are
supplied, then this field MUST be supplied. supplied, then this field MUST be supplied.
senderKID and recipKID are usable to indicate which keys have been senderKID and recipKID are usable to indicate which keys have been
used to protect the message (recipKID will normally only be required used to protect the message (recipKID will normally only be required
where protection of the message uses Diffie-Hellman (DH) or where protection of the message uses Diffie-Hellman (DH) or Elliptic
elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) keys). These fields MUST be Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) keys). These fields MUST be used if
used if required to uniquely identify a key (e.g., if more than one required to uniquely identify a key (e.g., if more than one key is
key is associated with a given sender name). The senderKID SHOULD be associated with a given sender name). The senderKID SHOULD be used
used in any case. in any case.
Note: The recommendation of using senderKID is changed since Note: The recommendation of using senderKID has changed since
[RFC4210], where it was recommended to be omitted if not needed to [RFC4210], where it was recommended to be omitted if not needed to
identify the protection key. identify the protection key.
The transactionID field within the message header is to be used to The transactionID field within the message header is to be used to
allow the recipient of a message to correlate this with an ongoing allow the recipient of a message to correlate this with an ongoing
transaction. This is needed for all transactions that consist of transaction. This is needed for all transactions that consist of
more than just a single request/response pair. For transactions that more than just a single request/response pair. For transactions that
consist of a single request/response pair, the rules are as follows. consist of a single request/response pair, the rules are as follows.
A client MUST populate the transactionID field if the message A client MUST populate the transactionID field if the message
contains an infoValue of type KemCiphertextInfo, see Section 5.1.3.4. contains an infoValue of type KemCiphertextInfo (see
In all other cases the client MAY populate the transactionID field of Section 5.1.3.4). In all other cases, the client MAY populate the
the request. If a server receives such a request that has the transactionID field of the request. If a server receives such a
transactionID field set, then it MUST set the transactionID field of request that has the transactionID field set, then it MUST set the
the response to the same value. If a server receives such request transactionID field of the response to the same value. If a server
with a missing transactionID field, then it MUST populate the receives such request with a missing transactionID field, then it
transactionID field if the message contains a KemCiphertextInfo MUST populate the transactionID field if the message contains a
field. In all other cases the server MAY set transactionID field of KemCiphertextInfo field. In all other cases, the server MAY set the
the response. transactionID field of the response.
For transactions that consist of more than just a single request/ For transactions that consist of more than just a single request/
response pair, the rules are as follows. If the message contains an response pair, the rules are as follows. If the message contains an
infoValue of type KemCiphertextInfo, the client MUST generate a infoValue of type KemCiphertextInfo, the client MUST generate a
transactionID, otherwise the client SHOULD generate a transactionID transactionID; otherwise, the client SHOULD generate a transactionID
for the first request. If a server receives such a request that has for the first request. If a server receives such a request that has
the transactionID field set, then it MUST set the transactionID field the transactionID field set, then it MUST set the transactionID field
of the response to the same value. If a server receives such request of the response to the same value. If a server receives such request
with a missing transactionID field, then it MUST populate the with a missing transactionID field, then it MUST populate the
transactionID field of the response with a server-generated ID. transactionID field of the response with a server-generated ID.
Subsequent requests and responses MUST all set the transactionID Subsequent requests and responses MUST all set the transactionID
field to the thus established value. In all cases where a field to the thus established value. In all cases where a
transactionID is being used, a given client MUST NOT have more than transactionID is being used, a given client MUST NOT have more than
one transaction with the same transactionID in progress at any time one transaction with the same transactionID in progress at any time
(to a given server). Servers are free to require uniqueness of the (to a given server). Servers are free to require uniqueness of the
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messages with the corresponding transaction. Typically, this means messages with the corresponding transaction. Typically, this means
that a server will require the {client, transactionID} tuple to be that a server will require the {client, transactionID} tuple to be
unique, or even the transactionID alone to be unique, if it cannot unique, or even the transactionID alone to be unique, if it cannot
distinguish clients based on any transport-level information. A distinguish clients based on any transport-level information. A
server receiving the first message of a transaction (which requires server receiving the first message of a transaction (which requires
more than a single request/response pair) that contains a more than a single request/response pair) that contains a
transactionID that does not allow it to meet the above constraints transactionID that does not allow it to meet the above constraints
(typically because the transactionID is already in use) MUST send (typically because the transactionID is already in use) MUST send
back an ErrorMsgContent with a PKIFailureInfo of transactionIdInUse. back an ErrorMsgContent with a PKIFailureInfo of transactionIdInUse.
It is RECOMMENDED that the clients fill the transactionID field with It is RECOMMENDED that the clients fill the transactionID field with
128 bits of (pseudo-) random data for the start of a transaction to 128 bits of (pseudo-)random data for the start of a transaction to
reduce the probability of having the transactionID in use at the reduce the probability of having the transactionID in use at the
server. server.
The senderNonce and recipNonce fields protect the PKIMessage against The senderNonce and recipNonce fields protect the PKIMessage against
replay attacks. The senderNonce will typically be 128 bits of replay attacks. The senderNonce will typically be 128 bits of
(pseudo-) random data generated by the sender, whereas the recipNonce (pseudo-)random data generated by the sender, whereas the recipNonce
is copied from the senderNonce field of the previous message in the is copied from the senderNonce field of the previous message in the
transaction. transaction.
The messageTime field contains the time at which the sender created The messageTime field contains the time at which the sender created
the message. This may be useful to allow end entities to correct/ the message. This may be useful to allow end entities to correct/
check their local time for consistency with the time on a central check their local time for consistency with the time on a central
system. system.
The freeText field may be used to send a human-readable message to The freeText field may be used to send a human-readable message to
the recipient (in any number of languages). Each UTF8String MAY the recipient (in any number of languages). Each UTF8String MAY
include an [RFC5646] language tag to indicate the language of the include a language tag [RFC5646] to indicate the language of the
contained text. The first language used in this sequence indicates contained text. The first language used in this sequence indicates
the desired language for replies. the desired language for replies.
The generalInfo field may be used to send machine-processable The generalInfo field may be used to send machine-processable
additional data to the recipient. The following generalInfo additional data to the recipient. The following generalInfo
extensions are defined and MAY be supported. extensions are defined and MAY be supported.
5.1.1.1. ImplicitConfirm 5.1.1.1. ImplicitConfirm
This is used by the EE to inform the CA or RA that it does not wish This is used by the EE to inform the CA or RA that it does not wish
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generalInfo field of the PKIHeader of a PKIMessage. This is used by generalInfo field of the PKIHeader of a PKIMessage. This is used by
the RA to inform the CA of the original PKIMessage that it received the RA to inform the CA of the original PKIMessage that it received
from the EE and modified in some way (e.g., added or modified from the EE and modified in some way (e.g., added or modified
particular field values or added new extensions) before forwarding particular field values or added new extensions) before forwarding
the new PKIMessage. This accommodates, for example, cases in which the new PKIMessage. This accommodates, for example, cases in which
the CA wishes to check the message origin, the POP, or other the CA wishes to check the message origin, the POP, or other
information on the original EE message. information on the original EE message.
Note: If the changes made by the RA to the original PKIMessage break Note: If the changes made by the RA to the original PKIMessage break
the POP of a certificate request, the RA can set the popo field of the POP of a certificate request, the RA can set the popo field of
the new PKIMessage to raVerified, see Section 5.2.8.4. the new PKIMessage to raVerified (see Section 5.2.8.4).
Unless the OrigPKIMessage infoValue is in the header of a nested Unless the OrigPKIMessage infoValue is in the header of a nested
message, it MUST contain exactly one PKIMessage. The contents of message, it MUST contain exactly one PKIMessage. The contents of
OrigPKIMessage infoValue in the header of a nested message MAY OrigPKIMessage infoValue in the header of a nested message MAY
contain multiple PKIMessage structures, which MUST be in the same contain multiple PKIMessage structures, which MUST be in the same
order as the PKIMessage structures in PKIBody. order as the PKIMessage structures in PKIBody.
id-it-origPKIMessage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15} id-it-origPKIMessage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15}
OrigPKIMessageValue ::= PKIMessages OrigPKIMessageValue ::= PKIMessages
5.1.1.4. CertProfile 5.1.1.4. CertProfile
This is used by the EE to indicate specific certificate profiles, This is used by the EE to indicate specific certificate profiles,
e.g., when requesting a new certificate or a certificate request e.g., when requesting a new certificate or a certificate request
template; see Section 5.3.19.16. template (see Section 5.3.19.16).
id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21} id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21}
CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
When used in a p10cr message, the CertProfileValue sequence MUST NOT When used in a p10cr message, the CertProfileValue sequence MUST NOT
contain multiple certificate profile names. When used in an contain multiple certificate profile names. When used in an
ir/cr/kur/genm message, the CertProfileValue sequence MUST NOT ir/cr/kur/genm message, the CertProfileValue sequence MUST NOT
contain more certificate profile names than the number of CertReqMsg contain more certificate profile names than the number of CertReqMsg
or GenMsgContent InfoTypeAndValue elements contained in the message or GenMsgContent InfoTypeAndValue elements contained in the message
body. body.
skipping to change at page 38, line 12 skipping to change at line 1660
InfoTypeAndValue elements, the remaining CertReqMsg or GenMsgContent InfoTypeAndValue elements, the remaining CertReqMsg or GenMsgContent
InfoTypeAndValue elements have no profile name associated with them. InfoTypeAndValue elements have no profile name associated with them.
5.1.1.5. KemCiphertextInfo 5.1.1.5. KemCiphertextInfo
A PKI entity MAY provide the KEM ciphertext for MAC-based message A PKI entity MAY provide the KEM ciphertext for MAC-based message
protection using KEM (see Section 5.1.3.4) in the generalInfo field protection using KEM (see Section 5.1.3.4) in the generalInfo field
of a request message to a PKI management entity if it knows that the of a request message to a PKI management entity if it knows that the
PKI management entity uses a KEM key pair and has its public key. PKI management entity uses a KEM key pair and has its public key.
id-it-KemCiphertextInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-it TBD1 } id-it-KemCiphertextInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-it 24 }
KemCiphertextInfoValue ::= KemCiphertextInfo KemCiphertextInfoValue ::= KemCiphertextInfo
For more details of KEM-based message protection see Section 5.1.3.4. For more details of KEM-based message protection, see
See Section 5.3.19.18 for the definition of {id-it TBD1}. Section 5.1.3.4. See Section 5.3.19.18 for the definition of {id-it
24}.
5.1.2. PKI Message Body 5.1.2. PKI Message Body
PKIBody ::= CHOICE { PKIBody ::= CHOICE {
ir [0] CertReqMessages, --Initialization Req ir [0] CertReqMessages, --Initialization Req
ip [1] CertRepMessage, --Initialization Resp ip [1] CertRepMessage, --Initialization Resp
cr [2] CertReqMessages, --Certification Req cr [2] CertReqMessages, --Certification Req
cp [3] CertRepMessage, --Certification Resp cp [3] CertRepMessage, --Certification Resp
p10cr [4] CertificationRequest, --PKCS #10 Cert. Req. p10cr [4] CertificationRequest, --PKCS #10 Cert. Req.
popdecc [5] POPODecKeyChallContent, --pop Challenge popdecc [5] POPODecKeyChallContent, --pop Challenge
skipping to change at page 39, line 13 skipping to change at line 1709
The specific types are described in Section 5.3 below. The specific types are described in Section 5.3 below.
5.1.3. PKI Message Protection 5.1.3. PKI Message Protection
Some PKI messages will be protected for integrity. Some PKI messages will be protected for integrity.
Note: If an asymmetric algorithm is used to protect a message and the Note: If an asymmetric algorithm is used to protect a message and the
relevant public component has been certified already, then the origin relevant public component has been certified already, then the origin
of the message can also be authenticated. On the other hand, if the of the message can also be authenticated. On the other hand, if the
public component is uncertified, then the message origin cannot be public component is uncertified, then the message origin cannot be
automatically authenticated, but may be authenticated via out-of-band automatically authenticated but may be authenticated via out-of-band
means. means.
When protection is applied, the following structure is used: When protection is applied, the following structure is used:
PKIProtection ::= BIT STRING PKIProtection ::= BIT STRING
The input to the calculation of PKIProtection is the DER encoding of The input to the calculation of PKIProtection is the DER encoding of
the following data structure: the following data structure:
ProtectedPart ::= SEQUENCE { ProtectedPart ::= SEQUENCE {
skipping to change at page 39, line 38 skipping to change at line 1734
There MAY be cases in which the PKIProtection BIT STRING is There MAY be cases in which the PKIProtection BIT STRING is
deliberately not used to protect a message (i.e., this OPTIONAL field deliberately not used to protect a message (i.e., this OPTIONAL field
is omitted) because other protection, external to PKIX, will be is omitted) because other protection, external to PKIX, will be
applied instead. Such a choice is explicitly allowed in this applied instead. Such a choice is explicitly allowed in this
specification. Examples of such external protection include CMS specification. Examples of such external protection include CMS
[RFC5652] and Security Multiparts [RFC1847] encapsulation of the [RFC5652] and Security Multiparts [RFC1847] encapsulation of the
PKIMessage (or simply the PKIBody (omitting the CHOICE tag), if the PKIMessage (or simply the PKIBody (omitting the CHOICE tag), if the
relevant PKIHeader information is securely carried in the external relevant PKIHeader information is securely carried in the external
mechanism). It is noted, however, that many such external mechanisms mechanism). It is noted, however, that many such external mechanisms
require that the end entity already possesses a public-key require that the end entity already possesses a public-key
certificate, and/or a unique Distinguished Name, and/or other such certificate, a unique Distinguished Name, and/or other such
infrastructure-related information. Thus, they may not be infrastructure-related information. Thus, they may not be
appropriate for initial registration, key-recovery, or any other appropriate for initial registration, key-recovery, or any other
process with "boot-strapping" characteristics. For those cases it process with "boot-strapping" characteristics. For those cases, it
may be necessary that the PKIProtection parameter be used. In the may be necessary that the PKIProtection parameter be used. In the
future, if/when external mechanisms are modified to accommodate boot- future, if/when external mechanisms are modified to accommodate boot-
strapping scenarios, the use of PKIProtection may become rare or non- strapping scenarios, the use of PKIProtection may become rare or non-
existent. existent.
Depending on the circumstances, the PKIProtection bits may contain a Depending on the circumstances, the PKIProtection bits may contain a
Message Authentication Code (MAC) or signature. Only the following Message Authentication Code (MAC) or signature. Only the following
cases can occur: cases can occur:
5.1.3.1. Shared Secret Information 5.1.3.1. Shared Secret Information
In this case, the sender and recipient share secret information with In this case, the sender and recipient share secret information with
sufficient entropy (established via out-of-band means). sufficient entropy (established via out-of-band means).
PKIProtection will contain a MAC value and the protectionAlg MAY be PKIProtection will contain a MAC value, and the protectionAlg MAY be
one of the options described in CMP Algorithms Section 6.1 [RFC9481]. one of the options described in Section 6.1 of CMP Algorithms
[RFC9481].
The algorithm identifier id-PasswordBasedMac is defined in The algorithm identifier id-PasswordBasedMac is defined in
Section 4.4 of [RFC4211] and updated by [RFC9045]. It is mentioned Section 4.4 of [RFC4211] and updated by [RFC9045]. It is mentioned
in Section 6.1.1 of [RFC9481] for backward compatibility. More in Section 6.1.1 of [RFC9481] for backward compatibility. More
modern alternatives are listed in Section 6.1 of [RFC9481]. modern alternatives are listed in Section 6.1 of [RFC9481].
id-PasswordBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 2 840 113533 7 66 13} id-PasswordBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 2 840 113533 7 66 13}
PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE { PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
salt OCTET STRING, salt OCTET STRING,
owf AlgorithmIdentifier, owf AlgorithmIdentifier,
iterationCount INTEGER, iterationCount INTEGER,
mac AlgorithmIdentifier mac AlgorithmIdentifier
} }
The following text gives a method of key expansion to be used when The following text gives a method of key expansion to be used when
the MAC-algorithm requires an input length that is larger than the the MAC algorithm requires an input length that is larger than the
size of the one-way-function. size of the one-way function.
Note: Section 4.4 of [RFC4211] and [RFC9045] do not mention this key Note: Section 4.4 of [RFC4211] and [RFC9045] do not mention this key
expansion method and gives an example using HMAC algorithms where key expansion method or give an example using HMAC algorithms where key
expansion is not needed. It is recognized that this omission in expansion is not needed. It is recognized that this omission in
[RFC4211] can lead to confusion and possible incompatibility if [RFC4211] can lead to confusion and possible incompatibility if key
[RFC4210] key expansion is not used when needed. Therefore, when key expansion [RFC4210] is not used when needed. Therefore, when key
expansion is required (when K > H) the key expansion defined in the expansion is required (when K > H), the key expansion defined in the
following text MUST be used. following text MUST be used.
In the above protectionAlg, the salt value is appended to the shared In the above protectionAlg, the salt value is appended to the shared
secret input. The OWF is then applied iterationCount times, where secret input. The one-way function (OWF) is then applied
the salted secret is the input to the first iteration and, for each iterationCount times, where the salted secret is the input to the
successive iteration, the input is set to be the output of the first iteration and, for each successive iteration, the input is set
previous iteration. The output of the final iteration (called to be the output of the previous iteration. The output of the final
"BASEKEY" for ease of reference, with a size of "H") is what is used iteration (called "BASEKEY" for ease of reference, with a size of
to form the symmetric key. If the MAC algorithm requires a K-bit key "H") is what is used to form the symmetric key. If the MAC algorithm
and K <= H, then the most significant K bits of BASEKEY are used. If requires a K-bit key and K <= H, then the most significant K bits of
K > H, then all of BASEKEY is used for the most significant H bits of BASEKEY are used. If K > H, then all of BASEKEY is used for the most
the key, OWF("1" || BASEKEY) is used for the next most significant H significant H bits of the key, OWF("1" || BASEKEY) is used for the
bits of the key, OWF("2" || BASEKEY) is used for the next most next most significant H bits of the key, OWF("2" || BASEKEY) is used
significant H bits of the key, and so on, until all K bits have been for the next most significant H bits of the key, and so on, until all
derived. [Here "N" is the ASCII byte encoding the number N and "||" K bits have been derived. [Here "N" is the ASCII byte encoding the
represents concatenation.] number N and "||" represents concatenation.]
Note: It is RECOMMENDED that the fields of PBMParameter remain Note: It is RECOMMENDED that the fields of PBMParameter remain
constant throughout the messages of a single transaction (e.g., constant throughout the messages of a single transaction (e.g.,
ir/ip/certConf/pkiConf) to reduce the overhead associated with ir/ip/certConf/pkiConf) to reduce the overhead associated with
PasswordBasedMac computation. PasswordBasedMac computation.
5.1.3.2. DH Key Pairs 5.1.3.2. DH Key Pairs
Where the sender and receiver possess finite-field or elliptic-curve- Where the sender and receiver possess finite-field or elliptic-curve-
based Diffie-Hellman certificates with compatible DH parameters, in based Diffie-Hellman certificates with compatible DH parameters in
order to protect the message the end entity must generate a symmetric order to protect the message, the end entity must generate a
key based on its private DH key value and the DH public key of the symmetric key based on its private DH key value and the DH public key
recipient of the PKI message. PKIProtection will contain a MAC value of the recipient of the PKI message. PKIProtection will contain a
keyed with this derived symmetric key and the protectionAlg will be MAC value keyed with this derived symmetric key, and the
the following: protectionAlg will be the following:
id-DHBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 2 840 113533 7 66 30} id-DHBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 2 840 113533 7 66 30}
DHBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE { DHBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
owf AlgorithmIdentifier, owf AlgorithmIdentifier,
-- AlgId for a One-Way Function -- AlgId for a One-Way Function
mac AlgorithmIdentifier mac AlgorithmIdentifier
-- the MAC AlgId -- the MAC AlgId
} }
skipping to change at page 41, line 41 skipping to change at line 1832
symmetric key. If the MAC algorithm requires a K-bit key and K <= H, symmetric key. If the MAC algorithm requires a K-bit key and K <= H,
then the most significant K bits of BASEKEY are used. If K > H, then then the most significant K bits of BASEKEY are used. If K > H, then
all of BASEKEY is used for the most significant H bits of the key, all of BASEKEY is used for the most significant H bits of the key,
OWF("1" || BASEKEY) is used for the next most significant H bits of OWF("1" || BASEKEY) is used for the next most significant H bits of
the key, OWF("2" || BASEKEY) is used for the next most significant H the key, OWF("2" || BASEKEY) is used for the next most significant H
bits of the key, and so on, until all K bits have been derived. bits of the key, and so on, until all K bits have been derived.
[Here "N" is the ASCII byte encoding the number N and "||" represents [Here "N" is the ASCII byte encoding the number N and "||" represents
concatenation.] concatenation.]
Note: Hash algorithms that can be used as one-way functions are Note: Hash algorithms that can be used as one-way functions are
listed in CMP Algorithms [RFC9481] Section 2. listed in Section 2 of CMP Algorithms [RFC9481].
5.1.3.3. Signature 5.1.3.3. Signature
In this case, the sender possesses a signature key pair and simply In this case, the sender possesses a signature key pair and simply
signs the PKI message. PKIProtection will contain the signature signs the PKI message. PKIProtection will contain the signature
value and the protectionAlg will be an AlgorithmIdentifier for a value and the protectionAlg will be an AlgorithmIdentifier for a
digital signature MAY be one of the options described in CMP digital signature, which MAY be one of the options described in
Algorithms Section 3 [RFC9481]. Section 3 of CMP Algorithms [RFC9481].
5.1.3.4. Key Encapsulation 5.1.3.4. Key Encapsulation
In case the sender of a message has a Key Encapsulation Mechanism In case the sender of a message has a Key Encapsulation Mechanism
(KEM) key pair, it can be used to establish a shared secret key for (KEM) key pair, it can be used to establish a shared secret key for
MAC-based message protection. This can be used for message MAC-based message protection. This can be used for message
authentication. authentication.
This approach uses the definition of Key Encapsulation Mechanism This approach uses the definition of Key Encapsulation Mechanism
(KEM) algorithm functions in Section 1 of [RFC9629] as follows: (KEM) algorithm functions in Section 1 of [RFC9629] as follows:
A KEM algorithm provides three functions: A KEM algorithm provides three functions:
* KeyGen() -> (pk, sk): 1. KeyGen() -> (pk, sk): Generate a public key (pk) and a private
(secret) key (sk).
Generate a public key (pk) and a private (secret) key (sk).
* Encapsulate(pk) -> (ct, ss):
Given the public key (pk), produce a ciphertext (ct) and a shared
secret (ss).
* Decapsulate(sk, ct) -> (ss): 2. Encapsulate(pk) -> (ct, ss): Given the public key (pk), produce a
ciphertext (ct) and a shared secret (ss).
Given the private key (sk) and the ciphertext (ct), produce the 3. Decapsulate(sk, ct) -> (ss): Given the private key (sk) and the
shared secret (ss). ciphertext (ct), produce the shared secret (ss).
To support a particular KEM algorithm, the PKI entity that possesses To support a particular KEM algorithm, the PKI entity that possesses
a KEM key pair and wishes to use it for MAC-based message protection a KEM key pair and wishes to use it for MAC-based message protection
MUST support the KEM Decapsulate() function. The PKI entity that MUST support the KEM Decapsulate() function. The PKI entity that
wishes to verify the MAC-based message protection MUST support the wishes to verify the MAC-based message protection MUST support the
KEM Encapsulate() function. The respective public KEM key is usually KEM Encapsulate() function. The respective public KEM key is usually
carried in a certificate [I-D.ietf-lamps-kyber-certificates]. carried in a certificate [ML-KEM].
Note: Both PKI entities send and receive messages in a PKI management Note: Both PKI entities send and receive messages in a PKI management
operation. Both PKI entities may independently wish to protect operation. Both PKI entities may independently wish to protect
messages using their KEM key pairs. For ease of explanation we use messages using their KEM key pairs. For ease of explanation, we use
the term "Alice" to denote the PKI entity possessing the KEM key pair the terms "Alice" to denote the PKI entity possessing the KEM key
and who wishes to provide MAC-based message protection, and "Bob" to pair and who wishes to provide MAC-based message protection and "Bob"
denote the PKI entity having Alice’s authentic public KEM key and who to denote the PKI entity having Alice's authentic public KEM key and
needs to verify the MAC-based protection provided by Alice. who needs to verify the MAC-based protection provided by Alice.
Assuming Bob has Alice's KEM public key, he generates the ciphertext Assuming Bob has Alice's KEM public key, he generates the ciphertext
using KEM encapsulation and transfers it to Alice in an using KEM encapsulation and transfers it to Alice in an
InfoTypeAndValue structure. Alice then retrieves the KEM shared InfoTypeAndValue structure. Alice then retrieves the KEM shared
secret from the ciphertext using KEM decapsulation and the associated secret from the ciphertext using KEM decapsulation and the associated
KEM private key. Using a key derivation function (KDF), she derives KEM private key. Using a key derivation function (KDF), Alice
a shared secret key from the KEM shared secret and other data sent by derives a shared secret key from the KEM shared secret and other data
Bob. PKIProtection will contain a MAC value calculated using that sent by Bob. PKIProtection will contain a MAC value calculated using
shared secret key, and the protectionAlg will be the following: that shared secret key, and the protectionAlg will be the following:
id-KemBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 2 840 113533 7 66 16} id-KemBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 2 840 113533 7 66 16}
KemBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE { KemBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
kdf AlgorithmIdentifier{KEY-DERIVATION, {...}}, kdf AlgorithmIdentifier{KEY-DERIVATION, {...}},
kemContext [0] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, kemContext [0] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
len INTEGER (1..MAX), len INTEGER (1..MAX),
mac AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {...}} mac AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {...}}
} }
Note: The OID for id-KemBasedMac was assigned on the private-use arc Note: The OID for id-KemBasedMac was assigned on the private-use arc
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) nortelnetworks(113533) entrust(7) }, { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) nortelnetworks(113533) entrust(7) }
and not assigned on an IANA-owned arc because the authors wished to and not assigned on an IANA-owned arc because the authors wished to
placed it on the same branch as the existing OIDs for id- place it on the same branch as the existing OIDs for id-
PasswordBasedMac and id-DHBasedMac. PasswordBasedMac and id-DHBasedMac.
kdf is the algorithm identifier of the chosen KDF, and any associated kdf is the algorithm identifier of the chosen KDF, and any associated
parameters, used to derive the shared secret key. parameters, used to derive the shared secret key.
kemContext MAY be used to transfer additional algorithm specific kemContext MAY be used to transfer additional algorithm-specific
context information, see also the definition of ukm in [RFC9629], context information (see also the definition of ukm in Section 3 of
Section 3. [RFC9629]).
len is the output length of the KDF and MUST be the desired size of len is the output length of the KDF and MUST be the desired size of
the key to be used for MAC-based message protection. the key to be used for MAC-based message protection.
mac is the algorithm identifier of the chosen MAC algorithm, and any mac is the algorithm identifier of the chosen MAC algorithm, and any
associated parameters, used to calculate the MAC value. associated parameters, used to calculate the MAC value.
The KDF and MAC algorithms MAY be chosen from the options in CMP The KDF and MAC algorithms MAY be chosen from the options in CMP
Algorithms [RFC9481]. Algorithms [RFC9481].
The InfoTypeAndValue transferring the KEM ciphertext uses OID id-it- The InfoTypeAndValue transferring the KEM ciphertext uses OID id-it-
KemCiphertextInfo. It contains a KemCiphertextInfo structure as KemCiphertextInfo. It contains a KemCiphertextInfo structure, as
defined in Section 5.3.19.18. defined in Section 5.3.19.18.
Note: This InfoTypeAndValue can be carried in a genm/genp message Note: This InfoTypeAndValue can be carried in a genm/genp message
body as specified in Section 5.3.19.18 or in the generalInfo field of body, as specified in Section 5.3.19.18, or in the generalInfo field
PKIHeader in messages of other types, see Section 5.1.1.5. of PKIHeader in messages of other types (see Section 5.1.1.5).
In the following, a generic message flow for MAC-based protection In the following, a generic message flow for MAC-based protection
using KEM is specified in more detail. It is assumed that Bob using KEM is specified in more detail. It is assumed that Bob
possesses the public KEM key of Alice. Alice can be the initiator of possesses Alice's public KEM key. Alice can be the initiator of a
a PKI management operation or the responder. For more detailed PKI management operation or the responder. For more detailed
figures see Appendix E. figures, see Appendix E.
Generic Message Flow: Generic Message Flow:
Step# Alice Bob Step# Alice Bob
--------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
1 perform KEM Encapsulate 1 perform KEM Encapsulate
<-- KEM Ciphertext <-- <-- KEM Ciphertext <--
2 perform KEM Decapsulate, 2 perform KEM Decapsulate,
perform key derivation, perform key derivation,
format message with format message with
MAC-based protection MAC-based protection
--> message --> --> message -->
3 perform key derivation, 3 perform key derivation,
verify MAC-based verify MAC-based
protection protection
------------------- Alice authenticated by Bob -------------------- ------------------- Alice authenticated by Bob --------------------
Figure 2: Generic Message Flow when Alice has a KEM key pair Figure 2: Generic Message Flow When Alice Has a KEM Key Pair
1. Bob needs to possess the authentic public KEM key pk of Alice, 1. Bob needs to possess Alice's authentic public KEM key (pk), for
for instance contained in a KEM certificate that was received and instance, contained in a KEM certificate that was received and
successfully validated by Bob beforehand. successfully validated by Bob beforehand.
Bob generates a shared secret ss and the associated ciphertext ct Bob generates a shared secret (ss) and the associated ciphertext
using the KEM Encapsulate function with Alice's public KEM key (ct) using the KEM Encapsulate function with Alice's public KEM
pk. Bob MUST NOT reuse the ss and ct for other PKI management key (pk). Bob MUST NOT reuse the ss and ct for other PKI
operations. From this data, Bob produces a KemCiphertextInfo management operations. From this data, Bob produces a
structure including the KEM algorithm identifier and the KemCiphertextInfo structure, including the KEM algorithm
ciphertext ct and sends it to Alice in an InfoTypeAndValue identifier and the ciphertext (ct) and sends it to Alice in an
structure as defined in Section 5.3.19.18. InfoTypeAndValue structure, as defined in Section 5.3.19.18.
Encapsulate(pk) -> (ct, ss) Encapsulate(pk) -> (ct, ss)
2. Alice decapsulates the shared secret ss from the ciphertext ct 2. Alice decapsulates the shared secret (ss) from the ciphertext
using the KEM Decapsulate function and its private KEM key sk. (ct) using the KEM Decapsulate function and its private KEM key
(sk).
Decapsulate(ct, sk) -> (ss) Decapsulate(ct, sk) -> (ss)
If the decapsulation operation outputs an error, any failInfo If the decapsulation operation outputs an error, any failInfo
field in an error response message SHALL contain the value field in an error response message SHALL contain the value
badMessageCheck and the PKI management operation SHALL be badMessageCheck and the PKI management operation SHALL be
terminated. terminated.
Alice derives the shared secret key ssk using a KDF. The shared Alice derives the shared secret key (ssk) using a KDF. The
secret ss is used as input key material for the KDF, the value shared secret (ss) is used as input key material for the KDF, and
len is the desired output length of the KDF as required by the the value len is the desired output length of the KDF as required
MAC algorithm to be used for message protection. KDF, len, and by the MAC algorithm to be used for message protection. KDF,
MAC will be transferred to Bob in the protectionAlg len, and MAC will be transferred to Bob in the protectionAlg
KemBMParameter. The DER-encoded KemOtherInfo structure, as KemBMParameter. The DER-encoded KemOtherInfo structure, as
defined below, is used as context for the KDF. defined below, is used as context for the KDF.
KDF(ss, len, context)->(ssk) KDF(ss, len, context)->(ssk)
The shared secret key ssk is used for MAC-based protection by The shared secret key (ssk) is used for MAC-based protection by
Alice. Alice.
3. Bob derives the same shared secret key ssk using the KDF. Also 3. Bob derives the same shared secret key (ssk) using the KDF. Also
here the shared secret ss is used as input key material for the here, the shared secret (ss) is used as input key material for
KDF, the value len is the desired output length for the KDF, and the KDF, the value len is the desired output length for the KDF,
the DER-encoded KemOtherInfo structure constructed in the same and the DER-encoded KemOtherInfo structure constructed in the
way as on Alice's side is used as context for the KDF. same way as on Alice's side is used as context for the KDF.
KDF(ss, len, context)->(ssk) KDF(ss, len, context)->(ssk)
Bob uses the shared secret key ssk for verifying the MAC-based Bob uses the shared secret key (ssk) for verifying the MAC-based
protection of the message received and in this way authenticates protection of the message received and in this way authenticates
Alice. Alice.
This shared secret key ssk can be reused by Alice for MAC-based This shared secret key (ssk) can be reused by Alice for MAC-based
protection of further messages sent to Bob within the current PKI protection of further messages sent to Bob within the current PKI
management operation. management operation.
This approach employs the notation of KDF(IKM, L, info) as described This approach employs the notation of KDF(IKM, L, info) as described
in [RFC9629], Section 5 with the following changes: in Section 5 of [RFC9629] with the following changes:
* IKM is the input key material. It is the symmetric secret called * IKM is the input key material. It is the symmetric secret called
ss resulting from the key encapsulation mechanism. "ss" resulting from the key encapsulation mechanism.
* L is dependent of the MAC algorithm that is used with the shared * L is dependent of the MAC algorithm that is used with the shared
secret key for CMP message protection and is called len in this secret key for CMP message protection and is called "len" in this
document. document.
* info is an additional input to the KDF, is called context in this * info is an additional input to the KDF, is called "context" in
document, and contains the DER-encoded KemOtherInfo structure this document, and contains the DER-encoded KemOtherInfo structure
defined as: defined as:
KemOtherInfo ::= SEQUENCE { KemOtherInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
staticString PKIFreeText, staticString PKIFreeText,
transactionID OCTET STRING, transactionID OCTET STRING,
kemContext [0] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL kemContext [0] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
} }
staticString MUST be "CMP-KEM". staticString MUST be "CMP-KEM".
transactionID MUST be the value from the message containing the transactionID MUST be the value from the message containing the
ciphertext ct in KemCiphertextInfo. ciphertext (ct) in KemCiphertextInfo.
Note: The transactionID is used to ensure domain separation of the Note: The transactionID is used to ensure domain separation of the
derived shared secret key between different PKI management derived shared secret key between different PKI management
operations. For all PKI management operations with more than one operations. For all PKI management operations with more than one
exchange the transactionID MUST be set anyway, see Section 5.1.1. exchange, the transactionID MUST be set anyway (see
In case Bob provided a infoValue of type KemCiphertextInfo to Section 5.1.1). In case Bob provided an infoValue of type
Alice in the initial request message, see Figure 4 of Appendix E, KemCiphertextInfo to Alice in the initial request message (see
the transactionID MUST be set by Bob. Figure 4 of Appendix E), the transactionID MUST be set by Bob.
kemContext MAY contain additional algorithm specific context kemContext MAY contain additional algorithm-specific context
information. information.
* OKM is the output keying material of the KDF used for MAC-based * OKM is the output keying material of the KDF used for MAC-based
message protection of length len and is called ssk in this message protection of length len and is called "ssk" in this
document. document.
There are various ways how Alice can request, and Bob can provide the There are various ways that Alice can request and Bob can provide the
KEM ciphertext, see Appendix E for details. The KemCiphertextInfo KEM ciphertext (see Appendix E for details). The KemCiphertextInfo
can be requested using PKI general messages as described in can be requested using PKI general messages, as described in
Section 5.3.19.18. Alternatively, the generalInfo field of the Section 5.3.19.18. Alternatively, the generalInfo field of the
PKIHeader can be used to convey the same request and response PKIHeader can be used to convey the same request and response
InfoTypeAndValue structures as described in Section 5.1.1.5. The InfoTypeAndValue structures, as described in Section 5.1.1.5. The
procedure works also without Alice explicitly requesting the KEM procedure also works without Alice explicitly requesting the KEM
ciphertext in case Bob knows a KEM key of Alice beforehand and can ciphertext in case Bob knows one of Alice's KEM keys beforehand and
expect that she is ready to use it. can expect that she is ready to use it.
If both the initiator and responder in a PKI management operation If both the initiator and responder in a PKI management operation
have KEM key pairs, this procedure can be applied by both entities have KEM key pairs, this procedure can be applied by both entities
independently, establishing and using different shared secret keys independently, establishing and using different shared secret keys
for either direction. for either direction.
5.1.3.5. Multiple Protection 5.1.3.5. Multiple Protection
When receiving a protected PKI message, a PKI management entity, such When receiving a protected PKI message, a PKI management entity, such
as an RA, MAY forward that message adding its own protection. as an RA, MAY forward that message adding its own protection.
Additionally, multiple PKI messages MAY be aggregated. There are Additionally, multiple PKI messages MAY be aggregated. There are
several use cases for such messages. several use cases for such messages.
* The RA confirms having validated and authorized a message and * The RA confirms having validated and authorized a message and
forwards the original message unchanged. forwards the original message unchanged.
* A PKI management entity collects several messages that are to be * A PKI management entity collects several messages that are to be
forwarded in the same direction and forwards them in a batch. forwarded in the same direction and forwards them in a batch.
Request messages can be transferred as batch upstream (towards the Request messages can be transferred as a batch upstream (towards
CA); response or announce messages can be transferred as batch the CA); response or announce messages can be transferred as a
downstream (towards an RA but not to the EE). For instance, this batch downstream (towards an RA but not to the EE). For instance,
can be used when bridging an off-line connection between two PKI this can be used when bridging an off-line connection between two
management entities. PKI management entities.
These use cases are accomplished by nesting the messages within a new These use cases are accomplished by nesting the messages within a new
PKI message. The structure used is as follows: PKI message. The structure used is as follows:
NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages
In case an RA needs to modify a request message, it MAY include the In case an RA needs to modify a request message, it MAY include the
original PKIMessage in the generalInfo field of the modified message original PKIMessage in the generalInfo field of the modified message,
as described in Section 5.1.1.3. as described in Section 5.1.1.3.
5.2. Common Data Structures 5.2. Common Data Structures
Before specifying the specific types that may be placed in a PKIBody, Before specifying the specific types that may be placed in a PKIBody,
we define some data structures that are used in more than one case. we define some data structures that are used in more than one case.
5.2.1. Requested Certificate Contents 5.2.1. Requested Certificate Contents
Various PKI management messages require that the originator of the Various PKI management messages require that the originator of the
message indicate some of the fields that are required to be present message indicate some of the fields that are required to be present
in a certificate. The CertTemplate structure allows an end entity or in a certificate. The CertTemplate structure allows an end entity or
RA to specify as much as it wishes about the certificate it requires. RA to specify as much as it wishes about the certificate it requires.
CertTemplate is identical to a Certificate, but with all fields CertTemplate is identical to a Certificate but with all fields
optional. optional.
Note: Even if the originator completely specifies the contents of a Note: Even if the originator completely specifies the contents of a
certificate it requires, a CA is free to modify fields within the certificate it requires, a CA is free to modify fields within the
certificate actually issued. If the modified certificate is certificate actually issued. If the modified certificate is
unacceptable to the requester, the requester MUST send back a unacceptable to the requester, the requester MUST send back a
certConf message that either does not include this certificate (via a certConf message that either does not include this certificate (via a
CertHash), or does include this certificate (via a CertHash) along CertHash) or does include this certificate (via a CertHash) along
with a status of "rejected". See Section 5.3.18 for the definition with a status of "rejected". See Section 5.3.18 for the definition
and use of CertHash and the certConf message. and use of CertHash and the certConf message.
Note: Before requesting a new certificate, an end entity can request Note: Before requesting a new certificate, an end entity can request
a certTemplate structure as a kind of certificate request blueprint, a certTemplate structure as a kind of certificate request blueprint
in order to learn which data the CA expects to be present in the in order to learn which data the CA expects to be present in the
certificate request, see Section 5.3.19.16. certificate request (see Section 5.3.19.16).
See CRMF [RFC4211] for CertTemplate syntax. See CRMF [RFC4211] for CertTemplate syntax.
If certTemplate is an empty SEQUENCE (i.e., all fields omitted), then If certTemplate is an empty SEQUENCE (i.e., all fields omitted), then
the controls field in the CertRequest structure MAY contain the id- the controls field in the CertRequest structure MAY contain the id-
regCtrl-altCertTemplate control, specifying a template for a regCtrl-altCertTemplate control, specifying a template for a
certificate other than an X.509v3 public-key certificate. certificate other than an X.509v3 public-key certificate.
Conversely, if certTemplate is not empty (i.e., at least one field is Conversely, if certTemplate is not empty (i.e., at least one field is
present), then controls MUST NOT contain id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate. present), then controls MUST NOT contain id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate.
The new control is defined as follows: The new control is defined as follows:
id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pkip(5) regCtrl(1) 7} mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pkip(5) regCtrl(1) 7}
AltCertTemplate ::= AttributeTypeAndValue AltCertTemplate ::= AttributeTypeAndValue
See also [RFC4212] for more details on how to manage certificates in Also see [RFC4212] for more details on how to manage certificates in
alternative formats using CRMF [RFC4211] syntax. alternative formats using CRMF [RFC4211] syntax.
5.2.2. Encrypted Values 5.2.2. Encrypted Values
When encrypted data like a private key, certificate, POP challenge, When encrypted data like a private key, certificate, POP challenge,
or revocation passphrase is sent in PKI messages it is RECOMMENDED to or revocation passphrase is sent in PKI messages, it is RECOMMENDED
use the EnvelopedData structure. In some cases this is accomplished to use the EnvelopedData structure. In some cases, this is
by using the EncryptedKey data structure instead of EncryptedValue. accomplished by using the EncryptedKey data structure instead of
EncryptedValue.
EncryptedKey ::= CHOICE { EncryptedKey ::= CHOICE {
encryptedValue EncryptedValue, -- deprecated encryptedValue EncryptedValue, -- deprecated
envelopedData [0] EnvelopedData } envelopedData [0] EnvelopedData }
See Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) [RFC4211] for See Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) [RFC4211] for
EncryptedKey and EncryptedValue syntax and Cryptographic Message EncryptedKey and EncryptedValue syntax and Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] for EnvelopedData syntax. Using the Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] for EnvelopedData syntax. Using the
EncryptedKey data structure offers the choice to either use EncryptedKey data structure offers the choice to either use
EncryptedValue (for backward compatibility only) or EnvelopedData. EncryptedValue (for backward compatibility only) or EnvelopedData.
skipping to change at page 48, line 47 skipping to change at line 2163
Note: The EncryptedKey structure defined in CRMF [RFC4211] is used Note: The EncryptedKey structure defined in CRMF [RFC4211] is used
here, which makes the update backward compatible. Using the new here, which makes the update backward compatible. Using the new
syntax with the untagged default choice EncryptedValue is bits-on- syntax with the untagged default choice EncryptedValue is bits-on-
the-wire compatible with the old syntax. the-wire compatible with the old syntax.
To indicate support for EnvelopedData, the pvno cmp2021 has been To indicate support for EnvelopedData, the pvno cmp2021 has been
introduced. Details on the usage of the protocol version number introduced. Details on the usage of the protocol version number
(pvno) are described in Section 7. (pvno) are described in Section 7.
The EnvelopedData structure is RECOMMENDED to use in CMP to transport The EnvelopedData structure is RECOMMENDED to be used in CMP to
a private key, certificate, POP challenge, or revocation passphrase transport a private key, certificate, POP challenge, or revocation
in encrypted form as follows: passphrase in encrypted form as follows:
* It contains only one RecipientInfo structure because the content * It contains only one RecipientInfo structure because the content
is encrypted only for one recipient. is encrypted only for one recipient.
* It may contain a private key in the AsymmetricKeyPackage structure * It may contain a private key in the AsymmetricKeyPackage structure
(which is placed in the encryptedContentInfo field), as defined in (which is placed in the encryptedContentInfo field), as defined in
[RFC5958], that is wrapped in a SignedData structure, as specified [RFC5958], that is wrapped in a SignedData structure, as specified
in Section 5 of [RFC5652] and [RFC8933], signed by the Key in Section 5 of [RFC5652] and [RFC8933], signed by the Key
Generation Authority or CA. Generation Authority or CA.
skipping to change at page 49, line 48 skipping to change at line 2213
* recipient's certificate with an algorithm identifier and a public * recipient's certificate with an algorithm identifier and a public
key that supports key encapsulation mechanism and where any given key that supports key encapsulation mechanism and where any given
key usage extension allows keyEncipherment: The content-encryption key usage extension allows keyEncipherment: The content-encryption
key will be protected using the key management technique for KEM key will be protected using the key management technique for KEM
keys, as specified in [RFC9629]. keys, as specified in [RFC9629].
Note: There are cases where the algorithm identifier, the type of the Note: There are cases where the algorithm identifier, the type of the
public key, and the key usage extension will not be sufficient to public key, and the key usage extension will not be sufficient to
decide on the key management technique to use, e.g., when decide on the key management technique to use, e.g., when
rsaEncryption is the algorithm identifier. In such cases it is a rsaEncryption is the algorithm identifier. In such cases, it is a
matter of local policy to decide. matter of local policy to decide.
5.2.3. Status Codes and Failure Information for PKI Messages 5.2.3. Status Codes and Failure Information for PKI Messages
All response messages will include some status information. The All response messages will include some status information. The
following values are defined. following values are defined.
PKIStatus ::= INTEGER { PKIStatus ::= INTEGER {
accepted (0), accepted (0),
grantedWithMods (1), grantedWithMods (1),
skipping to change at page 52, line 5 skipping to change at line 2277
failInfo PKIFailureInfo OPTIONAL failInfo PKIFailureInfo OPTIONAL
} }
5.2.4. Certificate Identification 5.2.4. Certificate Identification
In order to identify particular certificates, the CertId data In order to identify particular certificates, the CertId data
structure is used. structure is used.
See [RFC4211] for CertId syntax. See [RFC4211] for CertId syntax.
5.2.5. Out-of-band root CA Public Key 5.2.5. Out-of-Band Root CA Public Key
Each root CA that provides a self-signed certificate must be able to Each root CA that provides a self-signed certificate must be able to
publish its current public key via some "out-of-band" means or publish its current public key via some "out-of-band" means or
together with the respective link certificate using an online together with the respective link certificate using an online
mechanism. While such mechanisms are beyond the scope of this mechanism. While such mechanisms are beyond the scope of this
document, we define data structures that can support such mechanisms. document, we define data structures that can support such mechanisms.
There are generally two methods available: Either the CA directly There are generally two methods available: Either the CA directly
publishes its self-signed certificate, or this information is publishes its self-signed certificate, or this information is
available via the directory (or equivalent) and the CA publishes a available via the directory (or equivalent) and the CA publishes a
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The fields within this certificate are restricted as follows: The fields within this certificate are restricted as follows:
* The certificate MUST be self-signed (i.e., the signature must be * The certificate MUST be self-signed (i.e., the signature must be
verifiable using the SubjectPublicKeyInfo field); verifiable using the SubjectPublicKeyInfo field);
* The subject and issuer fields MUST be identical; * The subject and issuer fields MUST be identical;
* If the subject field contains a "NULL-DN", then both * If the subject field contains a "NULL-DN", then both
subjectAltNames and issuerAltNames extensions MUST be present and subjectAltNames and issuerAltNames extensions MUST be present and
have exactly the same value; have exactly the same value; and
* The values of all other extensions must be suitable for a self- * The values of all other extensions must be suitable for a self-
signed certificate (e.g., key identifiers for subject and issuer signed certificate (e.g., key identifiers for the subject and
must be the same). issuer must be the same).
OOBCertHash ::= SEQUENCE { OOBCertHash ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
certId [1] CertId OPTIONAL, certId [1] CertId OPTIONAL,
hashVal BIT STRING hashVal BIT STRING
} }
The intention of the hash value is that anyone who has securely The intention of the hash value is that anyone who has securely
received the hash value (via the out-of-band means) can verify a received the hash value (via the out-of-band means) can verify a
self-signed certificate for that CA. self-signed certificate for that CA.
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5.2.7. Publication Information 5.2.7. Publication Information
Requesters may indicate that they wish the PKI to publish a Requesters may indicate that they wish the PKI to publish a
certificate using the PKIPublicationInfo structure. certificate using the PKIPublicationInfo structure.
See [RFC4211] for PKIPublicationInfo syntax. See [RFC4211] for PKIPublicationInfo syntax.
5.2.8. Proof-of-Possession Structures 5.2.8. Proof-of-Possession Structures
The proof-of-possession structure used is indicated in the popo field The proof-of-possession structure used is indicated in the popo field
of type ProofOfPossession in the CertReqMsg sequence, see Section 4 of type ProofOfPossession in the CertReqMsg sequence (see Section 4
of [RFC4211]. of [RFC4211]).
ProofOfPossession ::= CHOICE { ProofOfPossession ::= CHOICE {
raVerified [0] NULL, raVerified [0] NULL,
signature [1] POPOSigningKey, signature [1] POPOSigningKey,
keyEncipherment [2] POPOPrivKey, keyEncipherment [2] POPOPrivKey,
keyAgreement [3] POPOPrivKey keyAgreement [3] POPOPrivKey
} }
5.2.8.1. raVerified 5.2.8.1. raVerified
An EE MUST NOT use raVerified. If an RA performs changes to a An EE MUST NOT use raVerified. If an RA performs changes to a
certification request breaking the provided proof-of-possession certification request breaking the provided proof-of-possession
(POP), or if the RA requests a certificate on behalf of an EE and (POP), or if the RA requests a certificate on behalf of an EE and
cannot provide the POP itself, the RA MUST use raVerified. cannot provide the POP itself, the RA MUST use raVerified.
Otherwise, it SHOULD NOT use raVerified. Otherwise, it SHOULD NOT use raVerified.
When introducing raVerified, the RA MUST check the existing POP, or When introducing raVerified, the RA MUST check the existing POP, or
it MUST ensure by other means that the EE is the holder of the it MUST ensure by other means that the EE is the holder of the
private key. The RA MAY provide the original message containing the private key. The RA MAY provide the original message containing the
POP in the generalInfo field using the id-it-origPKIMessage, see POP in the generalInfo field using the id-it-origPKIMessage (see
Section 5.1.1.3, enabling the CA to verify it. Section 5.1.1.3) enabling the CA to verify it.
5.2.8.2. POPOSigningKey Structure 5.2.8.2. POPOSigningKey Structure
If the certification request is for a key pair that supports signing If the certification request is for a key pair that supports signing
(i.e., a request for a verification certificate), then the proof-of- (i.e., a request for a verification certificate), then the proof-of-
possession of the private key is demonstrated through use of the possession of the private key is demonstrated through use of the
POPOSigningKey structure, for details see Section 4.1 of [RFC4211]. POPOSigningKey structure; for details, see Section 4.1 of [RFC4211].
POPOSigningKey ::= SEQUENCE { POPOSigningKey ::= SEQUENCE {
poposkInput [0] POPOSigningKeyInput OPTIONAL, poposkInput [0] POPOSigningKeyInput OPTIONAL,
algorithmIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier, algorithmIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier,
signature BIT STRING signature BIT STRING
} }
POPOSigningKeyInput ::= SEQUENCE { POPOSigningKeyInput ::= SEQUENCE {
authInfo CHOICE { authInfo CHOICE {
sender [0] GeneralName, sender [0] GeneralName,
skipping to change at page 54, line 25 skipping to change at line 2390
}, },
publicKey SubjectPublicKeyInfo publicKey SubjectPublicKeyInfo
} }
PKMACValue ::= SEQUENCE { PKMACValue ::= SEQUENCE {
algId AlgorithmIdentifier, algId AlgorithmIdentifier,
value BIT STRING value BIT STRING
} }
Note: For the purposes of this specification, the ASN.1 comment given Note: For the purposes of this specification, the ASN.1 comment given
in Appendix C of [RFC4211] pertains not only to certTemplate, but in Appendix C of [RFC4211] pertains not only to certTemplate but also
also to the altCertTemplate control as defined in Section 5.2.1. to the altCertTemplate control, as defined in Section 5.2.1.
If certTemplate (or the altCertTemplate control) contains the subject If certTemplate (or the altCertTemplate control) contains the subject
and publicKey values, then poposkInput MUST be omitted and the and publicKey values, then poposkInput MUST be omitted and the
signature MUST be computed on the DER-encoded value of certReq field signature MUST be computed on the DER-encoded value of the certReq
of the CertReqMsg (or the DER-encoded value of AltCertTemplate). If field of the CertReqMsg (or the DER-encoded value of
certTemplate/altCertTemplate does not contain both the subject and AltCertTemplate). If certTemplate/altCertTemplate does not contain
public key values (i.e., if it contains only one of these, or both the subject and public key values (i.e., if it contains only one
neither), then poposkInput MUST be present and the signature MUST be of these or neither), then poposkInput MUST be present and the
computed on the DER-encoded value of poposkInput (i.e., the "value" signature MUST be computed on the DER-encoded value of poposkInput
OCTETs of the POPOSigningKeyInput DER). (i.e., the "value" OCTETs of the POPOSigningKeyInput DER).
In the special case that the CA/RA has a DH certificate that is known In the special case that the CA/RA has a DH certificate that is known
to the EE and the certification request is for a key agreement key to the EE and the certification request is for a key agreement key
pair, the EE can also use the POPOSigningKey structure (where the pair, the EE can also use the POPOSigningKey structure (where the
algorithmIdentifier field is DHBasedMAC and the signature field is algorithmIdentifier field is DHBasedMAC and the signature field is
the MAC) for demonstrating POP. the MAC) for demonstrating POP.
5.2.8.3. POPOPrivKey Structure 5.2.8.3. POPOPrivKey Structure
If the certification request is for a key pair that does not support If the certification request is for a key pair that does not support
signing (i.e., a request for an encryption or key agreement signing (i.e., a request for an encryption or key agreement
certificate), then the proof-of-possession of the private key is certificate), then the proof-of-possession of the private key is
demonstrated through use of the POPOPrivKey structure in one of the demonstrated through use of the POPOPrivKey structure in one of the
following three ways, for details see Section 4.2 and 4.3 of following three ways; for details see Sections 4.2 and 4.3 in
[RFC4211]. [RFC4211].
POPOPrivKey ::= CHOICE { POPOPrivKey ::= CHOICE {
thisMessage [0] BIT STRING, -- deprecated thisMessage [0] BIT STRING, -- deprecated
subsequentMessage [1] SubsequentMessage, subsequentMessage [1] SubsequentMessage,
dhMAC [2] BIT STRING, -- deprecated dhMAC [2] BIT STRING, -- deprecated
agreeMAC [3] PKMACValue, agreeMAC [3] PKMACValue,
encryptedKey [4] EnvelopedData encryptedKey [4] EnvelopedData
} }
skipping to change at page 55, line 33 skipping to change at line 2446
This method mentioned previously in Section 4.3 demonstrates proof- This method mentioned previously in Section 4.3 demonstrates proof-
of-possession of the private key by including the encrypted private of-possession of the private key by including the encrypted private
key in the CertRequest in the POPOPrivKey structure or in the key in the CertRequest in the POPOPrivKey structure or in the
PKIArchiveOptions control structure. This method SHALL only be used PKIArchiveOptions control structure. This method SHALL only be used
if archival of the private key is desired. if archival of the private key is desired.
For a certification request message indicating cmp2021(3) in the pvno For a certification request message indicating cmp2021(3) in the pvno
field of the PKIHeader, the encrypted private key MUST be transferred field of the PKIHeader, the encrypted private key MUST be transferred
in the encryptedKey choice of POPOPrivKey (or within the in the encryptedKey choice of POPOPrivKey (or within the
PKIArchiveOptions control) in a CMS EnvelopedData structure as PKIArchiveOptions control) in a CMS EnvelopedData structure, as
defined in Section 5.2.2. defined in Section 5.2.2.
Note: The thisMessage choice has been deprecated in favor of Note: The thisMessage choice has been deprecated in favor of
encryptedKey. When using cmp2000(2) in the certification request encryptedKey. When using cmp2000(2) in the certification request
message header for backward compatibility, the thisMessage choice of message header for backward compatibility, the thisMessage choice of
POPOPrivKey is used containing the encrypted private key in an POPOPrivKey is used containing the encrypted private key in an
EncryptedValue structure wrapped in a BIT STRING. This allows the EncryptedValue structure wrapped in a BIT STRING. This allows the
necessary conveyance and protection of the private key while necessary conveyance and protection of the private key while
maintaining bits-on-the-wire compatibility with [RFC4211]. maintaining bits-on-the-wire compatibility with [RFC4211].
5.2.8.3.2. Indirect Method - Encrypted Certificate 5.2.8.3.2. Indirect Method - Encrypted Certificate
The indirect method mentioned previously in Section 4.3 demonstrates The indirect method mentioned previously in Section 4.3 demonstrates
proof-of-possession of the private key by having the CA return the proof-of-possession of the private key by having the CA return the
requested certificate in encrypted form, see Section 5.2.2. This requested certificate in encrypted form (see Section 5.2.2). This
method is indicated in the CertRequest by requesting the encrCert method is indicated in the CertRequest by requesting the encrCert
option in the subsequentMessage choice of POPOPrivKey. option in the subsequentMessage choice of POPOPrivKey.
EE RA/CA EE RA/CA
---- req ----> ---- req ---->
<--- rep (enc cert) ----- <--- rep (enc cert) -----
---- conf (cert hash) ----> ---- conf (cert hash) ---->
<--- ack ----- <--- ack -----
The end entity proves knowledge of the private key to the CA by The end entity proves knowledge of the private key to the CA by
providing the correct CertHash for this certificate in the certConf providing the correct CertHash for this certificate in the certConf
message. This demonstrates POP because the EE can only compute the message. This demonstrates POP because the EE can only compute the
correct CertHash if it is able to recover the encrypted certificate, correct CertHash if it is able to recover the encrypted certificate,
and it can only recover the certificate if it is able to obtain the and it can only recover the certificate if it is able to obtain the
symmetric key using the required private key. Clearly, for this to symmetric key using the required private key. Clearly, for this to
work, the CA MUST NOT publish the certificate until the certConf work, the CA MUST NOT publish the certificate until the certConf
message arrives (when certHash is to be used to demonstrate POP). message arrives (when certHash is to be used to demonstrate POP).
See Section 5.3.18 for further details and see Section 8.11 for See Section 5.3.18 for further details, and see Section 8.11 for
security considerations regarding use of Certificate Transparency security considerations regarding use of Certificate Transparency
logs. logs.
The recipient SHOULD maintain a context of the PKI management The recipient SHOULD maintain a context of the PKI management
operation, e.g., using transactionID and certReqId, to identify the operation, e.g., using transactionID and certReqId, to identify the
private key to use when decrypting the EnvelopedData containing the private key to use when decrypting the EnvelopedData containing the
newly issued certificate. The recipient may be unable to use the newly issued certificate. The recipient may be unable to use the
RecipientInfo structure as it refers to the certificate that is still RecipientInfo structure as it refers to the certificate that is still
encrypted. The sender MUST populate the rid field as specified by encrypted. The sender MUST populate the rid field as specified by
CMS and the client MAY ignore it. CMS, and the client MAY ignore it.
5.2.8.3.3. Direct Method - Challenge-Response Protocol 5.2.8.3.3. Direct Method - Challenge-Response Protocol
The direct method mentioned previously in Section 4.3 demonstrates The direct method mentioned previously in Section 4.3 demonstrates
proof-of-possession of the private key by having the end entity proof-of-possession of the private key by having the end entity
engage in a challenge-response protocol (using the messages popdecc engage in a challenge-response protocol (using the messages popdecc
of type POPODecKeyChall and popdecr of type POPODecKeyResp; see of type POPODecKeyChall and popdecr of type POPODecKeyResp; see
below) between CertReqMessages and CertRepMessage. This method is below) between CertReqMessages and CertRepMessage. This method is
indicated in the CertRequest by requesting the challengeResp option indicated in the CertRequest by requesting the challengeResp option
in the subsequentMessage choice of POPOPrivKey. in the subsequentMessage choice of POPOPrivKey.
skipping to change at page 57, line 18 skipping to change at line 2523
---- resp ---> ---- resp --->
---- req' ---> ---- req' --->
<--- rep ----- <--- rep -----
---- conf ---> ---- conf --->
<--- ack ----- <--- ack -----
<--- rep ----- <--- rep -----
---- conf ---> ---- conf --->
<--- ack ----- <--- ack -----
This protocol is obviously much longer than the exchange given in This protocol is obviously much longer than the exchange given in
Section 5.2.8.3.2 above, but allows a local Registration Authority to Section 5.2.8.3.2 above but allows a local Registration Authority to
be involved and has the property that the certificate itself is not be involved and has the property that the certificate itself is not
actually created until the proof-of-possession is complete. In some actually created until the proof-of-possession is complete. In some
environments, a different order of the above messages may be environments, a different order of the above messages may be
required, such as the following (this may be determined by policy): required, such as the following (this may be determined by policy):
EE RA CA EE RA CA
---- req ----> ---- req ---->
<--- chall --- <--- chall ---
---- resp ---> ---- resp --->
---- req' ---> ---- req' --->
<--- rep ----- <--- rep -----
<--- rep ----- <--- rep -----
---- conf ---> ---- conf --->
---- conf ---> ---- conf --->
<--- ack ----- <--- ack -----
<--- ack ----- <--- ack -----
The challenge-response messages for proof-of-possession of a private The challenge-response messages for proof-of-possession of a private
key are specified as follows (for decryption keys see [MvOV97], p.404 key are specified as follows (for decryption keys, see [MvOV97],
for details). This challenge-response exchange is associated with p.404 for details). This challenge-response exchange is associated
the preceding certification request message (and subsequent with the preceding certification request message (and subsequent
certification response and confirmation messages) by the certification response and confirmation messages) by the
transactionID used in the PKIHeader and by the protection applied to transactionID used in the PKIHeader and by the protection applied to
the PKIMessage. the PKIMessage.
POPODecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge POPODecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge
Challenge ::= SEQUENCE { Challenge ::= SEQUENCE {
owf AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, owf AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
witness OCTET STRING, witness OCTET STRING,
challenge OCTET STRING, -- deprecated challenge OCTET STRING, -- deprecated
encryptedRand [0] EnvelopedData OPTIONAL encryptedRand [0] EnvelopedData OPTIONAL
} }
Rand ::= SEQUENCE { Rand ::= SEQUENCE {
int INTEGER, int INTEGER,
sender GeneralName sender GeneralName
} }
More details on the fields in this syntax is available in Appendix F. More details on the fields in this syntax are available in
Appendix F.
For a popdecc message indicating cmp2021(3) in the pvno field of the For a popdecc message indicating cmp2021(3) in the pvno field of the
PKIHeader, the encryption of Rand MUST be transferred in the PKIHeader, the encryption of Rand MUST be transferred in the
encryptedRand field in a CMS EnvelopedData structure as defined in encryptedRand field in a CMS EnvelopedData structure as defined in
Section 5.2.2. The challenge field MUST contain an empty OCTET Section 5.2.2. The challenge field MUST contain an empty OCTET
STRING. STRING.
The recipient SHOULD maintain a context of the PKI management The recipient SHOULD maintain a context of the PKI management
operation, e.g., using transactionID and certReqId, to identify the operation, e.g., using transactionID and certReqId, to identify the
private key to use when decrypting encryptedRand. The sender MUST private key to use when decrypting encryptedRand. The sender MUST
skipping to change at page 59, line 5 skipping to change at line 2599
portion will fit should be used (as long as it includes at least the portion will fit should be used (as long as it includes at least the
common name, and as long as the receiver is able to deal meaningfully common name, and as long as the receiver is able to deal meaningfully
with the abbreviation). with the abbreviation).
POPODecKeyRespContent ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER POPODecKeyRespContent ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER
On receiving the popdecc message, the end entity decrypts all On receiving the popdecc message, the end entity decrypts all
included challenges and responds with a popdecr message containing included challenges and responds with a popdecr message containing
the decrypted integer values in the same order. the decrypted integer values in the same order.
5.2.8.4. Summary of PoP Options 5.2.8.4. Summary of POP Options
The text in this section provides several options with respect to POP The text in this section provides several options with respect to POP
techniques. Using "SK" for "signing key", "EK" for "encryption key", techniques. Using "SK" for "signing key", "EK" for "encryption key",
"KAK" for "key agreement key", and "KEMK" for "key encapsulation "KAK" for "key agreement key", and "KEMK" for "key encapsulation
mechanism key", the techniques may be summarized as follows: mechanism key", the techniques may be summarized as follows:
RAVerified; RAVerified;
SKPOP; SKPOP;
EKPOPThisMessage; -- deprecated EKPOPThisMessage; -- deprecated
KAKPOPThisMessage; -- deprecated KAKPOPThisMessage; -- deprecated
skipping to change at page 59, line 32 skipping to change at line 2626
KEMKPOPEncryptedCert; KEMKPOPEncryptedCert;
EKPOPChallengeResp; EKPOPChallengeResp;
KAKPOPChallengeResp; and KAKPOPChallengeResp; and
KEMKPOPChallengeResp. KEMKPOPChallengeResp.
Given this array of options, it is natural to ask how an end entity Given this array of options, it is natural to ask how an end entity
can know what is supported by the CA/RA (i.e., which options it may can know what is supported by the CA/RA (i.e., which options it may
use when requesting certificates). The following guidelines should use when requesting certificates). The following guidelines should
clarify this situation for EE implementers. clarify this situation for EE implementers.
RAVerified: This is not an EE decision; the RA uses this if and only * RAVerified: This is not an EE decision; the RA uses this if and
if it has verified POP before forwarding the request on to the CA, so only if it has verified POP before forwarding the request on to
it is not possible for the EE to choose this technique. the CA, so it is not possible for the EE to choose this technique.
SKPOP: If the EE has a signing key pair, this is the only POP method * SKPOP: If the EE has a signing key pair, this is the only POP
specified for use in the request for a corresponding certificate. method specified for use in the request for a corresponding
certificate.
EKPOPThisMessage (deprecated), KAKPOPThisMessage (deprecated), * EKPOPThisMessage (deprecated), KAKPOPThisMessage (deprecated),
EKPOPEncryptedKey, KAKPOPEncryptedKey, KEMKPOPEncryptedKey: Whether EKPOPEncryptedKey, KAKPOPEncryptedKey, KEMKPOPEncryptedKey:
or not to give up its private key to the CA/RA is an EE decision. If Whether or not to give up its private key to the CA/RA is an EE
the EE decides to reveal its key, then these are the only POP methods decision. If the EE decides to reveal its key, then these are the
available in this specification to achieve this (and the key pair only POP methods available in this specification to achieve this
type and protocol version used will determine which of these methods (and the key pair type and protocol version used will determine
to use). The reason for deprecating EKPOPThisMessage and which of these methods to use). The reason for deprecating
KAKPOPThisMessage options has been given in Section 5.2.8.3.1. EKPOPThisMessage and KAKPOPThisMessage options has been given in
Section 5.2.8.3.1.
KAKPOPThisMessageDHMAC: The EE can only use this method if (1) the * KAKPOPThisMessageDHMAC: The EE can only use this method if (1) the
CA/RA has a DH certificate available for this purpose, and (2) the EE CA/RA has a DH certificate available for this purpose and (2) the
already has a copy of this certificate. If both these conditions EE already has a copy of this certificate. If both these
hold, then this technique is clearly supported and may be used by the conditions hold, then this technique is clearly supported and may
EE, if desired. be used by the EE, if desired.
EKPOPEncryptedCert, KAKPOPEncryptedCert, KEMKPOPEncryptedCert, * EKPOPEncryptedCert, KAKPOPEncryptedCert, KEMKPOPEncryptedCert,
EKPOPChallengeResp, KAKPOPChallengeResp, and KEMKPOPChallengeResp: EKPOPChallengeResp, KAKPOPChallengeResp, and KEMKPOPChallengeResp:
The EE picks one of these (in the subsequentMessage field) in the The EE picks one of these (in the subsequentMessage field) in the
request message, depending upon preference and key pair type. The EE request message, depending upon preference and key pair type. The
is not doing POP at this point; it is simply indicating which method EE is not doing POP at this point; it is simply indicating which
it wants to use. Therefore, if the CA/RA replies with a "badPOP" method it wants to use. Therefore, if the CA/RA replies with a
error, the EE can re-request using the other POP method chosen in "badPOP" error, the EE can re-request using the other POP method
subsequentMessage. Note, however, that this specification encourages chosen in subsequentMessage. Note, however, that this
the use of the EncryptedCert choice and, furthermore, says that the specification encourages the use of the EncryptedCert choice and,
challenge-response would typically be used when an RA is involved and furthermore, says that the challenge-response would typically be
doing POP verification. Thus, the EE should be able to make an used when an RA is involved and doing POP verification. Thus, the
intelligent decision regarding which of these POP methods to choose EE should be able to make an intelligent decision regarding which
in the request message. of these POP methods to choose in the request message.
5.2.9. GeneralizedTime 5.2.9. GeneralizedTime
GeneralizedTime is a standard ASN.1 type and SHALL be used as GeneralizedTime is a standard ASN.1 type and SHALL be used as
specified in Section 4.1.2.5.2 of [RFC5280]. specified in Section 4.1.2.5.2 of [RFC5280].
5.3. Operation-Specific Data Structures 5.3. Operation-Specific Data Structures
5.3.1. Initialization Request 5.3.1. Initialization Request
An Initialization request message contains as the PKIBody a An Initialization request message contains as the PKIBody a
CertReqMessages data structure, which specifies the requested CertReqMessages data structure, which specifies the requested
certificate(s). Typically, SubjectPublicKeyInfo, KeyId, and Validity certificate(s). Typically, SubjectPublicKeyInfo, KeyId, and Validity
are the template fields which may be supplied for each certificate are the template fields that may be supplied for each certificate
requested (see the profiles defined in [RFC9483] Section 4.1.1, requested (see the profiles defined in Section 4.1.1 of [RFC9483] and
Appendix C.4 and Appendix D.7 for further information). This message Appendices C.4 and D.7 for further information). This message is
is intended to be used for entities when first initializing into the intended to be used for entities when first initializing into the
PKI. PKI.
See Section 5.2.1 and [RFC4211] for CertReqMessages syntax. See Section 5.2.1 and [RFC4211] for CertReqMessages syntax.
5.3.2. Initialization Response 5.3.2. Initialization Response
An Initialization response message contains as the PKIBody a An Initialization response message contains as the PKIBody a
CertRepMessage data structure, which has for each certificate CertRepMessage data structure, which has for each certificate
requested a PKIStatusInfo field, a subject certificate, and possibly requested a PKIStatusInfo field, a subject certificate, and possibly
a private key (normally encrypted using EnvelopedData, see [RFC9483] a private key (normally encrypted using EnvelopedData; see
Section 4.1.6 for further information). Section 4.1.6 of [RFC9483] for further information).
See Section 5.3.4 for CertRepMessage syntax. Note that if the PKI See Section 5.3.4 for CertRepMessage syntax. Note that if the PKI
Message Protection is "shared secret information" (see message protection is "shared secret information" (see
Section 5.1.3.1), then any certificate transported in the caPubs Section 5.1.3.1), then any certificate transported in the caPubs
field may be directly trusted as a root CA certificate by the field may be directly trusted as a root CA certificate by the
initiator. initiator.
5.3.3. Certification Request 5.3.3. Certification Request
A Certification request message contains as the PKIBody a A Certification request message contains as the PKIBody a
CertReqMessages data structure, which specifies the requested CertReqMessages data structure, which specifies the requested
certificates (see the profiles defined in [RFC9483] Section 4.1.2 and certificates (see the profiles defined in Section 4.1.2 of [RFC9483]
Appendix C.2 for further information). This message is intended to and Appendix C.2 for further information). This message is intended
be used for existing PKI entities who wish to obtain additional to be used for existing PKI entities who wish to obtain additional
certificates. certificates.
See Section 5.2.1 and [RFC4211] for CertReqMessages syntax. See Section 5.2.1 and [RFC4211] for CertReqMessages syntax.
Alternatively, the PKIBody MAY be a CertificationRequest (this Alternatively, the PKIBody MAY be a CertificationRequest (this
structure is fully specified by the ASN.1 structure structure is fully specified by the ASN.1 structure
CertificationRequest given in [RFC2986], see the profiles defined in CertificationRequest given in [RFC2986]; see the profiles defined in
[RFC9483] Section 4.1.4 for further information). This structure may Section 4.1.4 of [RFC9483] for further information). This structure
be required for certificate requests for signing key pairs when may be required for certificate requests for signing key pairs when
interoperation with legacy systems is desired, but its use is interoperation with legacy systems is desired, but its use is
strongly discouraged whenever not absolutely necessary. strongly discouraged whenever not absolutely necessary.
5.3.4. Certification Response 5.3.4. Certification Response
A Certification response message contains as the PKIBody a A Certification response message contains as the PKIBody a
CertRepMessage data structure, which has a status value for each CertRepMessage data structure, which has a status value for each
certificate requested, and optionally has a CA public key, failure certificate requested and optionally has a CA public key, failure
information, a subject certificate, and an encrypted private key. information, a subject certificate, and an encrypted private key.
CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE { CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
caPubs [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate caPubs [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
OPTIONAL, OPTIONAL,
response SEQUENCE OF CertResponse response SEQUENCE OF CertResponse
} }
CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE { CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER, certReqId INTEGER,
skipping to change at page 62, line 33 skipping to change at line 2752
-- See [RFC4211] for comments on encoding. -- See [RFC4211] for comments on encoding.
publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL
} }
CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE { CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
certificate [0] CMPCertificate, certificate [0] CMPCertificate,
encryptedCert [1] EncryptedKey encryptedCert [1] EncryptedKey
} }
A p10cr message contains exactly one CertificationRequestInfo data A p10cr message contains exactly one CertificationRequestInfo data
structure, as specified in PKCS#10 [RFC2986], but no certReqId. structure, as specified in PKCS #10 [RFC2986], but no certReqId.
Therefore, the certReqId in the corresponding Certification Response Therefore, the certReqId in the corresponding Certification Response
(cp) message MUST be set to -1. (cp) message MUST be set to -1.
Only one of the failInfo (in PKIStatusInfo) and certificate (in Only one of the failInfo (in PKIStatusInfo) and certificate (in
CertifiedKeyPair) fields can be present in each CertResponse CertifiedKeyPair) fields can be present in each CertResponse
(depending on the status). For some status values (e.g., waiting), (depending on the status). For some status values (e.g., waiting),
neither of the optional fields will be present. neither of the optional fields will be present.
Given an EncryptedCert and the relevant decryption key, the Given an EncryptedCert and the relevant decryption key, the
certificate may be obtained. The purpose of this is to allow a CA to certificate may be obtained. The purpose of this is to allow a CA to
return the value of a certificate, but with the constraint that only return the value of a certificate but with the constraint that only
the intended recipient can obtain the actual certificate. The the intended recipient can obtain the actual certificate. The
benefit of this approach is that a CA may reply with a certificate benefit of this approach is that a CA may reply with a certificate
even in the absence of a proof that the requester is the end entity even in the absence of proof that the requester is the end entity
that can use the relevant private key (note that the proof is not that can use the relevant private key (note that the proof is not
obtained until the certConf message is received by the CA). Thus, obtained until the certConf message is received by the CA). Thus,
the CA will not have to revoke that certificate in the event that the CA will not have to revoke that certificate in the event that
something goes wrong with the proof-of-possession (but MAY do so something goes wrong with the proof-of-possession (but MAY do so
anyway, depending upon policy). anyway, depending upon policy).
The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section 5.2.2. The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section 5.2.2.
Note: To indicate support for EnvelopedData, the pvno cmp2021 has Note: To indicate support for EnvelopedData, the pvno cmp2021 has
been introduced. Details on the usage of different protocol version been introduced. Details on the usage of different protocol version
numbers (pvno) are described in Section 7. numbers (pvnos) are described in Section 7.
5.3.5. Key Update Request Content 5.3.5. Key Update Request Content
For key update requests the CertReqMessages syntax is used. For key update requests, the CertReqMessages syntax is used.
Typically, SubjectPublicKeyInfo, KeyId, and Validity are the template Typically, SubjectPublicKeyInfo, KeyId, and Validity are the template
fields that may be supplied for each key to be updated (see the fields that may be supplied for each key to be updated (see the
profiles defined in [RFC9483] Section 4.1.3 and Appendix C.6 for profiles defined in Section 4.1.3 of [RFC9483] and Appendix C.6 for
further information). This message is intended to be used to request further information). This message is intended to be used to request
updates to existing (non-revoked and non-expired) certificates updates to existing (non-revoked and non-expired) certificates
(therefore, it is sometimes referred to as a "Certificate Update" (therefore, it is sometimes referred to as a "Certificate Update"
operation). An update is a replacement certificate containing either operation). An update is a replacement certificate containing either
a new subject public key or the current subject public key (although a new subject public key or the current subject public key (although
the latter practice may not be appropriate for some environments). the latter practice may not be appropriate for some environments).
See Section 5.2.1 and [RFC4211] for CertReqMessages syntax. See Section 5.2.1 and [RFC4211] for CertReqMessages syntax.
5.3.6. Key Update Response Content 5.3.6. Key Update Response Content
For key update responses, the CertRepMessage syntax is used. The For key update responses, the CertRepMessage syntax is used. The
response is identical to the initialization response. response is identical to the initialization response.
See Section 5.3.4 for CertRepMessage syntax. See Section 5.3.4 for CertRepMessage syntax.
5.3.7. Key Recovery Request Content 5.3.7. Key Recovery Request Content
For key recovery requests the syntax used is identical to the For key recovery requests, the syntax used is identical to the
initialization request CertReqMessages. Typically, initialization request CertReqMessages. Typically,
SubjectPublicKeyInfo and KeyId are the template fields that may be SubjectPublicKeyInfo and KeyId are the template fields that may be
used to supply a signature public key for which a certificate is used to supply a signature public key for which a certificate is
required. required.
See Section 5.2.1 and [RFC4211] for CertReqMessages syntax. Note See Section 5.2.1 and [RFC4211] for CertReqMessages syntax. Note
that if a key history is required, the requester must supply a that if a key history is required, the requester must supply a
Protocol Encryption Key control in the request message. Protocol Encryption Key control in the request message.
5.3.8. Key Recovery Response Content 5.3.8. Key Recovery Response Content
For key recovery responses, the following syntax is used. For some For key recovery responses, the following syntax is used. For some
status values (e.g., waiting) none of the optional fields will be status values (e.g., waiting), none of the optional fields will be
present. present.
KeyRecRepContent ::= SEQUENCE { KeyRecRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
status PKIStatusInfo, status PKIStatusInfo,
newSigCert [0] Certificate OPTIONAL, newSigCert [0] Certificate OPTIONAL,
caCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF caCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
Certificate OPTIONAL, Certificate OPTIONAL,
keyPairHist [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF keyPairHist [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL
} }
5.3.9. Revocation Request Content 5.3.9. Revocation Request Content
When requesting revocation of a certificate (or several When requesting revocation of a certificate (or several
certificates), the following data structure is used (see the profiles certificates), the following data structure is used (see the profiles
defined in [RFC9483] Section 4.2 for further information). The name defined in Section 4.2 of [RFC9483] for further information). The
of the requester is present in the PKIHeader structure. name of the requester is present in the PKIHeader structure.
RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails
RevDetails ::= SEQUENCE { RevDetails ::= SEQUENCE {
certDetails CertTemplate, certDetails CertTemplate,
crlEntryDetails Extensions OPTIONAL crlEntryDetails Extensions OPTIONAL
} }
5.3.10. Revocation Response Content 5.3.10. Revocation Response Content
skipping to change at page 64, line 42 skipping to change at line 2856
separate revocation announcement message MAY be sent to the subject separate revocation announcement message MAY be sent to the subject
of the certificate for which revocation was requested.) of the certificate for which revocation was requested.)
RevRepContent ::= SEQUENCE { RevRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
status SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIStatusInfo, status SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIStatusInfo,
revCerts [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertId OPTIONAL, revCerts [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertId OPTIONAL,
crls [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList crls [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList
OPTIONAL OPTIONAL
} }
5.3.11. Cross Certification Request Content 5.3.11. Cross-Certification Request Content
Cross certification requests use the same syntax (CertReqMessages) as Cross-certification requests use the same syntax (CertReqMessages) as
normal certification requests, with the restriction that the key pair normal certification requests, with the restriction that the key pair
MUST have been generated by the requesting CA and the private key MUST have been generated by the requesting CA and the private key
MUST NOT be sent to the responding CA (see the profiles defined in MUST NOT be sent to the responding CA (see the profiles defined in
Appendix D.6 for further information). This request MAY also be used Appendix D.6 for further information). This request MAY also be used
by subordinate CAs to get their certificates signed by the parent CA. by subordinate CAs to get their certificates signed by the parent CA.
See Section 5.2.1 and [RFC4211] for CertReqMessages syntax. See Section 5.2.1 and [RFC4211] for CertReqMessages syntax.
5.3.12. Cross Certification Response Content 5.3.12. Cross-Certification Response Content
Cross certification responses use the same syntax (CertRepMessage) as Cross-certification responses use the same syntax (CertRepMessage) as
normal certification responses, with the restriction that no normal certification responses, with the restriction that no
encrypted private key can be sent. encrypted private key can be sent.
See Section 5.3.4 for CertRepMessage syntax. See Section 5.3.4 for CertRepMessage syntax.
5.3.13. CA Key Update Announcement Content 5.3.13. CA Key Update Announcement Content
When a CA updates its own key pair, the following data structure MAY When a CA updates its own key pair, the following data structure MAY
be used to announce this event. be used to announce this event.
skipping to change at page 66, line 23 skipping to change at line 2934
A CA MAY use such an announcement to warn (or notify) a subject that A CA MAY use such an announcement to warn (or notify) a subject that
its certificate is about to be (or has been) revoked. This would its certificate is about to be (or has been) revoked. This would
typically be used where the request for revocation did not come from typically be used where the request for revocation did not come from
the subject concerned. the subject concerned.
The willBeRevokedAt field contains the time at which a new entry will The willBeRevokedAt field contains the time at which a new entry will
be added to the relevant CRLs. be added to the relevant CRLs.
5.3.16. CRL Announcement 5.3.16. CRL Announcement
When a CA issues a new CRL (or set of CRLs) the following data When a CA issues a new CRL (or set of CRLs), the following data
structure MAY be used to announce this event. structure MAY be used to announce this event.
CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList
5.3.17. PKI Confirmation Content 5.3.17. PKI Confirmation Content
This data structure is used in the protocol exchange as the final This data structure is used in the protocol exchange as the final
PKIMessage. Its content is the same in all cases -- actually there PKIMessage. Its content is the same in all cases -- actually, there
is no content since the PKIHeader carries all the required is no content since the PKIHeader carries all the required
information. information.
PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL
Use of this message for certificate confirmation is NOT RECOMMENDED; Use of this message for certificate confirmation is NOT RECOMMENDED;
certConf SHOULD be used instead. Upon receiving a PKIConfirm for a certConf SHOULD be used instead. Upon receiving a PKIConfirm for a
certificate response, the recipient MAY treat it as a certConf with certificate response, the recipient MAY treat it as a certConf with
all certificates being accepted. all certificates being accepted.
skipping to change at page 67, line 19 skipping to change at line 2972
certReqId INTEGER, certReqId INTEGER,
statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL, statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL,
hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}} hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}
OPTIONAL OPTIONAL
} }
The hashAlg field SHOULD be used only in exceptional cases where the The hashAlg field SHOULD be used only in exceptional cases where the
signatureAlgorithm of the certificate to be confirmed does not signatureAlgorithm of the certificate to be confirmed does not
specify a hash algorithm in the OID or in the parameters or no hash specify a hash algorithm in the OID or in the parameters or no hash
algorithm is specified for hashing certificates signed using the algorithm is specified for hashing certificates signed using the
signatureAlgorithm. Note that for EdDSA a hash algorithm is signatureAlgorithm. Note that for EdDSA, a hash algorithm is
specified in Section 3.3 of [RFC9481], such that the hashAlg field is specified in Section 3.3 of [RFC9481], such that the hashAlg field is
not needed for EdDSA. Otherwise, the certHash value SHALL be not needed for EdDSA. Otherwise, the certHash value SHALL be
computed using the same hash algorithm as used to create and verify computed using the same hash algorithm as used to create and verify
the certificate signature or as specified for hashing certificates the certificate signature or as specified for hashing certificates
signed using the signatureAlgorithm. If hashAlg is used, the CMP signed using the signatureAlgorithm. If hashAlg is used, the CMP
version indicated by the certConf message header must be cmp2021(3). version indicated by the certConf message header must be cmp2021(3).
For any particular CertStatus, omission of the statusInfo field For any particular CertStatus, omission of the statusInfo field
indicates acceptance of the specified certificate. Alternatively, indicates acceptance of the specified certificate. Alternatively,
explicit status details (with respect to acceptance or rejection) MAY explicit status details (with respect to acceptance or rejection) MAY
be provided in the statusInfo field, perhaps for auditing purposes at be provided in the statusInfo field, perhaps for auditing purposes at
the CA/RA. the CA/RA.
Within CertConfirmContent, omission of a CertStatus structure Within CertConfirmContent, omission of a CertStatus structure
corresponding to a certificate supplied in the previous response corresponding to a certificate supplied in the previous response
message indicates rejection of the certificate. Thus, an empty message indicates rejection of the certificate. Thus, an empty
CertConfirmContent (a zero-length SEQUENCE) MAY be used to indicate CertConfirmContent (a zero-length SEQUENCE) MAY be used to indicate
rejection of all supplied certificates. See Section 5.2.8.3.2, for a rejection of all supplied certificates. See Section 5.2.8.3.2 for a
discussion of the certHash field with respect to proof-of-possession. discussion of the certHash field with respect to proof-of-possession.
5.3.19. PKI General Message Content 5.3.19. PKI General Message Content
InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
infoType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, infoType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
infoValue ANY DEFINED BY infoType OPTIONAL infoValue ANY DEFINED BY infoType OPTIONAL
} }
-- where {id-it} = {id-pkix 4} = {1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4} -- where {id-it} = {id-pkix 4} = {1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4}
skipping to change at page 68, line 18 skipping to change at line 3016
protect sensitive information during the protocol. protect sensitive information during the protocol.
GenMsg: {id-it 1}, < absent > GenMsg: {id-it 1}, < absent >
GenRep: {id-it 1}, Certificate | < absent > GenRep: {id-it 1}, Certificate | < absent >
EEs MUST ensure that the correct certificate is used for this EEs MUST ensure that the correct certificate is used for this
purpose. purpose.
5.3.19.2. Signing Key Pair Types 5.3.19.2. Signing Key Pair Types
This MAY be used by the EE to get the list of signature algorithm This MAY be used by the EE to get the list of signature algorithms
whose subject public key values the CA is willing to certify. whose subject public key values the CA is willing to certify.
GenMsg: {id-it 2}, < absent > GenMsg: {id-it 2}, < absent >
GenRep: {id-it 2}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GenRep: {id-it 2}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
AlgorithmIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier
Note: For the purposes of this exchange, rsaEncryption and Note: For the purposes of this exchange, rsaEncryption and
sha256WithRSAEncryption, for example, are considered to be sha256WithRSAEncryption, for example, are considered to be
equivalent; the question being asked is, "Is the CA willing to equivalent; the question being asked is, "Is the CA willing to
certify an RSA public key?" certify an RSA public key?"
Note: In case several elliptic curves are supported, several id- Note: In case several elliptic curves are supported, several id-
ecPublicKey elements as defined in [RFC5480] need to be given, one ecPublicKey elements as defined in [RFC5480] need to be given, one
per named curve. per named curve.
5.3.19.3. Encryption/Key Agreement Key Pair Types 5.3.19.3. Encryption / Key Agreement Key Pair Types
This MAY be used by the client to get the list of encryption/key This MAY be used by the client to get the list of encryption / key
agreement algorithms whose subject public key values the CA is agreement algorithms whose subject public key values the CA is
willing to certify. willing to certify.
GenMsg: {id-it 3}, < absent > GenMsg: {id-it 3}, < absent >
GenRep: {id-it 3}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GenRep: {id-it 3}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
AlgorithmIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier
Note: In case several elliptic curves are supported, several id- Note: In case several elliptic curves are supported, several id-
ecPublicKey elements as defined in [RFC5480] need to be given, one ecPublicKey elements as defined in [RFC5480] need to be given, one
per named curve. per named curve.
skipping to change at page 69, line 43 skipping to change at line 3084
that it does not recognize or support from the list submitted by the that it does not recognize or support from the list submitted by the
client. client.
GenRep: {id-it 7}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER GenRep: {id-it 7}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER
5.3.19.8. Key Pair Parameters 5.3.19.8. Key Pair Parameters
This MAY be used by the EE to request the domain parameters to use This MAY be used by the EE to request the domain parameters to use
for generating the key pair for certain public-key algorithms. It for generating the key pair for certain public-key algorithms. It
can be used, for example, to request the appropriate P, Q, and G to can be used, for example, to request the appropriate P, Q, and G to
generate the DH/DSA key, or to request a set of well-known elliptic generate the DH/DSA key or to request a set of well-known elliptic
curves. curves.
GenMsg: {id-it 10}, OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- (Algorithm object-id) GenMsg: {id-it 10}, OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- (Algorithm object-id)
GenRep: {id-it 11}, AlgorithmIdentifier | < absent > GenRep: {id-it 11}, AlgorithmIdentifier | < absent >
An absent infoValue in the GenRep indicates that the algorithm An absent infoValue in the GenRep indicates that the algorithm
specified in GenMsg is not supported. specified in GenMsg is not supported.
EEs MUST ensure that the parameters are acceptable to it and that the EEs MUST ensure that the parameters are acceptable to it and that the
GenRep message is authenticated (to avoid substitution attacks). GenRep message is authenticated (to avoid substitution attacks).
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5.3.19.11. ConfirmWaitTime 5.3.19.11. ConfirmWaitTime
See Section 5.1.1.2 for the definition and use of {id-it 14}. See Section 5.1.1.2 for the definition and use of {id-it 14}.
5.3.19.12. Original PKIMessage 5.3.19.12. Original PKIMessage
See Section 5.1.1.3 for the definition and use of {id-it 15}. See Section 5.1.1.3 for the definition and use of {id-it 15}.
5.3.19.13. Supported Language Tags 5.3.19.13. Supported Language Tags
This MAY be used to determine the appropriate [RFC5646] language tag This MAY be used to determine the appropriate language tag [RFC5646]
to use in subsequent messages. The sender sends its list of to use in subsequent messages. The sender sends its list of
supported languages (in order, most preferred to least); the receiver supported languages (in order of most to least preferred); the
returns the one it wishes to use. (Note: each UTF8String MUST receiver returns the one it wishes to use. (Note: Each UTF8String
include a language tag.) If none of the offered tags are supported, MUST include a language tag.) If none of the offered tags are
an error MUST be returned. supported, an error MUST be returned.
GenMsg: {id-it 16}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String GenMsg: {id-it 16}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
GenRep: {id-it 16}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1) OF UTF8String GenRep: {id-it 16}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1) OF UTF8String
5.3.19.14. CA Certificates 5.3.19.14. CA Certificates
This MAY be used by the client to get CA certificates. This MAY be used by the client to get CA certificates.
GenMsg: {id-it 17}, < absent > GenMsg: {id-it 17}, < absent >
GenRep: {id-it 17}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GenRep: {id-it 17}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
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certify. certify.
The id-regCtrl-algId control MAY be used to identify a cryptographic The id-regCtrl-algId control MAY be used to identify a cryptographic
algorithm (see Section 4.1.2.7 of [RFC5280]) other than algorithm (see Section 4.1.2.7 of [RFC5280]) other than
rsaEncryption. The algorithm field SHALL identify a cryptographic rsaEncryption. The algorithm field SHALL identify a cryptographic
algorithm. The contents of the optional parameters field will vary algorithm. The contents of the optional parameters field will vary
according to the algorithm identified. For example, when the according to the algorithm identified. For example, when the
algorithm is set to id-ecPublicKey, the parameters identify the algorithm is set to id-ecPublicKey, the parameters identify the
elliptic curve to be used; see [RFC5480]. elliptic curve to be used; see [RFC5480].
Note: The client may specify a profile name in the certProfile field, Note: The client may specify a profile name in the certProfile field
see Section 5.1.1.4. (see Section 5.1.1.4).
The id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen control SHALL be used for algorithm The id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen control SHALL be used for algorithm
rsaEncryption and SHALL contain the intended modulus bit length of rsaEncryption and SHALL contain the intended modulus bit length of
the RSA key. the RSA key.
GenMsg: {id-it 19}, < absent > GenMsg: {id-it 19}, < absent >
GenRep: {id-it 19}, CertReqTemplateContent | < absent > GenRep: {id-it 19}, CertReqTemplateContent | < absent >
CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent
skipping to change at page 72, line 39 skipping to change at line 3221
RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER (1..MAX) RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER (1..MAX)
The CertReqTemplateValue contains the prefilled certTemplate to be The CertReqTemplateValue contains the prefilled certTemplate to be
used for a future certificate request. The publicKey field in the used for a future certificate request. The publicKey field in the
certTemplate MUST NOT be used. In case the PKI management entity certTemplate MUST NOT be used. In case the PKI management entity
wishes to specify supported public-key algorithms, the keySpec field wishes to specify supported public-key algorithms, the keySpec field
MUST be used. One AttributeTypeAndValue per supported algorithm or MUST be used. One AttributeTypeAndValue per supported algorithm or
RSA key length MUST be used. RSA key length MUST be used.
Note: The controls ASN.1 type is defined in Section 6 of CRMF Note: The controls for an ASN.1 type are defined in Section 6 of CRMF
[RFC4211] [RFC4211].
5.3.19.17. CRL Update Retrieval 5.3.19.17. CRL Update Retrieval
This MAY be used by the client to get new CRLs, specifying the source This MAY be used by the client to get new CRLs, specifying the source
of the CRLs and the thisUpdate value of the latest CRL it already of the CRLs and the thisUpdate value of the latest CRL it already
has, if available. A CRL source is given either by a has, if available. A CRL source is given either by a
DistributionPointName or the GeneralNames of the issuing CA. The DistributionPointName or the GeneralNames of the issuing CA. The
DistributionPointName should be treated as an internal pointer to DistributionPointName should be treated as an internal pointer to
identify a CRL that the server already has and not as a way to ask identify a CRL that the server already has and not as a way to ask
the server to fetch CRLs from external locations. The server SHALL the server to fetch CRLs from external locations. The server SHALL
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CRLStatus ::= SEQUENCE { CRLStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
source CRLSource, source CRLSource,
thisUpdate Time OPTIONAL } thisUpdate Time OPTIONAL }
5.3.19.18. KEM Ciphertext 5.3.19.18. KEM Ciphertext
This MAY be used by a PKI entity to get the KEM ciphertext for MAC- This MAY be used by a PKI entity to get the KEM ciphertext for MAC-
based message protection using KEM (see Section 5.1.3.4). based message protection using KEM (see Section 5.1.3.4).
The PKI entity which possesses a KEM key pair can request the The PKI entity that possesses a KEM key pair can request the
ciphertext by sending an InfoTypeAndValue structure of type ciphertext by sending an InfoTypeAndValue structure of type
KemCiphertextInfo where the infoValue is absent. The ciphertext can KemCiphertextInfo where the infoValue is absent. The ciphertext can
be provided in the following genp message with an InfoTypeAndValue be provided in the following genp message with an InfoTypeAndValue
structure of the same type. structure of the same type.
GenMsg: {id-it TBD1}, < absent > GenMsg: {id-it 24}, < absent >
GenRep: {id-it TBD1}, KemCiphertextInfo GenRep: {id-it 24}, KemCiphertextInfo
KemCiphertextInfo ::= SEQUENCE { KemCiphertextInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
kem AlgorithmIdentifier{KEM-ALGORITHM, {...}}, kem AlgorithmIdentifier{KEM-ALGORITHM, {...}},
ct OCTET STRING ct OCTET STRING
} }
kem is the algorithm identifier of the KEM algorithm, and any kem is the algorithm identifier of the KEM algorithm, and any
associated parameters, used to generate the ciphertext ct. associated parameters, used to generate the ciphertext (ct).
ct is the ciphertext output from the KEM Encapsulate function. ct is the ciphertext output from the KEM Encapsulate function.
NOTE: These InfoTypeAndValue structures can also be transferred in Note: These InfoTypeAndValue structures can also be transferred in
the generalInfo field of the PKIHeader in messages of other types the generalInfo field of the PKIHeader in messages of other types
(see Section 5.1.1.5). (see Section 5.1.1.5).
5.3.20. PKI General Response Content 5.3.20. PKI General Response Content
GenRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue GenRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
Examples of GenReps that MAY be supported include those listed in the Examples of GenReps that MAY be supported include those listed in the
subsections of Section 5.3.19. subsections of Section 5.3.19.
5.3.21. Error Message Content 5.3.21. Error Message Content
This data structure MAY be used by EE, CA, or RA to convey error This data structure MAY be used by an EE, CA, or RA to convey error
information and by a PKI management entity to initiate delayed information and by a PKI management entity to initiate delayed
delivery of responses. delivery of responses.
ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE { ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE {
pKIStatusInfo PKIStatusInfo, pKIStatusInfo PKIStatusInfo,
errorCode INTEGER OPTIONAL, errorCode INTEGER OPTIONAL,
errorDetails PKIFreeText OPTIONAL errorDetails PKIFreeText OPTIONAL
} }
This message MAY be generated at any time during a PKI transaction. This message MAY be generated at any time during a PKI transaction.
If the client sends this request, the server MUST respond with a If the client sends this request, the server MUST respond with a
PKIConfirm response, or another ErrorMsg if any part of the header is PKIConfirm response or another ErrorMsg if any part of the header is
not valid. not valid.
In case a PKI management entity sends an error message to the EE with In case a PKI management entity sends an error message to the EE with
the pKIStatusInfo field containing the status "waiting", the EE the pKIStatusInfo field containing the status "waiting", the EE
SHOULD initiate polling as described in Section 5.3.22. If the EE SHOULD initiate polling as described in Section 5.3.22. If the EE
does not initiate polling, both sides MUST treat this message as the does not initiate polling, both sides MUST treat this message as the
end of the transaction (if a transaction is in progress). end of the transaction (if a transaction is in progress).
If protection is desired on the message, the client MUST protect it If protection is desired on the message, the client MUST protect it
using the same technique (i.e., signature or MAC) as the starting using the same technique (i.e., signature or MAC) as the starting
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PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER, certReqId INTEGER,
checkAfter INTEGER, -- time in seconds checkAfter INTEGER, -- time in seconds
reason PKIFreeText OPTIONAL } reason PKIFreeText OPTIONAL }
Unless implicit confirmation has been requested and granted, in Unless implicit confirmation has been requested and granted, in
response to an ir, cr, p10cr, kur, krr, or ccr request message, response to an ir, cr, p10cr, kur, krr, or ccr request message,
polling is initiated with an ip, cp, kup, krp, or ccp response polling is initiated with an ip, cp, kup, krp, or ccp response
message containing status "waiting". For any type of request message containing status "waiting". For any type of request
message, polling can be initiated with an error response messages message, polling can be initiated with an error response message with
with status "waiting". The following clauses describe how polling status "waiting". The following clauses describe how polling
messages are used. It is assumed that multiple certConf messages can messages are used. It is assumed that multiple certConf messages can
be sent during transactions. There will be one sent in response to be sent during transactions. There will be one sent in response to
each ip, cp, kup, krp, or ccp that contains a CertStatus for an each ip, cp, kup, krp, or ccp that contains a CertStatus for an
issued certificate. issued certificate.
1 In response to an ip, cp, kup, krp, or ccp message, an EE will 1. In response to an ip, cp, kup, krp, or ccp message, an EE will
send a certConf for all issued certificates and expect a PKIconf send a certConf for all issued certificates and expect a PKIconf
for each certConf. An EE will send a pollReq message in response for each certConf. An EE will send a pollReq message in response
to each CertResponse element of an ip, cp, or kup message with to each CertResponse element of an ip, cp, or kup message with
status "waiting" and in response to an error message with status status "waiting" and in response to an error message with status
"waiting". Its certReqId MUST be either the index of a "waiting". Its certReqId MUST be either the index of a
CertResponse data structure with status "waiting" or -1 referring CertResponse data structure with status "waiting" or -1 referring
to the complete response. to the complete response.
2 In response to a pollReq, a CA/RA will return an ip, cp, kup, krp, 2. In response to a pollReq, a CA/RA will return an ip, cp, kup,
or ccp if one or more of still pending requested certificates are krp, or ccp if one or more of the still pending requested
ready or the final response to some other type of request is certificates are ready or the final response to some other type
available; otherwise, it will return a pollRep. of request is available; otherwise, it will return a pollRep.
3 If the EE receives a pollRep, it will wait for at least the number 3. If the EE receives a pollRep, it will wait for at least the
of seconds given in the checkAfter field before sending another number of seconds given in the checkAfter field before sending
pollReq. another pollReq.
[RFC-Editor: Please fix the indentation. This note belongs to 3.] Note that the checkAfter value heavily depends on the certificate
Note that the checkAfter value heavily depends on the certificate management environment. There are different possible reasons for
management environment. There are different reasons for a delayed a delayed delivery of response messages, e.g., high load on the
delivery of response messages possible, e.g., high load on the server's backend, offline transfer of messages between two PKI
server's backend, offline transfer of messages between two PKI management entities, or required RA operator approval.
management entities, or required RA operator approval. Therefore, Therefore, the checkAfter time can vary greatly. This should
the checkAfter time can vary greatly. This should also be also be considered by the transfer protocol.
considered by the transfer protocol.
1. [RFC-Editor: Please fix the enumeration and continue with '4'.] 4. If the EE receives an ip, cp, kup, krp, or ccp, then it will be
If the EE receives an ip, cp, kup, krp, or ccp, then it will be
treated in the same way as the initial response; if it receives treated in the same way as the initial response; if it receives
any other response, then this will be treated as the final any other response, then this will be treated as the final
response to the original request. response to the original request.
The following client-side state machine describes polling for The following client-side state machine describes polling for
individual CertResponse elements at the example of an ir request individual CertResponse elements at the example of an ir request
message. message.
START START
| |
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Some of the PKI management functions outlined in Section 3.1 are Some of the PKI management functions outlined in Section 3.1 are
described in this section. described in this section.
This section deals with functions that are "mandatory" in the sense This section deals with functions that are "mandatory" in the sense
that all end entity and CA/RA implementations MUST be able to provide that all end entity and CA/RA implementations MUST be able to provide
the functionality described. This part is effectively the profile of the functionality described. This part is effectively the profile of
the PKI management functionality that MUST be supported. Note, the PKI management functionality that MUST be supported. Note,
however, that the management functions described in this section do however, that the management functions described in this section do
not need to be accomplished using the PKI messages defined in not need to be accomplished using the PKI messages defined in
Section 5 if alternate means are suitable for a given environment. Section 5 if alternate means are suitable for a given environment.
See [RFC9483] Section 7 and Appendix C for profiles of the PKIMessage See Section 7 of [RFC9483] and Appendix C for profiles of the
structures that MUST be supported for specific use cases. PKIMessage structures that MUST be supported for specific use cases.
6.1. Root CA Initialization 6.1. Root CA Initialization
[See Section 3.1.1.2 for this document's definition of "root CA".] [See Section 3.1.1.2 for this document's definition of "root CA".]
If a newly created root CA is at the top of a PKI hierarchy, it If a newly created root CA is at the top of a PKI hierarchy, it
usually produces a "self-certificate", which is a certificate usually produces a "self-certificate", which is a certificate
structure with the profile defined for the "newWithNew" certificate structure with the profile defined for the "newWithNew" certificate
issued following a root CA key update. issued following a root CA key update.
In order to make the CA's self-certificate useful to end entities In order to make the CA's self-certificate useful to end entities
that do not acquire the self-certificate via "out-of-band" means, the that do not acquire the self-certificate via "out-of-band" means, the
CA must also produce a fingerprint for its certificate. End entities CA must also produce a fingerprint for its certificate. End entities
that acquire this fingerprint securely via some "out-of-band" means that acquire this fingerprint securely via some "out-of-band" means
can then verify the CA's self-certificate and, hence, the other can then verify the CA's self-certificate and, hence, the other
attributes contained therein. attributes contained therein.
The data structure used to carry the fingerprint may be the The data structure used to carry the fingerprint may be the
OOBCertHash, see Section 5.2.5. OOBCertHash (see Section 5.2.5).
6.2. Root CA Key Update 6.2. Root CA Key Update
CA keys (as all other keys) have a finite lifetime and will have to CA keys (as all other keys) have a finite lifetime and will have to
be updated on a periodic basis. The certificates NewWithNew, be updated on a periodic basis. The certificates NewWithNew,
NewWithOld, and OldWithNew (see Section 4.4.1) MAY be issued by the NewWithOld, and OldWithNew (see Section 4.4.1) MAY be issued by the
CA to aid existing end entities who hold the current root CA CA to aid existing end entities who hold the current root CA
certificate (OldWithOld) to transition securely to the new root CA certificate (OldWithOld) to transition securely to the new root CA
certificate (NewWithNew), and to aid new end entities who will hold certificate (NewWithNew) and to aid new end entities who will hold
NewWithNew to acquire OldWithOld securely for verification of NewWithNew to acquire OldWithOld securely for verification of
existing data. existing data.
6.3. Subordinate CA Initialization 6.3. Subordinate CA Initialization
[See Section 3.1.1.2 for this document's definition of "subordinate [See Section 3.1.1.2 for this document's definition of "subordinate
CA".] CA".]
From the perspective of PKI management protocols, the initialization From the perspective of PKI management protocols, the initialization
of a subordinate CA is the same as the initialization of an end of a subordinate CA is the same as the initialization of an end
entity. The only difference is that the subordinate CA must also entity. The only difference is that the subordinate CA must also
produce an initial revocation list. produce an initial revocation list.
6.4. CRL production 6.4. CRL Production
Before issuing any certificates, a newly established CA (which issues Before issuing any certificates, a newly established CA (which issues
CRLs) must produce "empty" versions of each CRL which are to be CRLs) must produce "empty" versions of each CRL, which are to be
periodically produced. periodically produced.
6.5. PKI Information Request 6.5. PKI Information Request
When a PKI entity (CA, RA, or EE) wishes to acquire information about When a PKI entity (CA, RA, or EE) wishes to acquire information about
the current status of a CA, it MAY send that CA a request for such the current status of a CA, it MAY send that CA a request for such
information. information.
The CA MUST respond to the request by providing (at least) all of the The CA MUST respond to the request by providing (at least) all of the
information requested by the requester. If some of the information information requested by the requester. If some of the information
cannot be provided, then an error must be conveyed to the requester. cannot be provided, then an error must be conveyed to the requester.
If PKIMessages are used to request and supply this PKI information, If PKIMessages are used to request and supply this PKI information,
then the request MUST be the GenMsg message, the response MUST be the then the request MUST be the GenMsg message, the response MUST be the
GenRep message, and the error MUST be the Error message. These GenRep message, and the error MUST be the Error message. These
messages are protected using a MAC based on shared secret information messages are protected using a MAC based on shared secret information
(e.g., password-based MAC, see CMP Algorithms [RFC9481] Section 6.1) (e.g., password-based MAC; see Section 6.1 of "CMP Algorithms"
or using any asymmetric authentication means such as a signature (if [RFC9481]) or using any asymmetric authentication means such as a
the end entity has an existing certificate). signature (if the end entity has an existing certificate).
6.6. Cross Certification 6.6. Cross Certification
The requester CA is the CA that will become the subject of the cross- The requester CA is the CA that will become the subject of the cross-
certificate; the responder CA will become the issuer of the cross- certificate; the responder CA will become the issuer of the cross-
certificate. certificate.
The requester CA must be "up and running" before initiating the The requester CA must be "up and running" before initiating the
cross-certification operation. cross-certification operation.
6.6.1. One-Way Request-Response Scheme: 6.6.1. One-Way Request-Response Scheme
The cross-certification scheme is essentially a one way operation; The cross-certification scheme is essentially a one-way operation;
that is, when successful, this operation results in the creation of that is, when successful, this operation results in the creation of
one new cross-certificate. If the requirement is that cross- one new cross-certificate. If the requirement is that cross-
certificates be created in "both directions", then each CA, in turn, certificates be created in "both directions", then each CA, in turn,
must initiate a cross-certification operation (or use another must initiate a cross-certification operation (or use another
scheme). scheme).
This scheme is suitable where the two CAs in question can already This scheme is suitable where the two CAs in question can already
verify each other's signatures (they have some common points of verify each other's signatures (they have some common points of
trust) or where there is an out-of-band verification of the origin of trust) or where there is an out-of-band verification of the origin of
the certification request. the certification request.
Detailed Description: Detailed Description:
Cross certification is initiated at one CA known as the responder. Cross certification is initiated at one CA known as the responder.
The CA administrator for the responder identifies the CA it wants to The CA administrator for the responder identifies the CA it wants
cross certify and the responder CA equipment generates an to cross certify and the responder CA equipment generates an
authorization code. The responder CA administrator passes this authorization code. The responder CA administrator passes this
authorization code by out-of-band means to the requester CA authorization code by out-of-band means to the requester CA
administrator. The requester CA administrator enters the administrator. The requester CA administrator enters the
authorization code at the requester CA in order to initiate the on- authorization code at the requester CA in order to initiate the
line exchange. on-line exchange.
The authorization code is used for authentication and integrity The authorization code is used for authentication and integrity
purposes. This is done by generating a symmetric key based on the purposes. This is done by generating a symmetric key based on the
authorization code and using the symmetric key for generating Message authorization code and using the symmetric key for generating
Authentication Codes (MACs) on all messages exchanged. Message Authentication Codes (MACs) on all messages exchanged.
(Authentication may alternatively be done using signatures instead of (Authentication may alternatively be done using signatures instead
MACs, if the CAs are able to retrieve and validate the required of MACs, if the CAs are able to retrieve and validate the required
public keys by some means, such as an out-of-band hash comparison.) public keys by some means, such as an out-of-band hash
comparison.)
The requester CA initiates the exchange by generating a cross- The requester CA initiates the exchange by generating a cross-
certification request (ccr) with a fresh random number (requester certification request (ccr) with a fresh random number (requester
random number). The requester CA then sends the ccr message to the random number). The requester CA then sends the ccr message to
responder CA. The fields in this message are protected from the responder CA. The fields in this message are protected from
modification with a MAC based on the authorization code. modification with a MAC based on the authorization code.
Upon receipt of the ccr message, the responder CA validates the Upon receipt of the ccr message, the responder CA validates the
message and the MAC, saves the requester random number, and generates message and the MAC, saves the requester random number, and
its own random number (responder random number). It then generates generates its own random number (responder random number). It
(and archives, if desired) a new requester certificate that contains then generates (and archives, if desired) a new requester
the requester CA public key and is signed with the responder CA certificate that contains the requester CA public key and is
signature private key. The responder CA responds with the cross signed with the responder CA signature private key. The responder
certification response (ccp) message. The fields in this message are CA responds with the cross-certification response (ccp) message.
protected from modification with a MAC based on the authorization The fields in this message are protected from modification with a
code. MAC based on the authorization code.
Upon receipt of the ccp message, the requester CA validates the Upon receipt of the ccp message, the requester CA validates the
message (including the received random numbers) and the MAC. The message (including the received random numbers) and the MAC. The
requester CA responds with the certConf message. The fields in this requester CA responds with the certConf message. The fields in
message are protected from modification with a MAC based on the this message are protected from modification with a MAC based on
authorization code. The requester CA MAY write the requester the authorization code. The requester CA MAY write the requester
certificate to the Repository as an aid to later certificate path certificate to the Repository as an aid to later certificate path
construction. construction.
Upon receipt of the certConf message, the responder CA validates the Upon receipt of the certConf message, the responder CA validates
message and the MAC, and sends back an acknowledgement using the the message and the MAC and sends back an acknowledgement using
PKIConfirm message. It MAY also publish the requester certificate as the PKIConfirm message. It MAY also publish the requester
an aid to later path construction. certificate as an aid to later path construction.
Notes: Notes:
1. The ccr message must contain a "complete" certification request; 1. The ccr message must contain a "complete" certification request;
that is, all fields except the serial number (including, e.g., a that is, all fields except the serial number (including, e.g., a
BasicConstraints extension) must be specified by the requester BasicConstraints extension) must be specified by the requester
CA. CA.
2. The ccp message SHOULD contain the verification certificate of 2. The ccp message SHOULD contain the verification certificate of
the responder CA; if present, the requester CA must then verify the responder CA; if present, the requester CA must then verify
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6.7. End Entity Initialization 6.7. End Entity Initialization
As with CAs, end entities must be initialized. Initialization of end As with CAs, end entities must be initialized. Initialization of end
entities requires at least two steps: entities requires at least two steps:
* acquisition of PKI information * acquisition of PKI information
* out-of-band verification of one root-CA public key * out-of-band verification of one root-CA public key
(other possible steps include the retrieval of trust condition (Other possible steps include the retrieval of trust condition
information and/or out-of-band verification of other CA public keys). information and/or out-of-band verification of other CA public keys.)
6.7.1. Acquisition of PKI Information 6.7.1. Acquisition of PKI Information
The information REQUIRED is: The information REQUIRED is:
* the current root-CA public key * the current root-CA public key
* (if the certifying CA is not a root-CA) the certification path * (if the certifying CA is not a root-CA) the certification path
from the root CA to the certifying CA together with appropriate from the root CA to the certifying CA together with appropriate
revocation lists revocation lists
* the algorithms and algorithm parameters that the certifying CA * the algorithms and algorithm parameters that the certifying CA
supports for each relevant usage supports for each relevant usage
Additional information could be required (e.g., supported extensions Additional information could be required (e.g., supported extensions
or CA policy information) in order to produce a certification request or CA policy information) in order to produce a certification request
that will be successful. However, for simplicity we do not mandate that will be successful. However, for simplicity, we do not mandate
that the end entity acquires this information via the PKI messages. that the end entity acquires this information via the PKI messages.
The end result is simply that some certification requests may fail The end result is simply that some certification requests may fail
(e.g., if the end entity wants to generate its own encryption key, (e.g., if the end entity wants to generate its own encryption key,
but the CA doesn't allow that). but the CA doesn't allow that).
The required information MAY be acquired as described in Section 6.5. The required information MAY be acquired as described in Section 6.5.
6.7.2. Out-of-Band Verification of Root CA Key 6.7.2. Out-of-Band Verification of the Root CA Key
An end entity must securely possess the public key of its root CA. An end entity must securely possess the public key of its root CA.
One method to achieve this is to provide the end entity with the CA's One method to achieve this is to provide the end entity with the CA's
self-certificate fingerprint via some secure "out-of-band" means. self-certificate fingerprint via some secure "out-of-band" means.
The end entity can then securely use the CA's self-certificate. The end entity can then securely use the CA's self-certificate.
See Section 6.1 for further details. See Section 6.1 for further details.
6.8. Certificate Request 6.8. Certificate Request
skipping to change at page 84, line 41 skipping to change at line 3742
"Certificate Update" operation). If the end entity already possesses "Certificate Update" operation). If the end entity already possesses
a signing key pair (with a corresponding verification certificate), a signing key pair (with a corresponding verification certificate),
then this message will typically be protected by the entity's digital then this message will typically be protected by the entity's digital
signature. The CA returns the new certificate (if the request is signature. The CA returns the new certificate (if the request is
successful) in a key update response (kup) message, which is successful) in a key update response (kup) message, which is
syntactically identical to a CertRepMessage. syntactically identical to a CertRepMessage.
7. Version Negotiation 7. Version Negotiation
This section defines the version negotiation used to support older This section defines the version negotiation used to support older
protocols between client and servers. protocols between clients and servers.
If a client knows the protocol version(s) supported by the server If a client knows the protocol version(s) supported by the server
(e.g., from a previous PKIMessage exchange or via some out-of-band (e.g., from a previous PKIMessage exchange or via some out-of-band
means), then it MUST send a PKIMessage with the highest version means), then it MUST send a PKIMessage with the highest version
supported by both it and the server. If a client does not know what supported by both it and the server. If a client does not know what
version(s) the server supports, then it MUST send a PKIMessage using version(s) the server supports, then it MUST send a PKIMessage using
the highest version it supports with the following exception: version the highest version it supports with the following exception: Version
cmp2021 SHOULD only be used if cmp2021 syntax is needed for the cmp2021 SHOULD only be used if cmp2021 syntax is needed for the
request being sent or for the expected response. request being sent or for the expected response.
Note: Using cmp2000 as the default pvno is done to avoid extra Note: Using cmp2000 as the default pvno is done to avoid extra
message exchanges for version negotiation and to foster compatibility message exchanges for version negotiation and to foster compatibility
with cmp2000 implementations. Version cmp2021 syntax is only needed with cmp2000 implementations. Version cmp2021 syntax is only needed
if a message exchange uses EnvelopedData, hashAlg (in CertStatus), if a message exchange uses EnvelopedData, hashAlg (in CertStatus),
POPOPrivKey with agreeMAC, or ckuann with RootCaKeyUpdateContent. POPOPrivKey with agreeMAC, or ckuann with RootCaKeyUpdateContent.
If a server receives a message with a version that it supports, then If a server receives a message with a version that it supports, then
the version of the response message MUST be the same as the received the version of the response message MUST be the same as the received
version. If a server receives a message with a version higher or version. If a server receives a message with a version higher or
lower than it supports, then it MUST send back an ErrorMsg with the lower than it supports, then it MUST send back an ErrorMsg with the
unsupportedVersion bit set (in the failureInfo field of the unsupportedVersion bit set (in the failureInfo field of the
pKIStatusInfo). If the received version is higher than the highest pKIStatusInfo). If the received version is higher than the highest
supported version, then the version in the error message MUST be the supported version, then the version in the error message MUST be the
highest version the server supports; if the received version is lower highest version the server supports; if the received version is lower
than the lowest supported version then the version in the error than the lowest supported version, then the version in the error
message MUST be the lowest version the server supports. message MUST be the lowest version the server supports.
If a client gets back an ErrorMsgContent with the unsupportedVersion If a client gets back an ErrorMsgContent with the unsupportedVersion
bit set and a version it supports, then it MAY retry the request with bit set and a version it supports, then it MAY retry the request with
that version. that version.
7.1. Supporting RFC 2510 Implementations 7.1. Supporting RFC 2510 Implementations
RFC 2510 did not specify the behavior of implementations receiving [RFC2510] did not specify the behavior of implementations receiving
versions they did not understand since there was only one version in versions they did not understand since there was only one version in
existence. With the introduction of the revision in [RFC4210], the existence. With the introduction of the revision in [RFC4210], the
following versioning behaviour is recommended. following versioning behavior is recommended.
7.1.1. Clients Talking to RFC 2510 Servers 7.1.1. Clients Talking to RFC 2510 Servers
If, after sending a message with a protocol version number higher If, after sending a message with a protocol version number higher
than cmp1999, a client receives an ErrorMsgContent with a version of than cmp1999, a client receives an ErrorMsgContent with a version of
cmp1999, then it MUST abort the current transaction. cmp1999, then it MUST abort the current transaction.
If a client receives a non-error PKIMessage with a version of If a client receives a non-error PKIMessage with a version of
cmp1999, then it MAY decide to continue the transaction (if the cmp1999, then it MAY decide to continue the transaction (if the
transaction hasn't finished) using RFC 2510 semantics. If it does transaction hasn't finished) using the semantics described in
not choose to do so and the transaction is not finished, then it MUST [RFC2510]. If it does not choose to do so and the transaction is not
abort the transaction and send an ErrorMsgContent with a version of finished, then it MUST abort the transaction and send an
cmp1999. ErrorMsgContent with a version of cmp1999.
7.1.2. Servers Receiving Version cmp1999 PKIMessages 7.1.2. Servers Receiving Version cmp1999 PKIMessages
If a server receives a version cmp1999 message it MAY revert to RFC If a server receives a version cmp1999 message, it MAY revert to the
2510 behaviour and respond with version cmp1999 messages. If it does behavior described in [RFC2510] and respond with version cmp1999
not choose to do so, then it MUST send back an ErrorMsgContent as messages. If it does not choose to do so, then it MUST send back an
described above in Section 7. ErrorMsgContent as described above in Section 7.
8. Security Considerations 8. Security Considerations
8.1. On the Necessity of Proof-Of-Possession 8.1. On the Necessity of Proof-of-Possession
It is well established that the role of a Certification Authority is It is well established that the role of a Certification Authority is
to verify that the name and public key belong to the end entity prior to verify that the name and public key belong to the end entity prior
to issuing a certificate. If an entity holding a private key obtains to issuing a certificate. If an entity holding a private key obtains
a certificate containing the corresponding public key issued for a a certificate containing the corresponding public key issued for a
different entity, it can authenticate as the entity named in the different entity, it can authenticate as the entity named in the
certificate. This facilitates masquerading. It is not entirely certificate. This facilitates masquerading. It is not entirely
clear what security guarantees are lost if an end entity is able to clear what security guarantees are lost if an end entity is able to
obtain a certificate containing a public key that they do not possess obtain a certificate containing a public key that they do not possess
the corresponding private key for. There are some scenarios, the corresponding private key for. There are some scenarios,
described as "forwarding attacks" in Appendix A of [Gueneysu], in described as "forwarding attacks" in Appendix A of [Gueneysu], in
which this can lead to protocol attacks against a naively-implemented which this can lead to protocol attacks against a naively implemented
sign-then-encrypt protocol, but in general it merely results in the sign-then-encrypt protocol, but in general, it merely results in the
end entity obtaining a certificate that they can not use. end entity obtaining a certificate that they cannot use.
8.2. Proof-Of-Possession with a Decryption Key 8.2. Proof-of-Possession with a Decryption Key
Some cryptographic considerations are worth explicitly spelling out. Some cryptographic considerations are worth explicitly spelling out.
In the protocols specified above, when an end entity is required to In the protocols specified above, when an end entity is required to
prove possession of a decryption key, it is effectively challenged to prove possession of a decryption key, it is effectively challenged to
decrypt something (its own certificate). This scheme (and many decrypt something (its own certificate). This scheme (and many
others!) could be vulnerable to an attack if the possessor of the others!) could be vulnerable to an attack if the possessor of the
decryption key in question could be fooled into decrypting an decryption key in question could be fooled into decrypting an
arbitrary challenge and returning the cleartext to an attacker. arbitrary challenge and returning the cleartext to an attacker.
Although in this specification a number of other failures in security Although in this specification a number of other failures in security
are required in order for this attack to succeed, it is conceivable are required in order for this attack to succeed, it is conceivable
that some future services (e.g., notary, trusted time) could that some future services (e.g., notary, trusted time) could
potentially be vulnerable to such attacks. For this reason, we potentially be vulnerable to such attacks. For this reason, we
reiterate the general rule that implementations should be very reiterate the general rule that implementations should be very
careful about decrypting arbitrary "ciphertext" and revealing careful about decrypting arbitrary "ciphertext" and revealing
recovered "plaintext" since such a practice can lead to serious recovered "plaintext" since such a practice can lead to serious
security vulnerabilities. security vulnerabilities.
The client MUST return the decrypted values only if they match the The client MUST return the decrypted values only if they match the
expected content type. In an Indirect Method, the decrypted value expected content type. In an indirect method, the decrypted value
MUST be a valid certificate, and in the Direct Method, the decrypted MUST be a valid certificate, and in a direct method, the decrypted
value MUST be a Rand as defined in Section 5.2.8.3.3. value MUST be a Rand as defined in Section 5.2.8.3.3.
8.3. Proof-Of-Possession by Exposing the Private Key 8.3. Proof-of-Possession by Exposing the Private Key
Note also that exposing a private key to the CA/RA as a proof-of- Note also that exposing a private key to the CA/RA as a proof-of-
possession technique can carry some security risks (depending upon possession technique can carry some security risks (depending upon
whether or not the CA/RA can be trusted to handle such material whether or not the CA/RA can be trusted to handle such material
appropriately). Implementers are advised to: appropriately). Implementers are advised to:
* Exercise caution in selecting and using this particular POP * Exercise caution in selecting and using this particular POP
mechanism. mechanism.
* Only use this POP mechanism if archival of the private key is * Only use this POP mechanism if archival of the private key is
desired. desired.
* When appropriate, have the user of the application explicitly * When appropriate, have the user of the application explicitly
state that they are willing to trust the CA/RA to have a copy of state that they are willing to trust the CA/RA to have a copy of
their private key before proceeding to reveal the private key. their private key before proceeding to reveal the private key.
8.4. Attack Against Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange 8.4. Attack Against Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
A small subgroup attack during a Diffie-Hellman key exchange may be A small subgroup attack during a Diffie-Hellman key exchange may be
carried out as follows. A malicious end entity may deliberately carried out as follows. A malicious end entity may deliberately
choose D-H parameters that enable it to derive (a significant number choose DH parameters that enable it to derive (a significant number
of bits of) the D-H private key of the CA during a key archival or of bits of) the DH private key of the CA during a key archival or key
key recovery operation. Armed with this knowledge, the EE would then recovery operation. Armed with this knowledge, the EE would then be
be able to retrieve the decryption private key of another able to retrieve the decryption private key of another unsuspecting
unsuspecting end entity, EE2, during EE2's legitimate key archival or end entity, EE2, during EE2's legitimate key archival or key recovery
key recovery operation with that CA. In order to avoid the operation with that CA. In order to avoid the possibility of such an
possibility of such an attack, two courses of action are available. attack, two courses of action are available. (1) The CA may generate
(1) The CA may generate a fresh D-H key pair to be used as a protocol a fresh DH key pair to be used as a protocol encryption key pair for
encryption key pair for each EE with which it interacts. (2) The CA each EE with which it interacts. (2) The CA may enter into a key
may enter into a key validation protocol (not specified in this validation protocol (not specified in this document) with each
document) with each requesting end entity to ensure that the EE's requesting end entity to ensure that the EE's protocol encryption key
protocol encryption key pair will not facilitate this attack. Option pair will not facilitate this attack. Option (1) is clearly simpler
(1) is clearly simpler (requiring no extra protocol exchanges from (requiring no extra protocol exchanges from either party) and is
either party) and is therefore RECOMMENDED. therefore RECOMMENDED.
8.5. Perfect Forward Secrecy 8.5. Perfect Forward Secrecy
Long-term security typically requires perfect forward secrecy (pfs). Long-term security typically requires perfect forward secrecy (pfs).
When transferring encrypted long-term confidential values such as When transferring encrypted long-term confidential values such as
centrally generated private keys or revocation passphrases, pfs centrally generated private keys or revocation passphrases, pfs is
likely is important. Yet it is not needed for CMP message protection likely important. Yet, it is not needed for CMP message protection
providing integrity and authenticity because transfer of PKI messages providing integrity and authenticity because transfer of PKI messages
is usually completed in very limited time. For the same reason it is usually completed in very limited time. For the same reason, it
typically is not required for the indirect method of providing a POP is not typically required for the indirect method to provide a POP
Section 5.2.8.3.2 delivering the newly issued certificate in (Section 5.2.8.3.2) delivering the newly issued certificate in
encrypted form. encrypted form.
Encrypted values Section 5.2.2 are transferred using CMS Encrypted values (Section 5.2.2) are transferred using CMS
EnvelopedData [RFC5652], which does not offer pfs. In cases where EnvelopedData [RFC5652], which does not offer pfs. In cases where
long-term security is needed, CMP messages SHOULD be transferred over long-term security is needed, CMP messages SHOULD be transferred over
a mechanism that provides pfs, such as TLS with appropriate cipher a mechanism that provides pfs, such as TLS with appropriate cipher
suites selected. suites selected.
8.6. Private Keys for Certificate Signing and CMP Message Protection 8.6. Private Keys for Certificate Signing and CMP Message Protection
A CA should not reuse its certificate signing key for other purposes, A CA should not reuse its certificate signing key for other purposes,
such as protecting CMP responses and TLS connections. This way, such as protecting CMP responses and TLS connections. This way,
exposure to other parts of the system and the number of uses of this exposure to other parts of the system and the number of uses of this
skipping to change at page 88, line 46 skipping to change at line 3937
keys or trust anchors. keys or trust anchors.
If the entropy of shared secret information protecting the delivery If the entropy of shared secret information protecting the delivery
of a centrally generated key pair is known, it should not be less of a centrally generated key pair is known, it should not be less
than the security strength of that key pair; if the shared secret than the security strength of that key pair; if the shared secret
information is reused for different key pairs, the security of the information is reused for different key pairs, the security of the
shared secret information should exceed the security strength of each shared secret information should exceed the security strength of each
individual key pair. individual key pair.
For the case of a PKI management operation that delivers a new trust For the case of a PKI management operation that delivers a new trust
anchor (e.g., a root CA certificate) using caPubs or genp that is (a) anchor (e.g., a root CA certificate), using caPubs or genp that is
not concluded in a timely manner or (b) where the shared secret (a) not concluded in a timely manner or (b) where the shared secret
information is reused for several key management operations, the information is reused for several key management operations, the
entropy of the shared secret information, if known, should not be entropy of the shared secret information, if known, should not be
less than the security strength of the trust anchor being managed by less than the security strength of the trust anchor being managed by
the operation. The shared secret information should have an entropy the operation. The shared secret information should have an entropy
that at least matches the security strength of the key material being that at least matches the security strength of the key material being
managed by the operation. Certain use cases may require shared managed by the operation. Certain use cases may require shared
secret information that may be of a low security strength, e.g., a secret information that may be of a low security strength, e.g., a
human-generated password. It is RECOMMENDED that such secret human-generated password. It is RECOMMENDED that such secret
information be limited to a single PKI management operation. information be limited to a single PKI management operation.
Importantly for this section further information about algorithm use Importantly for this section, further information about algorithm use
profiles and their security strength is available in CMP Algorithms profiles and their security strength is available in Section 7 of CMP
[RFC9481] Section 7. Algorithms [RFC9481].
8.8. Recurring Usage of KEM Keys for Message Protection 8.8. Recurring Usage of KEM Keys for Message Protection
For each PKI management operation using MAC-based message protection For each PKI management operation using MAC-based message protection
involving KEM, see Section 5.1.3.4, the KEM Encapsulate() function, involving KEM (see Section 5.1.3.4), the KEM Encapsulate() function,
providing a fresh KEM ciphertext (ct) and shared secret (ss), MUST be providing a fresh KEM ciphertext (ct) and shared secret (ss), MUST be
invoked. invoked.
It is assumed that the overall data size of the CMP messages in a PKI It is assumed that the overall data size of the CMP messages in a PKI
management operation protected by a single shared secret key is small management operation protected by a single shared secret key is small
enough not to introduce extra security risks. enough not to introduce extra security risks.
To be appropriate for use with this specification, the KEM algorithm To be appropriate for use with this specification, the KEM algorithm
MUST explicitly be designed to be secure when the public key is used MUST explicitly be designed to be secure when the public key is used
many times. For example, a KEM algorithm with a single-use public many times. For example, a KEM algorithm with a single-use public
key is not appropriate because the public key is expected to be key is not appropriate because the public key is expected to be
carried in a long-lived certificate [RFC5280] and used over and over. carried in a long-lived certificate [RFC5280] and used over and over.
Thus, KEM algorithms that offer indistinguishability under adaptive Thus, KEM algorithms that offer indistinguishability under adaptive
chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2) security are appropriate. A chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2) security are appropriate. A
common design pattern for obtaining IND-CCA2 security with public key common design pattern for obtaining IND-CCA2 security with public key
reuse is to apply the Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) transform [Fujisaki] or a reuse is to apply the Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) transform [Fujisaki] or a
variant of the FO transform [Hofheinz]. variant of the FO transform [Hofheinz].
Therefore, given a long-term public key using an IND-CCA2 secure KEM Therefore, given a long-term public key using an IND-CCA2-secure KEM
algorithm, there is no limit to the number of CMP messages that can algorithm, there is no limit to the number of CMP messages that can
be authenticated using KEM keys for MAC-based message protection. be authenticated using KEM keys for MAC-based message protection.
8.9. Trust Anchor Provisioning Using CMP Messages 8.9. Trust Anchor Provisioning Using CMP Messages
A provider of trust anchors, which may be an RA involved in A provider of trust anchors, which may be an RA involved in
configuration management of its clients, MUST NOT include to-be- configuration management of its clients, MUST NOT include to-be-
trusted CA certificates in a CMP message unless the specific trusted CA certificates in a CMP message unless the specific
deployment scenario can ensure that it is adequate that the receiving deployment scenario can ensure that it is adequate that the receiving
EE trusts these certificates, e.g., by loading them into its trust EE trusts these certificates, e.g., by loading them into its trust
store. store.
Whenever an EE receives in a CMP message a CA certificate to be used Whenever an EE receives in a CMP message a CA certificate to be used
as a trust anchor (for example in the caPubs field of a certificate as a trust anchor (for example, in the caPubs field of a certificate
response or in a general response), it MUST properly authenticate the response or in a general response), it MUST properly authenticate the
message sender with existing trust anchors without requiring new message sender with existing trust anchors without requiring new
trust anchor information included in the message. trust anchor information included in the message.
Additionally, the EE MUST verify that the sender is an authorized Additionally, the EE MUST verify that the sender is an authorized
source of trust anchors. This authorization is governed by local source of trust anchors. This authorization is governed by local
policy and typically indicated using shared secret information or policy and typically indicated using shared secret information or
with a signature-based message protection using a certificate issued with a signature-based message protection using a certificate issued
by a PKI that is explicitly authorized for this purpose. by a PKI that is explicitly authorized for this purpose.
8.10. Authorizing Requests for Certificates with Specific EKUs 8.10. Authorizing Requests for Certificates with Specific EKUs
When a CA issues a certificate containing extended key usage When a CA issues a certificate containing extended key usage
extensions as defined in Section 4.5, this expresses delegation of an extensions as defined in Section 4.5, this expresses delegation of an
authorization that originally is only with the CA certificate itself. authorization that originally is only with the CA certificate itself.
Such delegation is a very sensitive action in a PKI and therefore Such delegation is a very sensitive action in a PKI, and therefore,
special care must be taken when approving such certificate requests special care must be taken when approving such certificate requests
to ensure that only legitimate entities receive a certificate to ensure that only legitimate entities receive a certificate
containing such an EKU. containing such an EKU.
8.11. Usage of Certificate Transparency Logs 8.11. Usage of Certificate Transparency Logs
CAs that support indirect POP MUST NOT also publish final CAs that support indirect POP MUST NOT also publish final
certificates to Certificate Transparency logs [RFC9162] before having certificates to Certificate Transparency (CT) logs [RFC9162] before
received the certConf message containing the certHash of that having received the certConf message containing the certHash of that
certificate to complete the POP. The risk is that a malicious actor certificate to complete the POP. The risk is that a malicious actor
could fetch the final certificate from the CT log and use that to could fetch the final certificate from the CT log and use that to
spoof a response to the implicit POP challenge via a certConf spoof a response to the implicit POP challenge via a certConf
response. This risk does not apply to CT precertificates, so those response. This risk does not apply to CT precertificates, so those
are ok to publish. are OK to publish.
If a certificate or its precertificate was published in a CT log it If a certificate or its precertificate was published in a CT log, it
must be revoked, if a required certConf message could not be must be revoked if a required certConf message could not be verified,
verified, especially when the implicit POP was used. especially when the implicit POP was used.
9. IANA Considerations 9. IANA Considerations
This document updates the ASN.1 modules of CMP Updates Appendix A.2 This document updates the ASN.1 modules in Appendix A.2 of CMP
[RFC9480]. The OID TBD2 (id-mod-cmp2023-02) was registered in the Updates [RFC9480]. The OID 116 (id-mod-cmp2023-02) was registered in
"SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier" registry to identify the the "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier" registry to identify
updated ASN.1 module. the updated ASN.1 module.
In the SMI-numbers registry "SMI Security for PKIX CMP Information
Types (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.4)" (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-
numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.4) as defined in
[RFC7299] one addition has been performed.
One new entry has been added:
Decimal: TBD1
Description: id-it-KemCiphertextInfo IANA has added the following entry in the "SMI Security for PKIX CMP
Information Types" registry within the SMI Numbers registry group
(see <https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers>) [RFC7299]:
Reference: [RFCXXXX] Decimal: 24
Description: id-it-KemCiphertextInfo
Reference: RFC 9810
The new OID 1.2.840.113533.7.66.16 was registered by Entrust for id- The new OID 1.2.840.113533.7.66.16 was registered by Entrust for id-
KemBasedMac in the arch 1.2.840.113533.7.66. Entrust registered also KemBasedMac in the arc 1.2.840.113533.7.66. Entrust also registered
the OIDs for id-PasswordBasedMac and id-DHBasedMac there. the OIDs for id-PasswordBasedMac and id-DHBasedMac there.
All existing references to [RFC2510], [RFC4210], and [RFC9480] at All existing references to [RFC2510], [RFC4210], and [RFC9480] at
https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml except <https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers> except those in the
those in the "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier" registry "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier" registry have been replaced
should be replaced with references to this document. with references to this document.
10. Acknowledgements
The authors of this document wish to thank Carlisle Adams, Stephen
Farrell, Tomi Kause, and Tero Mononen, the original authors of
[RFC4210], for their work.
We also thank all reviewers of this document for their valuable
feedback.
Adding KEM support to this document was partly funded by the German
Federal Ministry of Education and Research in the project Quoryptan
through grant number 16KIS2033.
11. References 10. References
11.1. Normative References 10.1. Normative References
[RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object [RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object
Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985, Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2985, November 2000, DOI 10.17487/RFC2985, November 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2985>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2985>.
[RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification [RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986, Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000, DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2986>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986>.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO [RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November 10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November
2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3629>. 2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>.
[RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure [RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211, Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005, DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4211>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4211>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk, [RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
"Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009, Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5480>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5480>.
[RFC5646] Phillips, A., Ed. and M. Davis, Ed., "Tags for Identifying [RFC5646] Phillips, A., Ed. and M. Davis, Ed., "Tags for Identifying
Languages", BCP 47, RFC 5646, DOI 10.17487/RFC5646, Languages", BCP 47, RFC 5646, DOI 10.17487/RFC5646,
September 2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5646>. September 2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5646>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70, [RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009, RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5652>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC5958] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958, [RFC5958] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010, DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5958>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958>.
[RFC6402] Schaad, J., "Certificate Management over CMS (CMC) [RFC6402] Schaad, J., "Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)
Updates", RFC 6402, DOI 10.17487/RFC6402, November 2011, Updates", RFC 6402, DOI 10.17487/RFC6402, November 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6402>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6402>.
[RFC8933] Housley, R., "Update to the Cryptographic Message Syntax [RFC8933] Housley, R., "Update to the Cryptographic Message Syntax
(CMS) for Algorithm Identifier Protection", RFC 8933, (CMS) for Algorithm Identifier Protection", RFC 8933,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8933, October 2020, DOI 10.17487/RFC8933, October 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8933>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8933>.
[RFC9045] Housley, R., "Algorithm Requirements Update to the [RFC9045] Housley, R., "Algorithm Requirements Update to the
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 9045, Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 9045,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9045, June 2021, DOI 10.17487/RFC9045, June 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9045>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9045>.
[RFC9481] Brockhaus, H., Aschauer, H., Ounsworth, M., and J. Gray, [RFC9481] Brockhaus, H., Aschauer, H., Ounsworth, M., and J. Gray,
"Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Algorithms", "Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Algorithms",
RFC 9481, DOI 10.17487/RFC9481, November 2023, RFC 9481, DOI 10.17487/RFC9481, November 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9481>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9481>.
[RFC9629] Housley, R., Gray, J., and T. Okubo, "Using Key [RFC9629] Housley, R., Gray, J., and T. Okubo, "Using Key
Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) Algorithms in the Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) Algorithms in the
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 9629, Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 9629,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9629, August 2024, DOI 10.17487/RFC9629, August 2024,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9629>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9629>.
[MvOV97] Menezes, A., van Oorschot, P., and S. Vanstone, "Handbook [MvOV97] Menezes, A., van Oorschot, P., and S. Vanstone, "Handbook
of Applied Cryptography", CRC Press ISBN 0-8493-8523-7, of Applied Cryptography", CRC Press ISBN 0-8493-8523-7,
1996. 1996.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
11.2. Informative References 10.2. Informative References
[RFC9480] Brockhaus, H., von Oheimb, D., and J. Gray, "Certificate [RFC9480] Brockhaus, H., von Oheimb, D., and J. Gray, "Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP) Updates", RFC 9480, Management Protocol (CMP) Updates", RFC 9480,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9480, November 2023, DOI 10.17487/RFC9480, November 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9480>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9480>.
[RFC9482] Sahni, M., Ed. and S. Tripathi, Ed., "Constrained [RFC9482] Sahni, M., Ed. and S. Tripathi, Ed., "Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP) Transfer for the Certificate Application Protocol (CoAP) Transfer for the Certificate
Management Protocol", RFC 9482, DOI 10.17487/RFC9482, Management Protocol", RFC 9482, DOI 10.17487/RFC9482,
November 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9482>. November 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9482>.
[RFC9483] Brockhaus, H., von Oheimb, D., and S. Fries, "Lightweight [RFC9483] Brockhaus, H., von Oheimb, D., and S. Fries, "Lightweight
Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Profile", RFC 9483, Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Profile", RFC 9483,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9483, November 2023, DOI 10.17487/RFC9483, November 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9483>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9483>.
[I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc6712bis] [RFC9811] Brockhaus, H., von Oheimb, D., Ounsworth, M., and J. Gray,
Brockhaus, H., von Oheimb, D., Ounsworth, M., and J. Gray,
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure -- HTTP Transfer "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure -- HTTP Transfer
for the Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)", Work in for the Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 9811,
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-rfc6712bis-10, June 2025, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9811>.
9 January 2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-ietf-lamps-rfc6712bis-10>.
[RFC1847] Galvin, J., Murphy, S., Crocker, S., and N. Freed, [RFC1847] Galvin, J., Murphy, S., Crocker, S., and N. Freed,
"Security Multiparts for MIME: Multipart/Signed and "Security Multiparts for MIME: Multipart/Signed and
Multipart/Encrypted", RFC 1847, DOI 10.17487/RFC1847, Multipart/Encrypted", RFC 1847, DOI 10.17487/RFC1847,
October 1995, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1847>. October 1995, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1847>.
[RFC2510] Adams, C. and S. Farrell, "Internet X.509 Public Key [RFC2510] Adams, C. and S. Farrell, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols", Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols",
RFC 2510, DOI 10.17487/RFC2510, March 1999, RFC 2510, DOI 10.17487/RFC2510, March 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2510>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2510>.
[RFC2585] Housley, R. and P. Hoffman, "Internet X.509 Public Key [RFC2585] Housley, R. and P. Hoffman, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Operational Protocols: FTP and HTTP", Infrastructure Operational Protocols: FTP and HTTP",
RFC 2585, DOI 10.17487/RFC2585, May 1999, RFC 2585, DOI 10.17487/RFC2585, May 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2585>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2585>.
[RFC4210] Adams, C., Farrell, S., Kause, T., and T. Mononen, [RFC4210] Adams, C., Farrell, S., Kause, T., and T. Mononen,
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 4210, Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 4210,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4210, September 2005, DOI 10.17487/RFC4210, September 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4210>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4210>.
[RFC4212] Blinov, M. and C. Adams, "Alternative Certificate Formats [RFC4212] Blinov, M. and C. Adams, "Alternative Certificate Formats
for the Public-Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) for the Public-Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)
Certificate Management Protocols", RFC 4212, Certificate Management Protocols", RFC 4212,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4212, October 2005, DOI 10.17487/RFC4212, October 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4212>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4212>.
[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", [RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005, RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4303>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4303>.
[RFC4511] Sermersheim, J., Ed., "Lightweight Directory Access [RFC4511] Sermersheim, J., Ed., "Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol (LDAP): The Protocol", RFC 4511, Protocol (LDAP): The Protocol", RFC 4511,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4511, June 2006, DOI 10.17487/RFC4511, June 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4511>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4511>.
[RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the [RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912, Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010, DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5912>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.
[RFC6268] Schaad, J. and S. Turner, "Additional New ASN.1 Modules [RFC6268] Schaad, J. and S. Turner, "Additional New ASN.1 Modules
for the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and the Public for the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and the Public
Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 6268, Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 6268,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6268, July 2011, DOI 10.17487/RFC6268, July 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6268>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6268>.
[RFC6712] Kause, T. and M. Peylo, "Internet X.509 Public Key [RFC6712] Kause, T. and M. Peylo, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure -- HTTP Transfer for the Certificate Infrastructure -- HTTP Transfer for the Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 6712, Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 6712,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6712, September 2012, DOI 10.17487/RFC6712, September 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6712>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6712>.
[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T. [RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October (IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7296>. 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
[RFC7299] Housley, R., "Object Identifier Registry for the PKIX [RFC7299] Housley, R., "Object Identifier Registry for the PKIX
Working Group", RFC 7299, DOI 10.17487/RFC7299, July 2014, Working Group", RFC 7299, DOI 10.17487/RFC7299, July 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7299>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7299>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[RFC8572] Watsen, K., Farrer, I., and M. Abrahamsson, "Secure Zero [RFC8572] Watsen, K., Farrer, I., and M. Abrahamsson, "Secure Zero
Touch Provisioning (SZTP)", RFC 8572, Touch Provisioning (SZTP)", RFC 8572,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8572, April 2019, DOI 10.17487/RFC8572, April 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8572>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8572>.
[RFC8649] Housley, R., "Hash Of Root Key Certificate Extension", [RFC8649] Housley, R., "Hash Of Root Key Certificate Extension",
RFC 8649, DOI 10.17487/RFC8649, August 2019, RFC 8649, DOI 10.17487/RFC8649, August 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8649>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8649>.
[RFC8995] Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Eckert, T., Behringer, M., [RFC8995] Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Eckert, T., Behringer, M.,
and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
Infrastructure (BRSKI)", RFC 8995, DOI 10.17487/RFC8995, Infrastructure (BRSKI)", RFC 8995, DOI 10.17487/RFC8995,
May 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8995>. May 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8995>.
[RFC9147] Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The [RFC9147] Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
1.3", RFC 9147, DOI 10.17487/RFC9147, April 2022, 1.3", RFC 9147, DOI 10.17487/RFC9147, April 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9147>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9147>.
[RFC9162] Laurie, B., Messeri, E., and R. Stradling, "Certificate [RFC9162] Laurie, B., Messeri, E., and R. Stradling, "Certificate
Transparency Version 2.0", RFC 9162, DOI 10.17487/RFC9162, Transparency Version 2.0", RFC 9162, DOI 10.17487/RFC9162,
December 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9162>. December 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9162>.
[I-D.ietf-anima-brski-ae] [RFC9733] von Oheimb, D., Ed., Fries, S., and H. Brockhaus, "BRSKI
von Oheimb, D., Fries, S., and H. Brockhaus, "BRSKI-AE: with Alternative Enrollment (BRSKI-AE)", RFC 9733,
Alternative Enrollment Protocols in BRSKI", Work in DOI 10.17487/RFC9733, March 2025,
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-anima-brski-ae-13, 17 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9733>.
September 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-ietf-anima-brski-ae-13>.
[I-D.ietf-lamps-kyber-certificates] [ML-KEM] Turner, S., Kampanakis, P., Massimo, J., and B.
Turner, S., Kampanakis, P., Massimo, J., and B.
Westerbaan, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure - Westerbaan, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure -
Algorithm Identifiers for the Module-Lattice-Based Key- Algorithm Identifiers for the Module-Lattice-Based Key-
Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM)", Work in Progress, Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM)", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-kyber-certificates-07, 7 Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-kyber-certificates-10, 16
January 2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/ April 2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
draft-ietf-lamps-kyber-certificates-07>. ietf-lamps-kyber-certificates-10>.
[NIST.SP.800_90Ar1] [NIST.SP.800_90Ar1]
Barker, E. B., Kelsey, J. M., and NIST, "Recommendation Barker, E. B. and J. M. Kelsey, "Recommendation for Random
for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit
Bit Generators", NIST Special Publications Generators", NIST SP 800-90Ar1,
(General) 800-90Ar1, DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1, June DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1, June 2015,
2015,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/ <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf>. NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf>.
[IEEE.802.1AR-2018] [IEEE.802.1AR-2018]
"IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks - IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area
Secure Device Identity", IEEE, Networks - Secure Device Identity", IEEE Std 802.1AR-2018,
DOI 10.1109/ieeestd.2018.8423794, ISBN ["9781504450195"], DOI 10.1109/ieeestd.2018.8423794, August 2018,
July 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1109/ieeestd.2018.8423794>. <https://doi.org/10.1109/ieeestd.2018.8423794>.
[CVE-2008-0166] [CVE-2008-0166]
National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST), National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST),
"National Vulnerability Database - CVE-2008-0166", May "National Vulnerability Database - CVE-2008-0166", May
2008, <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-0166>. 2008, <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-0166>.
[MiningPsQs] [MiningPsQs]
Security'12: Proceedings of the 21st USENIX conference on Heninger, N., Durumeric, Z., Wustrow, E., and J. A.
Security symposium, Heninger, N., Durumeric, Z., Wustrow, Halderman, "Mining Your Ps and Qs: Detection of Widespread
E., and J. A. Halderman, "Mining Your Ps and Qs: Detection Weak Keys in Network Devices", 21st USENIX Security
of Widespread Weak Keys in Network Devices", August 2012, Symposium (USENIX Security 12), August 2012,
<https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity12/ <https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity12/
technical-sessions/presentation/heninger>. technical-sessions/presentation/heninger>.
[X509.2019] [X509.2019]
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), "Information ITU-T, "Information technology - Open Systems
technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Interconnection - The Directory: Public-key and attribute
Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks", certificate frameworks", ITU-T Recommendation X.509
ITU Recommendation X.509 (10/2019), 14 October 2019, (10/2019), October 2019,
<https://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/14033>. <https://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/14033>.
[ISO.20543-2019] [ISO.20543-2019]
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), ISO/IEC, "Information technology -- Security techniques --
"Information technology -- Security techniques -- Test and Test and analysis methods for random bit generators within
analysis methods for random bit generators within ISO/IEC ISO/IEC 19790 and ISO/IEC 15408", ISO/IEC 20543:2019,
19790 and ISO/IEC 15408", ISO Draft Standard 20543-2019, October 2019, <https://www.iso.org/standard/68296.html>.
October 2019.
[AIS31] Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), Killmann, [AIS31] Killmann, W. and W. Schindler, "A proposal for:
W., and W. Schindler, "A proposal for: Functionality Functionality classes for random number generators -
classes for random number generators, version 2.0", Version 2.0", Federal Office for Information Security
September 2011, (BSI), September 2011,
<https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/ <https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/
Zertifizierung/Interpretationen/AIS_31_Functionality_class Zertifizierung/Interpretationen/AIS_31_Functionality_class
es_for_random_number_generators_e.pdf>. es_for_random_number_generators_e.pdf>.
[Gueneysu] Gueneysu, T., Hodges, P., Land, G., Ounsworth, M., [Gueneysu] Gueneysu, T., Hodges, P., Land, G., Ounsworth, M.,
Stebila, D., and G. Zaverucha, "Proof-of-possession for Stebila, D., and G. Zaverucha, "Proof-of-possession for
KEM certificates using verifiable generation", Cryptology KEM certificates using verifiable generation", Cryptology
ePrint Archive , 2022, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/703>. ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/703, 2022,
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/703>.
[Fujisaki] Fujisaki, E. and T. Okamoto, "Secure Integration of [Fujisaki] Fujisaki, E. and T. Okamoto, "Secure Integration of
Asymmetric and Symmetric Encryption Schemes", Springer Asymmetric and Symmetric Encryption Schemes", Journal of
Science and Business Media LLC, Journal of Cryptology vol. Cryptology, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 80-101,
26, no. 1, pp. 80-101, DOI 10.1007/s00145-011-9114-1, DOI 10.1007/s00145-011-9114-1, December 2011,
December 2011,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-011-9114-1>. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-011-9114-1>.
[Hofheinz] Hofheinz, D., Hövelmanns, K., and E. Kiltz, "A Modular [Hofheinz] Hofheinz, D., Hövelmanns, K., and E. Kiltz, "A Modular
Analysis of the Fujisaki-Okamoto Transformation", Springer Analysis of the Fujisaki-Okamoto Transformation", Theory
International Publishing, Lecture Notes in Computer of Cryptography (TCC 2017), Lecture Notes in Computer
Science pp. 341-371, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-70500-2_12, Science, vol. 10677, pp. 341-371,
ISBN ["9783319704999", "9783319705002"], 2017, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-70500-2_12, November 2017,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70500-2_12>. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70500-2_12>.
[ETSI-3GPP.33.310] [ETSI-3GPP.33.310]
3GPP, "Network Domain Security (NDS); Authentication 3GPP, "Network Domain Security (NDS); Authentication
Framework (AF)", 3GPP TS 33.310 16.6.0, December 2020, Framework (AF)", 3GPP TS 33.310 16.6.0, December 2020,
<http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/html-info/33310.htm>. <http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/html-info/33310.htm>.
[UNISIG.Subset-137] [UNISIG.Subset-137]
UNISIG, "ERTMS/ETCS On-line Key Management FFFIS", Subset- UNISIG, "ERTMS/ETCS On-line Key Management FFFIS", Subset-
137, V1.0.0 , December 2015, 137, V1.0.0, December 2015,
<https://www.era.europa.eu/system/files/2023-01/ <https://www.era.europa.eu/system/files/2023-01/
sos3_index083_-_subset-137_v100.pdf>. sos3_index083_-_subset-137_v100.pdf>.
Appendix A. Reasons for the Presence of RAs Appendix A. Reasons for the Presence of RAs
The reasons that justify the presence of an RA can be split into The reasons that justify the presence of an RA can be split into
those that are due to technical factors and those which are those that are due to technical factors and those that are
organizational in nature. Technical reasons include the following. organizational in nature. Technical reasons include the following.
* If hardware tokens are in use, then not all end entities will have * If hardware tokens are in use, then not all end entities will have
the equipment needed to initialize these; the RA equipment can the equipment needed to initialize these; the RA equipment can
include the necessary functionality (this may also be a matter of include the necessary functionality (this may also be a matter of
policy). policy).
* Some end entities may not have the capability to publish * Some end entities may not have the capability to publish
certificates; again, the RA may be suitably placed for this. certificates; again, the RA may be suitably placed for this.
skipping to change at page 98, line 27 skipping to change at line 4369
(especially if special token initialization equipment is to be (especially if special token initialization equipment is to be
used). used).
* Establishing RAs within an organization can reduce the number of * Establishing RAs within an organization can reduce the number of
CAs required, which is sometimes desirable. CAs required, which is sometimes desirable.
* RAs may be better placed to identify people with their * RAs may be better placed to identify people with their
"electronic" names, especially if the CA is physically remote from "electronic" names, especially if the CA is physically remote from
the end entity. the end entity.
* For many applications, there will already be in place some * For many applications, there will already be some administrative
administrative structure so that candidates for the role of RA are structure in place so that candidates for the role of RA are easy
easy to find (which may not be true of the CA). to find (which may not be true of the CA).
Further reasons relevant for automated machine-to-machine certificate Further reasons relevant for automated machine-to-machine certificate
lifecycle management are available in the Lightweight CMP Profile lifecycle management are available in the Lightweight CMP Profile
[RFC9483]. [RFC9483].
Appendix B. The Use of Revocation Passphrase Appendix B. The Use of Revocation Passphrase
A revocation request must incorporate suitable security mechanisms, A revocation request must incorporate suitable security mechanisms,
including proper authentication, in order to reduce the probability including proper authentication, in order to reduce the probability
of successful denial-of-service attacks. A digital signature or DH/ of successful denial-of-service attacks. A digital signature or DH/
KEM-based message protection on the request -- REQUIRED to support KEM-based message protection on the request -- REQUIRED to support
within this specification depending on the key type used if within this specification depending on the key type used if
revocation requests are supported -- can provide the authentication revocation requests are supported -- can provide the authentication
required, but there are circumstances under which an alternative required, but there are circumstances under which an alternative
mechanism may be desirable (e.g., when the private key is no longer mechanism may be desirable (e.g., when the private key is no longer
accessible and the entity wishes to request a revocation prior to re- accessible and the entity wishes to request a revocation prior to re-
certification of another key pair). In order to accommodate such certification of another key pair). In order to accommodate such
circumstances, a password-based MAC, see CMP Algorithms [RFC9481] circumstances, a password-based MAC (see Section 6.1 of CMP
Section 6.1, on the request is also REQUIRED to support within this Algorithms [RFC9481]) on the request is also REQUIRED to support
specification (subject to local security policy for a given within this specification (subject to local security policy for a
environment) if revocation requests are supported and if shared given environment) if revocation requests are supported and if shared
secret information can be established between the requester and the secret information can be established between the requester and the
responder prior to the need for revocation. responder prior to the need for revocation.
A mechanism that has seen use in some environments is "revocation A mechanism that has seen use in some environments is "revocation
passphrase", in which a value of sufficient entropy (i.e., a passphrase", in which a value of sufficient entropy (i.e., a
relatively long passphrase rather than a short password) is shared relatively long passphrase rather than a short password) is shared
between (only) the entity and the CA/RA at some point prior to between (only) the entity and the CA/RA at some point prior to
revocation; this value is later used to authenticate the revocation revocation; this value is later used to authenticate the revocation
request. request.
skipping to change at page 99, line 24 skipping to change at line 4415
support. Its precise use in CMP messages is as follows. support. Its precise use in CMP messages is as follows.
* The OID and value specified in Section 5.3.19.9 MAY be sent in a * The OID and value specified in Section 5.3.19.9 MAY be sent in a
GenMsg message at any time or MAY be sent in the generalInfo field GenMsg message at any time or MAY be sent in the generalInfo field
of the PKIHeader of any PKIMessage at any time. (In particular, of the PKIHeader of any PKIMessage at any time. (In particular,
the EncryptedKey structure as described in Section 5.2.2 may be the EncryptedKey structure as described in Section 5.2.2 may be
sent in the header of the certConf message that confirms sent in the header of the certConf message that confirms
acceptance of certificates requested in an initialization request acceptance of certificates requested in an initialization request
or certificate request message.) This conveys a revocation or certificate request message.) This conveys a revocation
passphrase chosen by the entity to the relevant CA/RA. When passphrase chosen by the entity to the relevant CA/RA. When
EnvelopedData is used, this is in the decrypted bytes of EnvelopedData is used, this is in the decrypted bytes of the
encryptedContent field. When EncryptedValue is used, this is in encryptedContent field. When EncryptedValue is used, this is in
the decrypted bytes of the encValue field. Furthermore, the the decrypted bytes of the encValue field. Furthermore, the
transfer is accomplished with appropriate confidentiality transfer is accomplished with appropriate confidentiality
characteristics. characteristics.
* If a CA/RA receives the revocation passphrase (OID and value * If a CA/RA receives the revocation passphrase (OID and value
specified in Section 5.3.19.9) in a GenMsg, it MUST construct and specified in Section 5.3.19.9) in a GenMsg, it MUST construct and
send a GenRep message that includes the OID (with absent value) send a GenRep message that includes the OID (with absent value)
specified in Section 5.3.19.9. If the CA/RA receives the specified in Section 5.3.19.9. If the CA/RA receives the
revocation passphrase in the generalInfo field of a PKIHeader of revocation passphrase in the generalInfo field of a PKIHeader of
skipping to change at page 100, line 6 skipping to change at line 4441
set. set.
* Either the localKeyId attribute of EnvelopedData as specified in * Either the localKeyId attribute of EnvelopedData as specified in
[RFC2985] or the valueHint field of EncryptedValue MAY contain a [RFC2985] or the valueHint field of EncryptedValue MAY contain a
key identifier (chosen by the entity, along with the passphrase key identifier (chosen by the entity, along with the passphrase
itself) to assist in later retrieval of the correct passphrase itself) to assist in later retrieval of the correct passphrase
(e.g., when the revocation request is constructed by the end (e.g., when the revocation request is constructed by the end
entity and received by the CA/RA). entity and received by the CA/RA).
* The revocation request message is protected by a password-based * The revocation request message is protected by a password-based
MAC, see CMP Algorithms [RFC9481] Section 6.1, with the revocation MAC (see Section 6.1 of "CMP Algorithms" [RFC9481]) with the
passphrase as the key. If appropriate, the senderKID field in the revocation passphrase as the key. If appropriate, the senderKID
PKIHeader MAY contain the value previously transmitted in field in the PKIHeader MAY contain the value previously
localKeyId or valueHint. transmitted in localKeyId or valueHint.
Note: For a message transferring a revocation passphrase indicating Note: For a message transferring a revocation passphrase indicating
cmp2021(3) in the pvno field of the PKIHeader, the encrypted cmp2021(3) in the pvno field of the PKIHeader, the encrypted
passphrase MUST be transferred in the envelopedData choice of passphrase MUST be transferred in the envelopedData choice of
EncryptedKey as defined in Section 5.2.2. When using cmp2000(2) in EncryptedKey as defined in Section 5.2.2. When using cmp2000(2) in
the message header for backward compatibility, the encryptedValue is the message header for backward compatibility, the encryptedValue is
used. This allows the necessary conveyance and protection of the used. This allows the necessary conveyance and protection of the
passphrase while maintaining bits-on-the-wire compatibility with passphrase while maintaining bits-on-the-wire compatibility with
[RFC4210]. The encryaptedValue choice has been deprecated in favor [RFC4210]. The encryptedValue choice has been deprecated in favor of
of encryptedData. encryptedData.
Using the technique specified above, the revocation passphrase may be Using the technique specified above, the revocation passphrase may be
initially established and updated at any time without requiring extra initially established and updated at any time without requiring extra
messages or out-of-band exchanges. For example, the revocation messages or out-of-band exchanges. For example, the revocation
request message itself (protected and authenticated through a MAC request message itself (protected and authenticated through a MAC
that uses the revocation passphrase as a key) may contain, in the that uses the revocation passphrase as a key) may contain, in the
PKIHeader, a new revocation passphrase to be used for authenticating PKIHeader, a new revocation passphrase to be used for authenticating
future revocation requests for any of the entity's other future revocation requests for any of the entity's other
certificates. In some environments this may be preferable to certificates. In some environments, this may be preferable to
mechanisms that reveal the passphrase in the revocation request mechanisms that reveal the passphrase in the revocation request
message, since this can allow a denial-of-service attack in which the message, since this can allow a denial-of-service attack in which the
revealed passphrase is used by an unauthorized third party to revealed passphrase is used by an unauthorized third party to
authenticate revocation requests on the entity's other certificates. authenticate revocation requests on the entity's other certificates.
However, because the passphrase is not revealed in the request However, because the passphrase is not revealed in the request
message, there is no requirement that the passphrase must always be message, there is no requirement that the passphrase must always be
updated when a revocation request is made (that is, the same updated when a revocation request is made (that is, the same
passphrase MAY be used by an entity to authenticate revocation passphrase MAY be used by an entity to authenticate revocation
requests for different certificates at different times). requests for different certificates at different times).
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typically do not provide cryptographic protection over the fields of typically do not provide cryptographic protection over the fields of
the request message (so that a request for revocation of one the request message (so that a request for revocation of one
certificate may be modified by an unauthorized third party to a certificate may be modified by an unauthorized third party to a
request for revocation of another certificate for that entity). request for revocation of another certificate for that entity).
Appendix C. PKI Management Message Profiles (REQUIRED) Appendix C. PKI Management Message Profiles (REQUIRED)
This appendix contains detailed profiles for those PKIMessages that This appendix contains detailed profiles for those PKIMessages that
MUST be supported by conforming implementations (see Section 6). MUST be supported by conforming implementations (see Section 6).
Note: Appendix C and D focus on PKI management operations managing Note: Appendices C and D focus on PKI management operations managing
certificates for human end entities. In contrast, the Lightweight certificates for human end entities. In contrast, the Lightweight
CMP Profile [RFC9483] focuses on typical use cases of industrial and CMP Profile [RFC9483] focuses on typical use cases of industrial and
IoT scenarios supporting highly automated certificate lifecycle IoT scenarios supporting highly automated certificate lifecycle
management scenarios. management scenarios.
Profiles for the PKIMessages used in the following PKI management Profiles for the PKIMessages used in the following PKI management
operations are provided: operations are provided:
* initial registration/certification * initial registration/certification
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7. Where any ambiguity arises due to naming of fields, the profile 7. Where any ambiguity arises due to naming of fields, the profile
names these using a "dot" notation (e.g., "certTemplate.subject" names these using a "dot" notation (e.g., "certTemplate.subject"
means the subject field within a field called certTemplate). means the subject field within a field called certTemplate).
8. Where a "SEQUENCE OF types" is part of a message, a zero-based 8. Where a "SEQUENCE OF types" is part of a message, a zero-based
array notation is used to describe fields within the SEQUENCE OF array notation is used to describe fields within the SEQUENCE OF
(e.g., crm[0].certReq.certTemplate.subject refers to a subfield (e.g., crm[0].certReq.certTemplate.subject refers to a subfield
of the first CertReqMsg contained in a request message). of the first CertReqMsg contained in a request message).
9. All PKI message exchanges in Appendix C.4 to C.6 require a 9. All PKI message exchanges in Appendices C.4 to C.6 require a
certConf message to be sent by the initiating entity and a certConf message to be sent by the initiating entity and a
PKIConfirm to be sent by the responding entity. The PKIConfirm PKIConfirm to be sent by the responding entity. The PKIConfirm
is not included in some of the profiles given since its body is is not included in some of the profiles given since its body is
NULL and its header contents are clear from the context. Any NULL and its header contents are clear from the context. Any
authenticated means can be used for the protectionAlg (e.g., authenticated means can be used for the protectionAlg (e.g.,
password-based MAC, if shared secret information is known, or password-based MAC, if shared secret information is known, or
signature). signature).
C.2. Algorithm Use Profile C.2. Algorithm Use Profile
skipping to change at page 102, line 48 skipping to change at line 4577
+=====================+=============+===========================+ +=====================+=============+===========================+
| algorithmIdentifier | MSG_SIG_ALG | only signature protection | | algorithmIdentifier | MSG_SIG_ALG | only signature protection |
| | | is allowed for this proof | | | | is allowed for this proof |
+---------------------+-------------+---------------------------+ +---------------------+-------------+---------------------------+
| signature | present | bits calculated using | | signature | present | bits calculated using |
| | | MSG_SIG_ALG | | | | MSG_SIG_ALG |
+---------------------+-------------+---------------------------+ +---------------------+-------------+---------------------------+
Table 2 Table 2
Note: For examples of MSG_SIG_ALG OIDs see CMP Algorithms Section 3 Note: For examples of MSG_SIG_ALG OIDs, see Section 3 of CMP
[RFC9481]. Algorithms [RFC9481].
Proof-of-possession of a private decryption key that corresponds to a Proof-of-possession of a private decryption key that corresponds to a
public encryption key for which a certificate has been requested does public encryption key for which a certificate has been requested does
not use this profile; the CertHash field of the certConf message is not use this profile; the CertHash field of the certConf message is
used instead. used instead.
Not every CA/RA will do Proof-of-Possession (of signing key, Not every CA/RA will do Proof-of-Possession (of signing key,
decryption key, or key agreement key) in the PKIX-CMP in-band decryption key, or key agreement key) in the PKIX-CMP in-band
certification request protocol (how POP is done MAY ultimately be a certification request protocol (how POP is done MAY ultimately be a
policy issue that is made explicit for any given CA in its publicized policy issue that is made explicit for any given CA in its publicized
skipping to change at page 103, line 29 skipping to change at line 4604
C.4. Initial Registration/Certification (Basic Authenticated Scheme) C.4. Initial Registration/Certification (Basic Authenticated Scheme)
An (uninitialized) end entity requests a (first) certificate from a An (uninitialized) end entity requests a (first) certificate from a
CA. When the CA responds with a message containing a certificate, CA. When the CA responds with a message containing a certificate,
the end entity replies with a certificate confirmation. The CA sends the end entity replies with a certificate confirmation. The CA sends
a PKIConfirm back, closing the transaction. All messages are a PKIConfirm back, closing the transaction. All messages are
authenticated. authenticated.
This scheme allows the end entity to request certification of a This scheme allows the end entity to request certification of a
locally-generated public key (typically a signature key). The end locally generated public key (typically a signature key). The end
entity MAY also choose to request the centralized generation and entity MAY also choose to request the centralized generation and
certification of another key pair (typically an encryption key pair). certification of another key pair (typically an encryption key pair).
Certification may only be requested for one locally generated public Certification may only be requested for one locally generated public
key (for more, use separate PKIMessages). key (for more, use separate PKIMessages).
The end entity MUST support proof-of-possession of the private key The end entity MUST support proof-of-possession of the private key
associated with the locally-generated public key. associated with the locally generated public key.
Preconditions: Preconditions:
1. The end entity can authenticate the CA's signature based on out- 1. The end entity can authenticate the CA's signature based on out-
of-band means of-band means.
2. The end entity and the CA share a symmetric MACing key 2. The end entity and the CA share a symmetric MACing key.
Message flow: Message Flow:
Step# End entity PKI Step# End entity PKI
--------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
1 format ir 1 format ir
2 --> ir --> 2 --> ir -->
3 handle ir 3 handle ir
4 format ip 4 format ip
5 <-- ip <-- 5 <-- ip <--
6 handle ip 6 handle ip
7 format certConf 7 format certConf
8 --> certConf --> 8 --> certConf -->
9 handle certConf 9 handle certConf
10 format PKIConf 10 format PKIConf
11 <-- PKIConf <-- 11 <-- PKIConf <--
12 handle PKIConf 12 handle PKIConf
For this profile, we mandate that the end entity MUST include all For this profile, we mandate that the end entity MUST include all
(i.e., one or two) CertReqMsg in a single PKIMessage, and that the (i.e., one or two) CertReqMsg in a single PKIMessage and that the PKI
PKI (CA) MUST produce a single response PKIMessage that contains the (CA) MUST produce a single response PKIMessage that contains the
complete response (i.e., including the OPTIONAL second key pair, if complete response (i.e., including the OPTIONAL second key pair, if
it was requested and if centralized key generation is supported). it was requested and if centralized key generation is supported).
For simplicity, we also mandate that this message MUST be the final For simplicity, we also mandate that this message MUST be the final
one (i.e., no use of "waiting" status value). one (i.e., no use of "waiting" status value).
The end entity has an out-of-band interaction with the CA/RA. This The end entity has an out-of-band interaction with the CA/RA. This
transaction established the shared secret, the referenceNumber and transaction established the shared secret, the referenceNumber and
OPTIONALLY the distinguished name used for both sender and subject OPTIONALLY the distinguished name used for both the sender and
name in the certificate template. See Section 8.7 for security subject name in the certificate template. See Section 8.7 for
considerations on quality of shared secret information. security considerations on quality of shared secret information.
Initialization Request -- ir Initialization Request -- ir
Field Value Field Value
recipient CA name recipient CA name
-- the name of the CA who is being asked to produce a certificate -- the name of the CA who is being asked to produce a certificate
protectionAlg MSG_MAC_ALG protectionAlg MSG_MAC_ALG
-- only MAC protection is allowed for this request, based -- only MAC protection is allowed for this request, based
-- on initial authentication key -- on initial authentication key
senderKID referenceNum senderKID referenceNum
-- the reference number which the CA has previously issued -- the reference number that the CA has previously issued
-- to the end entity (together with the MACing key) -- to the end entity (together with the MACing key)
transactionID present transactionID present
-- implementation-specific value, meaningful to end -- implementation-specific value, meaningful to end
-- entity. -- entity.
-- [If already in use at the CA, then a rejection message MUST -- [If already in use at the CA, then a rejection message MUST
-- be produced by the CA] -- be produced by the CA]
senderNonce present senderNonce present
-- 128 (pseudo-)random bits -- 128 (pseudo-)random bits
freeText any valid value freeText any valid value
body ir (CertReqMessages) body ir (CertReqMessages)
only one or two CertReqMsg only one or two CertReqMsg
are allowed are allowed
-- if more certificates are required, requests MUST be -- if more certificates are required, requests MUST be
-- packaged in separate PKIMessages -- packaged in separate PKIMessages
CertReqMsg one or two present CertReqMsg one or two present
-- see below for details, note: crm[0] means the first -- see below for details, note: crm[0] means the first
-- (which MUST be present), crm[1] means the second (which -- (which MUST be present), crm[1] means the second (which
-- is OPTIONAL, and used to ask for a centrally-generated key) -- is OPTIONAL, and used to ask for a centrally generated key)
crm[0].certReq. fixed value of zero crm[0].certReq. fixed value of zero
certReqId certReqId
-- this is the index of the template within the message -- this is the index of the template within the message
crm[0].certReq present crm[0].certReq present
certTemplate certTemplate
-- MUST include subject public key value, otherwise unconstrained -- MUST include subject public key value, otherwise unconstrained
crm[0].pop... optionally present if public key crm[0].pop... optionally present if public key
POPOSigningKey from crm[0].certReq.certTemplate is POPOSigningKey from crm[0].certReq.certTemplate is
a signing key a signing key
-- proof-of-possession MAY be required in this exchange -- proof-of-possession MAY be required in this exchange
-- (see Appendix D.3 for details) -- (see Appendix D.3 for details)
crm[0].certReq. optionally present crm[0].certReq. optionally present
controls.archiveOptions controls.archiveOptions
-- the end entity MAY request that the locally-generated -- the end entity MAY request that the locally generated
-- private key be archived -- private key be archived
crm[0].certReq. optionally present crm[0].certReq. optionally present
controls.publicationInfo controls.publicationInfo
-- the end entity MAY ask for publication of resulting cert. -- the end entity MAY ask for publication of resulting cert.
crm[1].certReq fixed value of one crm[1].certReq fixed value of one
certReqId certReqId
-- the index of the template within the message -- the index of the template within the message
crm[1].certReq present crm[1].certReq present
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-- indicates where certificate has been published (present -- indicates where certificate has been published (present
-- at discretion of CA) -- at discretion of CA)
protection present protection present
-- bits calculated using MSG_MAC_ALG -- bits calculated using MSG_MAC_ALG
extraCerts optionally present extraCerts optionally present
-- the CA MAY provide additional certificates to the end -- the CA MAY provide additional certificates to the end
-- entity -- entity
Certificate confirm -- certConf Certificate confirm -- certConf
Field Value Field Value
sender present sender present
-- same as in ir -- same as in ir
recipient CA name recipient CA name
-- the name of the CA who was asked to produce a certificate -- the name of the CA who was asked to produce a certificate
transactionID present transactionID present
-- value from corresponding ir and ip messages -- value from corresponding ir and ip messages
senderNonce present senderNonce present
-- 128 (pseudo-) random bits -- 128 (pseudo-)random bits
recipNonce present recipNonce present
-- value from senderNonce in corresponding ip message -- value from senderNonce in corresponding ip message
protectionAlg MSG_MAC_ALG protectionAlg MSG_MAC_ALG
-- only MAC protection is allowed for this message. The -- only MAC protection is allowed for this message. The
-- MAC is based on the initial authentication key shared -- MAC is based on the initial authentication key shared
-- between the EE and the CA. -- between the EE and the CA.
senderKID referenceNum senderKID referenceNum
-- the reference number which the CA has previously issued -- the reference number that the CA has previously issued
-- to the end entity (together with the MACing key) -- to the end entity (together with the MACing key)
body certConf body certConf
-- see Section 5.3.18, "PKI Confirmation Content", for the -- see Section 5.3.18, "PKI Confirmation Content", for the
-- contents of the certConf fields. -- contents of the certConf fields.
-- Note: two CertStatus structures are required if both an -- Note: two CertStatus structures are required if both an
-- encryption and a signing certificate were sent. -- encryption and a signing certificate were sent.
protection present protection present
-- bits calculated using MSG_MAC_ALG -- bits calculated using MSG_MAC_ALG
skipping to change at page 109, line 4 skipping to change at line 4846
body certConf body certConf
-- see Section 5.3.18, "PKI Confirmation Content", for the -- see Section 5.3.18, "PKI Confirmation Content", for the
-- contents of the certConf fields. -- contents of the certConf fields.
-- Note: two CertStatus structures are required if both an -- Note: two CertStatus structures are required if both an
-- encryption and a signing certificate were sent. -- encryption and a signing certificate were sent.
protection present protection present
-- bits calculated using MSG_MAC_ALG -- bits calculated using MSG_MAC_ALG
Confirmation -- PKIConf Confirmation -- PKIConf
Field Value Field Value
sender present sender present
-- same as in ip -- same as in ip
recipient present recipient present
-- sender name from certConf -- sender name from certConf
transactionID present transactionID present
-- value from certConf message -- value from certConf message
senderNonce present senderNonce present
-- 128 (pseudo-) random bits -- 128 (pseudo-)random bits
recipNonce present recipNonce present
-- value from senderNonce from certConf message -- value from senderNonce from certConf message
protectionAlg MSG_MAC_ALG protectionAlg MSG_MAC_ALG
-- only MAC protection is allowed for this message. -- only MAC protection is allowed for this message.
senderKID referenceNum senderKID referenceNum
body PKIConf body PKIConf
protection present protection present
-- bits calculated using MSG_MAC_ALG -- bits calculated using MSG_MAC_ALG
C.5. Certificate Request C.5. Certificate Request
An (initialized) end entity requests a certificate from a CA (for any An (initialized) end entity requests a certificate from a CA (for any
reason). When the CA responds with a message containing a reason). When the CA responds with a message containing a
certificate, the end entity replies with a certificate confirmation. certificate, the end entity replies with a certificate confirmation.
The CA replies with a PKIConfirm, to close the transaction. All The CA replies with a PKIConfirm to close the transaction. All
messages are authenticated. messages are authenticated.
The profile for this exchange is identical to that given in The profile for this exchange is identical to that given in
Appendix C.4, with the following exceptions: Appendix C.4, with the following exceptions:
* sender name SHOULD be present * sender name SHOULD be present;
* protectionAlg of MSG_SIG_ALG MUST be supported (MSG_MAC_ALG MAY * protectionAlg of MSG_SIG_ALG MUST be supported (MSG_MAC_ALG MAY
also be supported) in request, response, certConfirm, and also be supported) in request, response, certConfirm, and
PKIConfirm messages; PKIConfirm messages;
* senderKID and recipKID are only present if required for message * senderKID and recipKID are only present if required for message
verification; verification;
* body is cr or cp; * body is cr or cp;
* body may contain one or two CertReqMsg structures, but either * body may contain one or two CertReqMsg structures, but either
CertReqMsg may be used to request certification of a locally- CertReqMsg may be used to request certification of a locally
generated public key or a centrally-generated public key (i.e., generated public key or a centrally generated public key (i.e.,
the position-dependence requirement of Appendix C.4 is removed); the position-dependence requirement of Appendix C.4 is removed);
and
* protection bits are calculated according to the protectionAlg * protection bits are calculated according to the protectionAlg
field. field.
C.6. Key Update Request C.6. Key Update Request
An (initialized) end entity requests a certificate from a CA (to An (initialized) end entity requests a certificate from a CA (to
update the key pair and/or corresponding certificate that it already update the key pair and/or corresponding certificate that it already
possesses). When the CA responds with a message containing a possesses). When the CA responds with a message containing a
certificate, the end entity replies with a certificate confirmation. certificate, the end entity replies with a certificate confirmation.
The CA replies with a PKIConfirm, to close the transaction. All The CA replies with a PKIConfirm to close the transaction. All
messages are authenticated. messages are authenticated.
The profile for this exchange is identical to that given in The profile for this exchange is identical to that given in
Appendix C.4, with the following exceptions: Appendix C.4, with the following exceptions:
1. sender name SHOULD be present 1. sender name SHOULD be present;
2. protectionAlg of MSG_SIG_ALG MUST be supported (MSG_MAC_ALG MAY 2. protectionAlg of MSG_SIG_ALG MUST be supported (MSG_MAC_ALG MAY
also be supported) in request, response, certConfirm, and also be supported) in request, response, certConfirm, and
PKIConfirm messages; PKIConfirm messages;
3. senderKID and recipKID are only present if required for message 3. senderKID and recipKID are only present if required for message
verification; verification;
4. body is kur or kup; 4. body is kur or kup;
5. body may contain one or two CertReqMsg structures, but either 5. body may contain one or two CertReqMsg structures, but either
CertReqMsg may be used to request certification of a locally- CertReqMsg may be used to request certification of a locally
generated public key or a centrally-generated public key generated public key or a centrally generated public key
(i.e.,the position-dependence requirement of Appendix C.4 is (i.e.,the position-dependence requirement of Appendix C.4 is
removed); removed);
6. protection bits are calculated according to the protectionAlg 6. protection bits are calculated according to the protectionAlg
field; field; and
7. regCtrl OldCertId SHOULD be used (unless it is clear to both 7. regCtrl OldCertId SHOULD be used (unless it is clear to both the
sender and receiver -- by means not specified in this document -- sender and receiver -- by means not specified in this document --
that it is not needed). that it is not needed).
Appendix D. PKI Management Message Profiles (OPTIONAL) Appendix D. PKI Management Message Profiles (OPTIONAL)
This appendix contains detailed profiles for those PKIMessages that This appendix contains detailed profiles for those PKIMessages that
MAY be supported by implementations. MAY be supported by implementations.
Profiles for the PKIMessages used in the following PKI management Profiles for the PKIMessages used in the following PKI management
operations are provided: operations are provided:
skipping to change at page 111, line 4 skipping to change at line 4944
This appendix contains detailed profiles for those PKIMessages that This appendix contains detailed profiles for those PKIMessages that
MAY be supported by implementations. MAY be supported by implementations.
Profiles for the PKIMessages used in the following PKI management Profiles for the PKIMessages used in the following PKI management
operations are provided: operations are provided:
* root CA key update * root CA key update
* information request/response * information request/response
* cross-certification request/response (1-way) * cross-certification request/response (1-way)
* in-band initialization using external identity certificate * in-band initialization using external identity certificate
Later versions of this document may extend the above to include Future versions of this document may extend the above to include
profiles for the operations listed below (along with other profiles for the operations listed below (along with other
operations, if desired). operations, if desired).
* revocation request * revocation request
* certificate publication * certificate publication
* CRL publication * CRL publication
D.1. General Rules for Interpretation of These Profiles. D.1. General Rules for Interpretation of These Profiles
Identical to Appendix C.1. Identical to Appendix C.1.
D.2. Algorithm Use Profile D.2. Algorithm Use Profile
Identical to Appendix C.2. Identical to Appendix C.2.
D.3. Self-Signed Certificates D.3. Self-Signed Certificates
Profile of how a certificate structure may be "self-signed". These Profile of how a certificate structure may be "self-signed". These
skipping to change at page 113, line 8 skipping to change at line 5035
| | | certificates | | | | certificates |
| | | signed using the | | | | signed using the |
| | | new private key) | | | | new private key) |
+------------+--------------------------------+---------------------+ +------------+--------------------------------+---------------------+
Table 4 Table 4
D.5. PKI Information Request/Response D.5. PKI Information Request/Response
The end entity sends a general message to the PKI requesting details The end entity sends a general message to the PKI requesting details
that will be required for later PKI management operations. RA/CA that will be required for later PKI management operations. The RA/CA
responds with a general response. If an RA generates the response, responds with a general response. If an RA generates the response,
then it will simply forward the equivalent message that it previously then it will simply forward the equivalent message that it previously
received from the CA, with the possible addition of certificates to received from the CA, with the possible addition of certificates to
the extraCerts fields of the PKIMessage. A confirmation message is the extraCerts fields of the PKIMessage. A confirmation message is
not required from the end entity. not required from the end entity.
Message Flows: Message Flows:
Step# End entity PKI Step# End entity PKI
--------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
skipping to change at page 114, line 8 skipping to change at line 5077
GenMsgContent empty SEQUENCE GenMsgContent empty SEQUENCE
-- all relevant information requested -- all relevant information requested
protection present protection present
-- bits calculated using MSG_MAC_ALG or MSG_SIG_ALG -- bits calculated using MSG_MAC_ALG or MSG_SIG_ALG
genP: genP:
Field Value Field Value
sender CA name sender CA name
-- name of the CA which produced the message -- name of the CA that produced the message
protectionAlg MSG_MAC_ALG or MSG_SIG_ALG protectionAlg MSG_MAC_ALG or MSG_SIG_ALG
-- any authenticated protection alg. -- any authenticated protection alg.
senderKID present if required senderKID present if required
-- must be present if required for verification of message -- must be present if required for verification of message
-- protection -- protection
body genp (GenRepContent) body genp (GenRepContent)
CAProtEncCert present (object identifier one CAProtEncCert present (object identifier one
of PROT_ENC_ALG), with relevant of PROT_ENC_ALG), with relevant
value value
-- to be used if end entity needs to encrypt information for -- to be used if end entity needs to encrypt information for
-- the CA (e.g., private key for recovery purposes) -- the CA (e.g., private key for recovery purposes)
SignKeyPairTypes present, with relevant value SignKeyPairTypes present, with relevant value
-- the set of signature algorithm identifiers that this CA will -- the set of signature algorithm identifiers that this CA will
-- certify for subject public keys -- certify for subject public keys
EncKeyPairTypes present, with relevant value EncKeyPairTypes present, with relevant value
-- the set of encryption/key agreement algorithm identifiers that -- the set of encryption / key agreement algorithm identifiers that
-- this CA will certify for subject public keys -- this CA will certify for subject public keys
PreferredSymmAlg present (object identifier one PreferredSymmAlg present (object identifier one
of PROT_SYM_ALG) , with relevant of PROT_SYM_ALG) , with relevant
value value
-- the symmetric algorithm that this CA expects to be used -- the symmetric algorithm that this CA expects to be used
-- in later PKI messages (for encryption) -- in later PKI messages (for encryption)
RootCaKeyUpdate optionally present, with RootCaKeyUpdate optionally present, with
relevant value relevant value
-- Use RootCaKeyUpdate; if backward compatibility with cmp2000 is -- Use RootCaKeyUpdate; if backward compatibility with cmp2000 is
-- required, use CAKeyUpdateInfo. -- required, use CAKeyUpdateInfo.
skipping to change at page 115, line 5 skipping to change at line 5117
-- that the responding CA is the root CA in question) -- that the responding CA is the root CA in question)
CurrentCRL optionally present, with relevant value CurrentCRL optionally present, with relevant value
-- the CA MAY provide a copy of a complete CRL (i.e., -- the CA MAY provide a copy of a complete CRL (i.e.,
-- fullest possible one) -- fullest possible one)
protection present protection present
-- bits calculated using MSG_MAC_ALG or MSG_SIG_ALG -- bits calculated using MSG_MAC_ALG or MSG_SIG_ALG
extraCerts optionally present extraCerts optionally present
-- can be used to send some certificates to the end -- can be used to send some certificates to the end
-- entity. An RA MAY add its certificate here. -- entity. An RA MAY add its certificate here.
D.6. Cross Certification Request/Response (1-way) D.6. Cross-Certification Request/Response (1-way)
Creation of a single cross-certificate (i.e., not two at once). The Creation of a single cross-certificate (i.e., not two at once). The
requesting CA MAY choose who is responsible for publication of the requesting CA MAY choose who is responsible for publication of the
cross-certificate created by the responding CA through use of the cross-certificate created by the responding CA through use of the
PKIPublicationInfo control. PKIPublicationInfo control.
Preconditions: Preconditions:
1. Responding CA can verify the origin of the request (possibly 1. Responding CA can verify the origin of the request (possibly
requiring out-of-band means) before processing the request. requiring out-of-band means) before processing the request.
2. Requesting CA can authenticate the authenticity of the origin of 2. Requesting CA can authenticate the authenticity of the origin of
the response (possibly requiring out-of-band means) before the response (possibly requiring out-of-band means) before
processing the response processing the response.
The use of certificate confirmation and the corresponding server The use of certificate confirmation and the corresponding server
confirmation is determined by the generalInfo field in the PKIHeader confirmation is determined by the generalInfo field in the PKIHeader
(see Section 5.1.1). The following profile does not mandate support (see Section 5.1.1). The following profile does not mandate support
for either confirmation. for either confirmation.
Message Flows: Message Flows:
Step# Requesting CA Responding CA Step# Requesting CA Responding CA
--------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
skipping to change at page 116, line 8 skipping to change at line 5169
protectionAlg MSG_SIG_ALG protectionAlg MSG_SIG_ALG
-- only signature protection is allowed for this request -- only signature protection is allowed for this request
senderKID present if required senderKID present if required
-- must be present if required for verification of message -- must be present if required for verification of message
-- protection -- protection
recipKID present if required recipKID present if required
-- must be present if required for verification of message -- must be present if required for verification of message
-- protection -- protection
transactionID present transactionID present
-- implementation-specific value, meaningful to requesting CA. -- implementation-specific value, meaningful to requesting CA.
-- [If already in use at responding CA then a rejection message -- [If already in use at responding CA, then a rejection message
-- MUST be produced by responding CA] -- MUST be produced by responding CA]
senderNonce present senderNonce present
-- 128 (pseudo-)random bits -- 128 (pseudo-)random bits
freeText any valid value freeText any valid value
body ccr (CertReqMessages) body ccr (CertReqMessages)
only one CertReqMsg only one CertReqMsg
allowed allowed
-- if multiple cross certificates are required, they MUST be -- if multiple cross-certificates are required, they MUST be
-- packaged in separate PKIMessages -- packaged in separate PKIMessages
certTemplate present certTemplate present
-- details follow -- details follow
version v1 or v3 version v1 or v3
-- v3 STRONGLY RECOMMENDED -- v3 STRONGLY RECOMMENDED
signingAlg present signingAlg present
-- the requesting CA must know in advance with which algorithm it -- the requesting CA must know in advance with which algorithm it
-- wishes the certificate to be signed -- wishes the certificate to be signed
subject present subject present
skipping to change at page 116, line 38 skipping to change at line 5199
validity present validity present
-- MUST be completely specified (i.e., both fields present) -- MUST be completely specified (i.e., both fields present)
issuer present issuer present
-- may be NULL-DN only if issuerAltNames extension value proposed -- may be NULL-DN only if issuerAltNames extension value proposed
publicKey present publicKey present
-- the key to be certified (which must be for a signing algorithm) -- the key to be certified (which must be for a signing algorithm)
extensions optionally present extensions optionally present
-- a requesting CA must propose values for all extensions -- a requesting CA must propose values for all extensions
-- that it requires to be in the cross-certificate -- that it requires to be in the cross-certificate
POPOSigningKey present POPOSigningKey present
-- see Section D3: Proof-of-possession profile -- see Appendix C.3: Proof-of-Possession Profile
protection present protection present
-- bits calculated using MSG_SIG_ALG -- bits calculated using MSG_SIG_ALG
extraCerts optionally present extraCerts optionally present
-- MAY contain any additional certificates that requester wishes -- MAY contain any additional certificates that requester wishes
-- to include -- to include
ccp: ccp:
Field Value Field Value
skipping to change at page 117, line 28 skipping to change at line 5231
recipKID present if required recipKID present if required
transactionID present transactionID present
-- value from corresponding ccr message -- value from corresponding ccr message
senderNonce present senderNonce present
-- 128 (pseudo-)random bits -- 128 (pseudo-)random bits
recipNonce present recipNonce present
-- senderNonce from corresponding ccr message -- senderNonce from corresponding ccr message
freeText any valid value freeText any valid value
body ccp (CertRepMessage) body ccp (CertRepMessage)
only one CertResponse allowed only one CertResponse allowed
-- if multiple cross certificates are required they MUST be -- if multiple cross-certificates are required, they MUST be
-- packaged in separate PKIMessages -- packaged in separate PKIMessages
response present response present
status present status present
PKIStatusInfo.status present PKIStatusInfo.status present
-- if PKIStatusInfo.status is one of: -- if PKIStatusInfo.status is one of:
-- accepted, or -- accepted, or
-- grantedWithMods, -- grantedWithMods,
-- then certifiedKeyPair MUST be present and failInfo MUST -- then certifiedKeyPair MUST be present and failInfo MUST
-- be absent -- be absent
failInfo present depending on failInfo present depending on
PKIStatusInfo.status PKIStatusInfo.status
-- if PKIStatusInfo.status is: -- if PKIStatusInfo.status is:
-- rejection -- rejection,
-- then certifiedKeyPair MUST be absent and failInfo MUST be -- then certifiedKeyPair MUST be absent and failInfo MUST be
-- present and contain appropriate bit settings -- present and contain appropriate bit settings
certifiedKeyPair present depending on certifiedKeyPair present depending on
PKIStatusInfo.status PKIStatusInfo.status
certificate present depending on certificate present depending on
certifiedKeyPair certifiedKeyPair
-- content of actual certificate must be examined by requesting CA -- content of actual certificate must be examined by requesting CA
-- before publication -- before publication
protection present protection present
-- bits calculated using MSG_SIG_ALG -- bits calculated using MSG_SIG_ALG
extraCerts optionally present extraCerts optionally present
-- MAY contain any additional certificates that responder wishes -- MAY contain any additional certificates that responder wishes
-- to include -- to include
D.7. In-Band Initialization Using External Identity Certificate D.7. In-Band Initialization Using External Identity Certificate
An (uninitialized) end entity wishes to initialize into the PKI with An (uninitialized) end entity wishes to initialize into the PKI with
a CA, CA-1. It uses, for authentication purposes, a pre-existing a CA, CA-1. It uses, for authentication purposes, a pre-existing
identity certificate issued by another (external) CA, CA-X. A trust identity certificate issued by another (external) CA, CA-X. A trust
relationship must already have been established between CA-1 and CA-X relationship must already have been established between CA-1 and CA-X
so that CA-1 can validate the EE identity certificate signed by CA-X. so that CA-1 can validate the EE identity certificate signed by CA-X.
Furthermore, some mechanism must already have been established within Furthermore, some mechanism must already have been established within
the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) also known as Personal the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), also known as Personal
Security Environment (PSE) of the EE that would allow it to Security Environment (PSE), of the EE that would allow it to
authenticate and verify PKIMessages signed by CA-1 (as one example, authenticate and verify PKIMessages signed by CA-1 (as one example,
the TEE may contain a certificate issued for the public key of CA-1, the TEE may contain a certificate issued for the public key of CA-1,
signed by another CA that the EE trusts on the basis of out-of-band signed by another CA that the EE trusts on the basis of out-of-band
authentication techniques). authentication techniques).
The EE sends an initialization request to start the transaction. The EE sends an initialization request to start the transaction.
When CA-1 responds with a message containing the new certificate, the When CA-1 responds with a message containing the new certificate, the
end entity replies with a certificate confirmation. CA-1 replies end entity replies with a certificate confirmation. CA-1 replies
with a PKIConfirm to close the transaction. All messages are signed with a PKIConfirm to close the transaction. All messages are signed
(the EE messages are signed using the private key that corresponds to (the EE messages are signed using the private key that corresponds to
skipping to change at page 118, line 48 skipping to change at line 5299
* the EE and CA-1 do not share a symmetric MACing key (i.e., there * the EE and CA-1 do not share a symmetric MACing key (i.e., there
is no out-of-band shared secret information between these is no out-of-band shared secret information between these
entities); entities);
* sender name in ir MUST be present (and identical to the subject * sender name in ir MUST be present (and identical to the subject
name present in the external identity certificate); name present in the external identity certificate);
* protectionAlg of MSG_SIG_ALG MUST be used in all messages; * protectionAlg of MSG_SIG_ALG MUST be used in all messages;
* external identity cert. MUST be carried in ir extraCerts field * external identity certificate MUST be carried in ir extraCerts
field
* senderKID and recipKID are not used; * senderKID and recipKID are not used;
* body is ir or ip; * body is ir or ip; and
* protection bits are calculated according to the protectionAlg * protection bits are calculated according to the protectionAlg
field. field.
Appendix E. Variants of Using KEM Keys for PKI Message Protection Appendix E. Variants of Using KEM Keys for PKI Message Protection
As described in Section 5.1.3.4, any party in a PKI management As described in Section 5.1.3.4, any party in a PKI management
operation may wish to use a KEM key pair for message protection. operation may wish to use a KEM key pair for message protection.
Below possible cases are described. Possible cases are described below.
For any PKI management operation started by a PKI entity with any For any PKI management operation started by a PKI entity with any
type of request message, the following message flows describe the use type of request message, the following message flows describe the use
of a KEM key. There are two cases to distinguish, namely whether the of a KEM key. There are two cases to distinguish, namely whether the
PKI entity or the PKI management entity owns a KEM key pair. If both PKI entity or the PKI management entity owns a KEM key pair. If both
sides own KEM key pairs, the flows need to be combined such that for sides own KEM key pairs, the flows need to be combined such that for
each direction a shared secret key is established. each direction a shared secret key is established.
In the following message flows Alice indicates the PKI entity that In the following message flows, Alice indicates the PKI entity that
uses a KEM key pair for message authentication and Bob provides the uses a KEM key pair for message authentication and Bob provides the
KEM ciphertext using Alice's public KEM key, as described in KEM ciphertext using Alice's public KEM key, as described in
Section 5.1.3.4. Section 5.1.3.4.
Message Flow when the PKI entity has a KEM key pair and certificate: Message Flow when the PKI entity has a KEM key pair and certificate:
Step# PKI entity PKI management entity Step# PKI entity PKI management entity
(Alice) (Bob) (Alice) (Bob)
--------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
1 format unprotected genm 1 format unprotected genm
skipping to change at page 120, line 47 skipping to change at line 5371
available key material available key material
14 <-- response <-- 14 <-- response <--
15 verify protection 15 verify protection
provided by the provided by the
PKI management entity PKI management entity
16 Further messages of this PKI management operation 16 Further messages of this PKI management operation
can be exchanged with MAC-based protection by the PKI can be exchanged with MAC-based protection by the PKI
entity using the established shared secret key (ssk) entity using the established shared secret key (ssk)
Figure 3: Message Flow when PKI entity has a KEM key pair Figure 3: Message Flow When the PKI Entity Has a KEM Key Pair
Message Flow when the PKI entity knows that the PKI management entity Message Flow when the PKI entity knows that the PKI management entity
uses a KEM key pair and has the authentic public key: uses a KEM key pair and has the authentic public key:
Step# PKI entity PKI management entity Step# PKI entity PKI management entity
(Bob) (Alice) (Bob) (Alice)
--------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
1 perform KEM Encapsulate 1 perform KEM Encapsulate
2 format request providing 2 format request providing
KEM ciphertext in KEM ciphertext in
skipping to change at page 121, line 35 skipping to change at line 5406
9 verify MAC-based 9 verify MAC-based
protection protection
-------- PKI management entity authenticated by PKI entity -------- -------- PKI management entity authenticated by PKI entity --------
10 Further messages of this PKI management operation 10 Further messages of this PKI management operation
can be exchanged with MAC-based protection by the can be exchanged with MAC-based protection by the
PKI management entity using the established PKI management entity using the established
shared secret key (ssk) shared secret key (ssk)
Figure 4: Message Flow when the PKI entity knows that the PKI Figure 4: Message Flow When the PKI Entity Knows That the PKI
management entity uses a KEM key pair and has the authentic Management Entity Uses a KEM Key Pair and Has the Authentic
public key Public Key
Note: Figure 4 describes the situation where KEM-based message Note: Figure 4 describes the situation where KEM-based message
protection may not require more that one message exchange. In this protection may not require more than one message exchange. In this
case, the transactionID MUST also be used by the PKI entity (Bob) to case, the transactionID MUST also be used by the PKI entity (Bob) to
ensure domain separation between different PKI management operations. ensure domain separation between different PKI management operations.
Message Flow when the PKI entity does not know that the PKI Message Flow when the PKI entity does not know that the PKI
management entity uses a KEM key pair: management entity uses a KEM key pair:
Step# PKI entity PKI management entity Step# PKI entity PKI management entity
(Bob) (Alice) (Bob) (Alice)
--------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
1 format request with 1 format request with
skipping to change at page 122, line 22 skipping to change at line 5435
2 --> request --> 2 --> request -->
3 format unprotected error 3 format unprotected error
with status "rejection" with status "rejection"
and failInfo and failInfo
"wrongIntegrity" and KEM "wrongIntegrity" and KEM
certificate in certificate in
extraCerts extraCerts
4 <-- error <-- 4 <-- error <--
5 validate KEM certificate 5 validate KEM certificate
6 proceed as shown in the Figure before 6 proceed as shown in the figure before
Figure 5: Message Flow when the PKI entity does not know that the PKI Figure 5: Message Flow When the PKI Entity Does Not Know That the PKI
management entity uses a KEM key pair Management Entity Uses a KEM Key Pair
Appendix F. Compilable ASN.1 Definitions Appendix F. Compilable ASN.1 Definitions
This section contains the updated 2002 ASN.1 module for [RFC5912] as This section contains the updated 2002 ASN.1 module from [RFC5912],
updated in [RFC9480]. This module replaces the module in Section 9 which was updated in [RFC9480]. This module replaces the module in
of [RFC5912]. The module contains those changes to the normative Section 9 of [RFC5912]. The module contains those changes to the
ASN.1 module from Appendix F of [RFC4210] that were specified in normative ASN.1 module from Appendix F of [RFC4210] that were
[RFC9480], as well as changes made in this document. specified in [RFC9480], as well as changes made in this document.
PKIXCMP-2023 PKIXCMP-2023
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-cmp2023-02(TBD2) } id-mod-cmp2023-02(116) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN BEGIN
IMPORTS IMPORTS
AttributeSet{}, SingleAttribute{}, Extensions{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE AttributeSet{}, SingleAttribute{}, Extensions{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE
FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)} mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)}
AlgorithmIdentifier{}, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, ALGORITHM, AlgorithmIdentifier{}, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, ALGORITHM,
skipping to change at page 124, line 6 skipping to change at line 5516
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58)} smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58)}
-- The import of EnvelopedData and SignedData from [RFC6268] is -- The import of EnvelopedData and SignedData from [RFC6268] is
-- added due to the updates made in CMP Updates [RFC9480] -- added due to the updates made in CMP Updates [RFC9480]
KEM-ALGORITHM KEM-ALGORITHM
FROM KEMAlgorithmInformation-2023 -- [RFC9629] FROM KEMAlgorithmInformation-2023 -- [RFC9629]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-kemAlgorithmInformation-2023(109) } id-mod-kemAlgorithmInformation-2023(109) }
-- The import of KEM-ALGORITHM was added due to the updates made -- The import of KEM-ALGORITHM was added due to the updates made
-- in [RFCXXXX] -- in [RFC9810]
; ;
-- History of the PKIXCMP ASN.1 modules -- History of the PKIXCMP ASN.1 modules
-- [RFC2510] -- [RFC2510]
-- 1988 Syntax, PKIXCMP, 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0.9 (id-mod-cmp) -- 1988 Syntax, PKIXCMP, 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0.9 (id-mod-cmp)
-- Obsoleted by RFC 4210 PKIXCMP, 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0.16 -- Obsoleted by RFC 4210 PKIXCMP, 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0.16
-- (id-mod-cmp2000) -- (id-mod-cmp2000)
-- [RFC4210] -- [RFC4210]
-- 1988 Syntax, PKIXCMP, 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0.16 (id-mod-cmp2000) -- 1988 Syntax, PKIXCMP, 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0.16 (id-mod-cmp2000)
-- Replaced by RFC 9480 PKIXCMP, 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0.99 -- Replaced by RFC 9480 PKIXCMP, 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0.99
-- (id-mod-cmp2021-88) -- (id-mod-cmp2021-88)
-- [RFC5912] -- [RFC5912]
-- 2002 Syntax, PKIXCMP-2009, 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0.50 -- 2002 Syntax, PKIXCMP-2009, 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0.50
-- (id-mod-cmp2000-02) -- (id-mod-cmp2000-02)
-- Replaced by RFC 9480 PKIXCMP-2021, 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0.100 -- Replaced by RFC 9480 PKIXCMP-2021, 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0.100
-- (id-mod-cmp2021-02) -- (id-mod-cmp2021-02)
-- [RFC9480] -- [RFC9480]
-- 1988 Syntax, PKIXCMP, 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0.99 (id-mod-cmp2021-88) -- 1988 Syntax, PKIXCMP, 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0.99 (id-mod-cmp2021-88)
-- 2002 Syntax, PKIXCMP-2021, 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0.100 -- 2002 Syntax, PKIXCMP-2021, 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0.100
-- (id-mod-cmp2021-02) -- (id-mod-cmp2021-02)
-- Obsoleted by [RFCXXXX] PKIXCMP-2023, 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0.TBD2 -- Obsoleted by [RFC9810] PKIXCMP-2023, 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0.116
-- (id-mod-cmp2023-02) -- (id-mod-cmp2023-02)
-- [RFCXXXX] -- [RFC9810]
-- 2002 Syntax, PKIXCMP-2023, 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0.TBD2 -- 2002 Syntax, PKIXCMP-2023, 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0.116
-- (id-mod-cmp2023-02) -- (id-mod-cmp2023-02)
-- The rest of the module contains locally defined OIDs and -- The rest of the module contains locally defined OIDs and
-- constructs: -- constructs:
CMPCertificate ::= CHOICE { x509v3PKCert Certificate, ... } CMPCertificate ::= CHOICE { x509v3PKCert Certificate, ... }
-- This syntax, while bits-on-the-wire compatible with the -- This syntax, while bits-on-the-wire compatible with the
-- standard X.509 definition of "Certificate", allows the -- standard X.509 definition of "Certificate", allows the
-- possibility of future certificate types (such as X.509 -- possibility of future certificate types (such as X.509
-- attribute certificates, card-verifiable certificates, or other -- attribute certificates, card-verifiable certificates, or other
skipping to change at page 125, line 46 skipping to change at line 5604
-- nonces used to provide replay protection, senderNonce -- nonces used to provide replay protection, senderNonce
-- is inserted by the creator of this message; recipNonce -- is inserted by the creator of this message; recipNonce
-- is a nonce previously inserted in a related message by -- is a nonce previously inserted in a related message by
-- the intended recipient of this message. -- the intended recipient of this message.
freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL, freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL,
-- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions -- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions
-- (this field is intended for human consumption) -- (this field is intended for human consumption)
generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL
-- this may be used to convey context-specific information -- this may be used to convey context-specific information
-- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption) -- (this field is not primarily intended for human consumption)
} }
PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
-- text encoded as UTF-8 string [RFC3629] -- text encoded as UTF-8 string [RFC3629]
PKIBody ::= CHOICE { -- message-specific body elements PKIBody ::= CHOICE { -- message-specific body elements
ir [0] CertReqMessages, --Initialization Request ir [0] CertReqMessages, --Initialization Request
ip [1] CertRepMessage, --Initialization Response ip [1] CertRepMessage, --Initialization Response
cr [2] CertReqMessages, --Certification Request cr [2] CertReqMessages, --Certification Request
cp [3] CertRepMessage, --Certification Response cp [3] CertRepMessage, --Certification Response
skipping to change at page 127, line 19 skipping to change at line 5673
id-DHBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) id-DHBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
usa(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 30 } usa(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 30 }
DHBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE { DHBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
owf AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}, owf AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}},
-- AlgId for a One-Way Function -- AlgId for a One-Way Function
mac AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {...}} mac AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {...}}
-- AlgId of the Message Authentication Code algorithm -- AlgId of the Message Authentication Code algorithm
} }
-- id-KemBasedMac and KemBMParameter were added in [RFCXXXX] -- id-KemBasedMac and KemBMParameter were added in [RFC9810]
id-KemBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) id-KemBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
usa(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 16 } usa(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 16 }
KemBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE { KemBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
kdf AlgorithmIdentifier{KEY-DERIVATION, {...}}, kdf AlgorithmIdentifier{KEY-DERIVATION, {...}},
-- AlgId of the Key Derivation Function algorithm -- AlgId of the Key Derivation Function algorithm
kemContext [0] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, kemContext [0] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
-- MAY contain additional algorithm specific context information -- MAY contain additional algorithm-specific context information
len INTEGER (1..MAX), len INTEGER (1..MAX),
-- Defines the length of the keying material output of the KDF -- Defines the length of the keying material output of the KDF
-- SHOULD be the maximum key length of the MAC function -- SHOULD be the maximum key length of the MAC function
mac AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {...}} mac AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {...}}
-- AlgId of the Message Authentication Code algorithm -- AlgId of the Message Authentication Code algorithm
} }
PKIStatus ::= INTEGER { PKIStatus ::= INTEGER {
accepted (0), accepted (0),
-- you got exactly what you asked for -- you got exactly what you asked for
skipping to change at page 129, line 51 skipping to change at line 5801
hashVal BIT STRING hashVal BIT STRING
-- hashVal is calculated over the DER encoding of the -- hashVal is calculated over the DER encoding of the
-- self-signed certificate with the identifier certID. -- self-signed certificate with the identifier certID.
} }
POPODecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge POPODecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge
-- One Challenge per encryption or key agreement key certification -- One Challenge per encryption or key agreement key certification
-- request (in the same order as these requests appear in -- request (in the same order as these requests appear in
-- CertReqMessages). -- CertReqMessages).
-- encryptedRand was added in [RFCXXXX] -- encryptedRand was added in [RFC9810]
Challenge ::= SEQUENCE { Challenge ::= SEQUENCE {
owf AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}} owf AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}
OPTIONAL, OPTIONAL,
-- MUST be present in the first Challenge; MAY be omitted in -- MUST be present in the first Challenge; MAY be omitted in
-- any subsequent Challenge in POPODecKeyChallContent (if -- any subsequent Challenge in POPODecKeyChallContent (if
-- omitted, then the owf used in the immediately preceding -- omitted, then the owf used in the immediately preceding
-- Challenge is to be used). -- Challenge is to be used).
witness OCTET STRING, witness OCTET STRING,
-- the result of applying the one-way function (owf) to a -- the result of applying the one-way function (owf) to a
-- randomly-generated INTEGER, A. (Note that a different -- randomly generated INTEGER, A. (Note that a different
-- INTEGER MUST be used for each Challenge.) -- INTEGER MUST be used for each Challenge.)
challenge OCTET STRING, challenge OCTET STRING,
-- MUST be used for cmp2000(2) popdecc messages and MUST be -- MUST be used for cmp2000(2) popdecc messages and MUST be
-- the encryption of Rand (using a mechanism depending on the -- the encryption of Rand (using a mechanism depending on the
-- private key type). -- private key type).
-- MUST be an empty OCTET STRING for cmp2021(3) popdecc messages. -- MUST be an empty OCTET STRING for cmp2021(3) popdecc messages.
-- Note: Using challenge omitting the optional encryptedRand is -- Note: Using challenge omitting the optional encryptedRand is
-- bit-compatible to the syntax without adding this optional -- bit-compatible to the syntax without adding this optional
-- field. -- field.
encryptedRand [0] EnvelopedData OPTIONAL encryptedRand [0] EnvelopedData OPTIONAL
skipping to change at page 132, line 24 skipping to change at line 5920
crls [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList OPTIONAL crls [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList OPTIONAL
-- the resulting CRLs (there may be more than one) -- the resulting CRLs (there may be more than one)
} }
CAKeyUpdAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE { CAKeyUpdAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
oldWithNew CMPCertificate, -- old pub signed with new priv oldWithNew CMPCertificate, -- old pub signed with new priv
newWithOld CMPCertificate, -- new pub signed with old priv newWithOld CMPCertificate, -- new pub signed with old priv
newWithNew CMPCertificate -- new pub signed with new priv newWithNew CMPCertificate -- new pub signed with new priv
} }
-- CAKeyUpdContent was added in [RFCXXXX] -- CAKeyUpdContent was added in [RFC9810]
CAKeyUpdContent ::= CHOICE { CAKeyUpdContent ::= CHOICE {
cAKeyUpdAnnV2 CAKeyUpdAnnContent, -- deprecated cAKeyUpdAnnV2 CAKeyUpdAnnContent, -- deprecated
cAKeyUpdAnnV3 [0] RootCaKeyUpdateContent cAKeyUpdAnnV3 [0] RootCaKeyUpdateContent
} }
-- With cmp2021 the use of CAKeyUpdAnnContent is deprecated , use -- With cmp2021, the use of CAKeyUpdAnnContent is deprecated, use
-- RootCaKeyUpdateContent instead. -- RootCaKeyUpdateContent instead.
CertAnnContent ::= CMPCertificate CertAnnContent ::= CMPCertificate
RevAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE { RevAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
status PKIStatus, status PKIStatus,
certId CertId, certId CertId,
willBeRevokedAt GeneralizedTime, willBeRevokedAt GeneralizedTime,
badSinceDate GeneralizedTime, badSinceDate GeneralizedTime,
crlDetails Extensions{{...}} OPTIONAL crlDetails Extensions{{...}} OPTIONAL
skipping to change at page 134, line 22 skipping to change at line 6014
} }
CRLSource ::= CHOICE { CRLSource ::= CHOICE {
dpn [0] DistributionPointName, dpn [0] DistributionPointName,
issuer [1] GeneralNames } issuer [1] GeneralNames }
CRLStatus ::= SEQUENCE { CRLStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
source CRLSource, source CRLSource,
thisUpdate Time OPTIONAL } thisUpdate Time OPTIONAL }
-- KemCiphertextInfo and KemOtherInfo were added in [RFCXXXX] -- KemCiphertextInfo and KemOtherInfo were added in [RFC9810]
KemCiphertextInfo ::= SEQUENCE { KemCiphertextInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
kem AlgorithmIdentifier{KEM-ALGORITHM, {...}}, kem AlgorithmIdentifier{KEM-ALGORITHM, {...}},
-- AlgId of the Key Encapsulation Mechanism algorithm -- AlgId of the Key Encapsulation Mechanism algorithm
ct OCTET STRING ct OCTET STRING
-- Ciphertext output from the Encapsulate function -- Ciphertext output from the Encapsulate function
} }
KemOtherInfo ::= SEQUENCE { KemOtherInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
staticString PKIFreeText, staticString PKIFreeText,
-- MUST be "CMP-KEM" -- MUST be "CMP-KEM"
transactionID OCTET STRING, transactionID OCTET STRING,
-- MUST contain the values from the message previously received -- MUST contain the values from the message previously received
-- containing the ciphertext (ct) in KemCiphertextInfo -- containing the ciphertext (ct) in KemCiphertextInfo
kemContext [0] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL kemContext [0] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
-- MAY contain additional algorithm specific context information -- MAY contain additional algorithm-specific context information
} }
INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER
InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
infoType INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE. infoType INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE.
&id({SupportedInfoSet}), &id({SupportedInfoSet}),
infoValue INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE. infoValue INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE.
&Type({SupportedInfoSet}{@infoType}) } &Type({SupportedInfoSet}{@infoType}) }
skipping to change at page 136, line 21 skipping to change at line 6109
-- UTF8String -- UTF8String
-- - id-it-certProfile added in [RFC9480] -- - id-it-certProfile added in [RFC9480]
-- id-it-crlStatusList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 22} -- id-it-crlStatusList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 22}
-- CRLStatusListValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- CRLStatusListValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- CRLStatus -- CRLStatus
-- - id-it-crlStatusList added in [RFC9480] -- - id-it-crlStatusList added in [RFC9480]
-- id-it-crls OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 23} -- id-it-crls OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 23}
-- CRLsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- CRLsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- CertificateList -- CertificateList
-- - id-it-crls added in [RFC9480] -- - id-it-crls added in [RFC9480]
-- id-it-KemCiphertextInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it TBD1} -- id-it-KemCiphertextInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 24}
-- KemCiphertextInfoValue ::= KemCiphertextInfo -- KemCiphertextInfoValue ::= KemCiphertextInfo
-- - id-it-KemCiphertextInfo was added in [RFCXXXX] -- - id-it-KemCiphertextInfo was added in [RFC9810]
-- --
-- where -- where
-- --
-- id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { -- id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
-- iso(1) identified-organization(3) -- iso(1) identified-organization(3)
-- dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)} -- dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)}
-- and -- and
-- id-it OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4} -- id-it OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4}
-- --
-- --
skipping to change at page 137, line 49 skipping to change at line 6185
-- The EKUs for the CA and RA are reused from CMC, as defined in -- The EKUs for the CA and RA are reused from CMC, as defined in
-- [RFC6402] -- [RFC6402]
-- --
-- id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 } -- id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 }
-- id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 } -- id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 }
id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 } id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 }
END END
Appendix G. History of Changes Acknowledgements
Note: This appendix will be deleted in the final version of the
document.
From version 17 -> 18:
* Deleted last paragraph of Appendix D.3 to resolve the DISCUSS from
Paul Wouters
From version 16 -> 17:
* Addressing DISCUSS from Paul Wouters by extending text of Sections
3.1.1.2, 4.4, 5.2.5, 6, and D.3.
* Updated IPSEC -> IPsec
From version 15 -> 16:
* Addressed IESG review comments from Erik Kline, Gunter Van de
Velde, Orie Steele, Zaheduzzaman Sarker, Éric Vyncke, and Paul
Wouters, except the DISCUSS issue Paul raised
From version 14 -> 15:
* Addressed SECDIR, OPSDIR, and TSVART review comments
From version 13 -> 14:
* Implemented some editorial changes throughout the document,
specifically in Sections 5.1.1, 5.1.1.3, 5.1.3.4, 5.2.2, 5.2.8.3,
5.3.18, 5.3.19.2, 5.2.22, 7, C.1, and C.4
* Aligned formatting of message flow diagrams
* Updated the page header to 'CMP'
* Removed one instruction to RFC Editors
* Fixed some nits in Section 5.2.2
* Fixed one reference to RFC 9629 in the ASN.1 Module
From version 12 -> 13:
* Updated the definition of "NULL-DN" in Section 5.1.1 and
Appendix D.1 and added a specification of how the RA/CA shall
generate the rid content to Section 5.2.8.3.3 to clarify direct
POP (see thread "CMS RecipientInfo for EnvelopedData in CMC")
* Added one minor clarification in Section 5.2.2
* Updated reference from draft-ietf-lamps-cms-kemri to RFC 9629
From version 11 -> 12:
* Adding a paragraph to Section 5.2.8.3.2 to clarify Indirect POP
(see thread "Using cms-kemri this CMP Indirect POP")
* Updated Appendix F addressing comments from Russ (see thread "WG
Last Call for draft-ietf-lamps-rfc4210bis and draft-ietf-lamps-
rfc6712bis")
* Extended the Acknowledgments section.
From version 10 -> 11:
* Updated Section 4.2.2 addressing the comment from Tomas Gustavsson
and as presented during IETF 119 (see thread "draft-ietf-lamps-
rfc4210bis-v10 Section 4.2.2 - removing normative language")
From version 09 -> 10:
* Implemented some minor editorial changes modernizing the text in
Section 3, 4, and 5.2.8 as proposed during IETF 119, without
changing normative language.
* Added to Section 4.2.2 two ToDos for further discussion, based on
the comment from Tomas Gustavsson as presented during IETF 119.
* Addressed erratum 7888
From version 08 -> 09:
* Changed reference from ITU-T X.509 to RFC 5280 (see thread " CMP
vs RFC5280").
* Deprecated CAKeyUpdAnnContent in favor of RootCaKeyUpdateContent
in CMP V3 as proposed by Tomas.
* Updated Section 4.4 incorporating RootCaKeyUpdateContent as
alternative to using a repository for providing root CA key
updates.
* Deleting an obsolete sentence in Section 8.8.
* Added IANA considerations addressing IANA early review.
From version 07 -> 08:
* Aligned with released RFC 9480 - RFC 9483
* Updated Section 1.3
* Added text on usage of transactionID with KEM-bases message
protection to Section 5.1.1
* Reverted a change to Section 5.1.3.1 from -02 and reinserting the
deleted text and adding some text explaining when a key expansion
is required.
* Consolidated the definition and transferal of KemCiphertextInfo.
Added a new Section 5.1.1.5 introducing KemCiphertextInfo in the
generalInfo filed and moving text on how to request a KEM
ciphertext using genm/genp from Section 5.1.3.4 to
Section 5.3.19.18
* Some editorial changes to Section 5.1.3.4 and Appendix E after
discussion with David resolving #30 and discussing at IETF 117.
Also introducing optional field kemContext to KemBasedMac and
KemOtherInfo as CMP-specific alternative to ukm in cms-kemri.
* Added ToDo for reviewing the reduced content of KemOtherInfo to
Section 5.1.3.4
* Added a cross-reference to Section 5.1.1.3 regarding use of
OrigPKIMessage to Section 5.1.3.5
* Added POP for KEM keys to Section 5.2.8. Restructured the section
and fixed some references which broke from RFC2510 to RFC4210.
Introduced a section on the usage of raVerified.
* Fixed the issue in Section 5.3.19.15, resulting from a change made
in draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-14, that no plain public-key can
be used in the request message in CMPCertificate.
* Updated Appendix B regarding KEM-based message protection and
usage of CMS EnvelopedData
From version 06 -> 07:
* Updated section 5.1.1.4 addressing a question from Liao Lijun on
how to interpret less profile names than certReqMsgs
* Updated section 5.1.3.4 specifying establishing a shares secret
key for one arbitrary side of the CMP communication only
* Removed the note and the security consideration regarding combiner
function for HPKE
* Added security considerations 8.1 and 8.8
* Updates IANA Considerations in section 9 to add new OID for the
updates ASN.1 module and for id-it-KemCiphertextInfo
* Added new appendix E showing different variants of using KEM keys
for PKI message protection
* Updates ASN.1 module in appendix F
From version 05 -> 06:
* Updated section 5.1.3.4 exchanging HPKE with plain KEM+KDF as also
used in draft-ietf-lamps-cms-kemri
From version 04 -> 05:
* Updated sections 5.1.3.4, 5.2.2, and 8.9 addressing comments from
Russ (see thread "I-D Action: draft-ietf-lamps-rfc4210bis-04.txt")
From version 03 -> 04:
* Added Section 4.3.4 regarding POP for KEM keys
* Added Section 5.1.3.4 on message protection using KEM keys and
HPKE
* Aligned Section 5.2.2 on guidance which CMS key management
technique to use with encrypted values (see thread "CMS: selection
of key management technique to use for EnvelopedData") also adding
support for KEM keys
* Added Section 8.9 and extended Section 3.1.2 regarding use of
Certificate Transparency logs
* Deleted former Appendix C as announced in the -03
* Fixed some nits resulting from XML -> MD conversion
From version 02 -> 03:
* Updated Section 4.4.1 clarifying the definition of "new with new"
certificate validity period (see thread "RFC4210bis - notAfter
time of newWithNew certificate")
* Added ToDo to Section 4.3 and 5.2.8 on required alignment
regarding POP for KEM keys.
* Updated Sections 5.2.1, 5.2.8, and 5.2.8.1 incorporating text of
former Appendix C (see thread "draft-ietf-lamps-rfc4210bis - ToDo
on review of Appendix C")
* Added a ToDo to Appendix B to indicate additional review need to
try pushing the content to Sections 4 and Section 5
From version 01 -> 02:
* Added Section 3.1.1.4 introducing the Key Generation Authority
* Added Section 5.1.1.3 containing description of origPKIMessage
content moved here from Section 5.1.3.4
* Added ToDos on defining POP and message protection using KEM keys
* Added a ToDo to Section 4.4.3
* Added a ToDo to Appendix C to do a more detailed review
* Removed concrete algorithms and referred to CMP Algorithms instead
* Added references to Appendix D and E as well as the Lightweight
CMP Profile for further information
* Broaden the scope from human users also to devices and services
* Addressed idnits feedback, specifically changing from historic
LDAP V2 to LDAP V3 (RFC4511)
* Did some further editorial alignment to the XML
From version 00 -> 01:
* Performed all updates specified in CMP Updates Section 2 and
Appendix A.2.
* Did some editorial alignment to the XML
Version 00:
This version consists of the text of RFC4210 with the following
changes:
* Introduced the authors of this document and thanked the authors of The authors of this document wish to thank Carlisle Adams, Stephen
RFC4210 for their work. Farrell, Tomi Kause, and Tero Mononen, the original authors of
[RFC4210], for their work.
* Added a paragraph to the introduction explaining the background of We also thank all reviewers of this document for their valuable
this document. feedback.
* Added the change history to this appendix. Adding KEM support to this document was partly funded by the German
Federal Ministry of Education and Research in the project Quoryptan
through grant number 16KIS2033.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Hendrik Brockhaus Hendrik Brockhaus
Siemens Siemens
Werner-von-Siemens-Strasse 1 Werner-von-Siemens-Strasse 1
80333 Munich 80333 Munich
Germany Germany
Email: hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com Email: hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com
URI: https://www.siemens.com URI: https://www.siemens.com
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